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SYNOPSIS
The present study is concerned with the problems of
race relations in Peninsular Malaysia, with special reference
to the Chinese community. My main thesis is that
Chinese institutions and organizations, together with their
values, economic and political activities tend to make
interaction and integration difficult in the conflict-prone
Malaysian plural society. However, despite the tremendous
amount of dissensus and conflict, the society has managed to
survive through the fact that the various component segments
are bound together not only by political institutions, but
also by their being involved in the same economic
institutions.
The study beg',s with an Introduction, which examines
the main structural features of the Malayan society during the
colonial period to 3erve as a background for discussion.
Chapter 1 deals with the overall stratification and
structure of the Chinese community. Particular attention is
paid to Chinese guilds and associations which tend to
perpetuate social distinctions between Chinese and Malays.
Chapter 2 attempts to examine Chinese role in Malaysian
economy.
	
It tries to show the relative position of the
iii
Chinese in Malaysian economy and concludes that the Chinese
are far from controlling Malaysian economy as has been alleged.
Chapters 3 and 4 trace Chinese politics in pre-war and
post-war Malaysia. Three main currents of influence on the
Chinese during the pre-war period - Chinese secret societies,
The Kuomintang and the Malayan Communist Party - are examined.
For the post-war period, an attempt is made to examine Chinese
participation in party politics as well as their relatively
subordinate position in the Alliance Party.
Chapter 5 examines Chinese education in Malaysia.
Attention is focused on the various governmental efforts to
devise a national education policy and its implications for
Chinese education. The political significance of the
education issue is also examined.
Chapter 6 endeavours to analyse race relations in
Malaysia, focusing on the sources of conflj o - : between Chinese
and Malays. A brief account of the 1969 iial riots is also
provided.
Chapter 7 deals with the problems of national unity.
	 It
is argued that the Malaysian plural society is held together by
political as well as economic institutions.
	
Some deliberate
attempts to foster unity are also examined.
Chapter 8 attempts to examine some theoretical framework.
It focuses on two major problems, namely the inadequacy of
some Western theoretical models and the theory of the plural
society and its relevance in Malaysia.
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INTRODUCTION
THE STRUCTURE OF THE MALAYAN SOCIETY
DURING THE COLONIAL ERA
The plural society in Malaysia* is largely the legacy
of British colonialism. 	 In order to understand the structure
of this society in general, it is necessary to look at two
very important components of colonialism, namely, the
political domination by the colonizing power and its
economic exploitation and control.
Political Domination
To begin with, we should look briefly at the indigenous
political system of Malaya. 	 Traditionally, the largest
political unit of the Malays was the State (Negri) headed
by a Sultan drawn from a royal patrilineage. The states
were organized around river valleys and river mouths as
rivers afforded the main lines or communication and trade.
Under each state there were a number of districts (daerah)
under the control of local chiefs, who were either drawn
from the aristocratic lineages or had connections with the
royal lineage.	 Together these district chiefly families
formed a ruling class of the whole state.
* Malaysia consists of Peninsular Malaysia (the eleven
states of the Malay Peninsula, known as Malaya before
1963 and West Malaysia between 1963 - 1974) and the
Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak.	 For the purpose
of this study, Malaysia, West Malaysia and Malaya are
used interchangeably to refer to Peninsular Malaysia only.
The districts were organized into smaller political
units known as the kampung (village) headed by a penghulu
(headman) who functioned as the bridge and channel of
communication between his villagers and the district chief.
The village was a unit of common residence, and to a lesser
extent of kinship and economic cooperation.
The whole social structure was marked by two classes -
the ruling class and the subject class.
	
The distinction
between the two classes was based on birth and was clearly
marked by custom and belief. Intermarriage was disapproved
and social mobility rare. The ruling class had absolute
authority over the subjects. The chief had the privilege
of exacting corvee (kerah) as well as of taking a substantial
share from the economic surplus accumulated by his subject:-
who were largely subsistence agriculturalists, mainly rice
growers and fishermen.
Among the ruling classes in different states there
was little contact.
	
Intermarriage across state frontiers
was also rare. The rulers, however, recognized each
other's status as equal to their own. 1
Over this traditional Malay political system was laid
the British colonial bureaucracy at the end of the nine-
teenth century. Before the British began to extend its
power into the Malay states, their influence had already
been established on the islands of Penang and Singapore and
in the state of Malacca.
1. The above section on the indigenous political system
of Malaya draws largely on the work of J.M. Gullick(1958).
3It began in 1786, when Francis Light hoisted the British
flag in Penang, an island off the west coast of the Malay
Peninsula.
	
Thirty-three years later, in 1819, Singapore was
acquired by Stamford Raffles. Malacca came into the
possession of Britain in 1824.
	
These three settlements
formed the Straits Settlements in 1826, and were placed
under the control of the Indian Government until 1867 when
they were transferred to the Colonial Office to become a
Crown Colony of Great Britain.
The Treaty of Pangkor of 1874 between the British and
the state of Perak marked the begir=iag of British inter-
vention in the Malay states. ThP .-:-eaty stipulated that
the Sultan was to accept a British Rasident 'whose advice
must be asked and acted on all quesi7 i ons other than those
touching Malay religion and custom'. 	 This system, later
came to be known as the Residential System, had extended to
Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang by 1895 and in that
year the four states were merged to form the Federated Malay
States (FMS) under a British Resident-General.
	 In 1914,
Johore combined with the north-western and eastern states of
Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu (these four states
were ceded to British protection from Thai suzerainty) to
form the Unfederated Malay States (UMS). Thus, by the
second decade of the present century, the pattern of British
rule was established.
	
There were, altogether, three
political groupings - the Straits Settlements, the FMS and
the UMS. The Straits Settlements were ruled directly by the
4British colonial office through the Governor. The FMS and
UMS were governed through the Residential System which was
in essence a form of indirect rule.	 These three groupings
were to remain until the Japanese Occupation in 1942.	 The
war brought great changes in Malaya. After the war, in
1948, the FMS, UMS and the Straits Settlements, with the
exception of Singapore (which constituted a separate Crown
Colony), combined to form the Federation of Malaya which
later achieved its independence in 1957.
The political institution created in Malaya by Great
Britain was therefore a combination L. f direct and indirect
rule. Both under the Residential --stem and under the
Federation of Malaya scheme, the indigenous sultanate in
the Malay states was kept intact and the native rulers and
local chieftains were absorbed into the administrative
machinery. It was indirect rule in name, but in actual
fact real political power was at all times exercised by the
British who occupied the higher echelons of the administration,
and the native rulers, with little effective control, merely
functioned as political puppets of the administration
(Emerson, 1964:123).
There was, in colonial Malaya - this was particularly
true in the prewar period - almost a complete absence of
representative elective institutions. There was no
franchise. The Federal Council of the FMS was dominated by
an official majority composed exclusively of British officers.
So was the Legislative 'Council of the Straits Settlements.
5Furthermore, all but a few of the unofficial members of both
the Federal and Legislative Councils were appointed by the
Governor who was also the High Commissioner of the Malay
states (Emerson, 1964: 180 & 277). 	 Under the Federation
Scheme of 1948, the situation did not change very much.
Although a Federal Legislative Council was established, its
membership was nominated rather than popularly elected, and
its function was of the nature of advisory since the High
Commissioner alone could veto a bill and had the power to
give effect to any bill which the Legislative Council failed
to pass
	 1958:39).
From , kte beginning, British policy was biased in favour
of the Malays. 	 While other immigrant communities were
excluded from positions of administrative or political
authority, the Malay traditional elite, the aristocracy, was
given opportunities to participate in the government.
	
In
order to create a Malay administrative elite to aid the
colonial regime, the latter established in 1905 the Kuala
Kangsar Malay College to provide special educational facilities
for the sons of Malay rulers and chiefs (Roff, 1967:101).
The graduates of the college were absorbed into the Malay
Administrative Service, a junior branch of the Malayan Civil
Service which was largely staffed by Europeans.
One important reason for the exclusion of Chinese and
Indians from political and administrative authority by the
colonial regime was probably the British recognition of their
obligation to look after the special interests of the Malay
ruling class.
	
Secondly, the non-Malay communities2 in pre-
war Malaya were manifestly transient and were persistently
regarded by the British as being so even though by 1931
there were tendencies toward permanent settlement. 	 The
British also held the popular stereotypes that the Chinese
and to a lesser extent Indians were "unassimilable",
uninterested in government affairs, and whose main concern
was making money. No efforts were thus made to integrate
them politically with the Malay community.
	
Finally, the
British increasingly saw their role as the arbi:,...ator and
adjudicator among the various communities in th,,, plural
society. This they could only achieve by maintoining the
distinctions and divisions between the various ^-mmunities
(Roff, 1967:110-111).
The political structure developed in Malaya as a result
of British indirect rule was typical of other colonial
situations. The essence was one of paternalism.
Effective political authority was rested with the British.
The native Malay rulers and aristocratic class were given
opportunities to participate in the administration and govern-
ment of the country, but they occupied mainly subordinate
positions with little effective control. The immigrant
communities - the Chinese and Indians - were large1y excluded
2. The term "communities" was the common British colonial
usage to refer to ethnic groups. 	 In order to follow
local practice, the terms communities, ethnic groups
and racial groups are interchangeable in this thesis.
7from effective participation in the government and the
civil service. With independence and the withdrawal of
colonial power, the political authority formerly held by
the British was transferred to the Malays who regarded
themselves as they still do as the 'sons of the soil'.
This situation of Malay predominance in the political field,
vis-a-vis other Asian communities, as we shall see later,
still persists today.
Economic Domination
Equally significant as political domination was the
economic exploitation of the British. The two primary forms
of British colonial ece---Imic exploitation in Malaya were
the establishments of tin mines and plantation agriculture
(rubber). The expansion of 	 and rubber industries
created a great demand for labour. Because of their
tradition-bound subsistence economy, the Malays could not
be attracted to these newly created economies. The answer
had to be found elsewhere. China and India readily provided
unlimited supplies of mobile labour who as people from
economically or commercially more advanced areas, were more
familiar to money economy than the native Malays. Moreover,
the cost of importing and employing Asian labour was lower
than that of using European expatriates (Hunter, 1966:61).
The result was the importation of large numbers of Chinese
and Indian immigrants into the tin and rubber zones of the
west coast of Malaya.
This large-scale Chinese and Indian immigration
stimulated by British colonialism has had far reaching
results.
	
It was largely responsible for the creation of a
plural society in Malaya, and with it the danger of racial
conflict.3
Chinese and Indian immigrants were brought to Malaya
through different recruiting systems.	 In the case of
Chinese immigrants, broadly speaking, there were two
categories based on the degree of freedom they possessed.
The first category included those who had sufficient means
to make their voyage from their homeland to Malaya. These
immigrants had no obligations whatever to anyone on arrival
in Malaya, and could move freely and look for whatever
employment they were competent. However, the demand for
labour in tin mines and rubber estates was so great that
these free immigrants were insufficient to meet the need.
Under such circumstances, a category of relatively lun-freei
immigrants emerged through the much-abused credit-ticket
system and later through the system of private recruitment.
Both of these systems were a form of indenture whereby the
coolies had to work for their employers for a period of time
until the cost of their passage together with other expenses
had been paid off. 4
3. Although it could be argued that racial problems are
not a direct product of British colonisation in Malaya
as in Africa on the ground that Chinese immigration
preceded the arrival of Europeans, the colonial powers
must bear responsibility for making the problems more
serious and complex by the influx of immigrants whom
they encouraged. 	 See Hunter (1966:60).
4. For a treatment of Chinese labour in Malaya, see
W.L. Blythe (1947:64-114).
9The immigration of Indians was largely stimulated by
the development of rubber industry. They were recruited
under the indenture system and after its abolition in 1910,
through the Kangany system. Under the system, a kangany
(who was himself an immigrant working on the estate as a
foreman or simply as an elderly labourer of some social
standing or influence) was sent by the employer to return
to his village in India to recruit labourers for which he
usually obtained a commission. Parmer has described the
system in a succinct manner:
The Kangany system was more than a means
of recruitment.	 It was also a method of
employment on the estates, fl_d the Indian
critics disliked the vaxyLm 6 degrees of
control which the kangany exercised over
the labourers whom he recrl:'ted.	 Control
was exercised in various ways and was often
a compound of family ties, personality,
friendship and admiration for the kangany's
worldly wisdom. The kangany sometimes
displayed genuine leadership. He would
listen to labourers' grievances, arbitrate
their disputes and intercede on the
labourers' behalf with the estate staff
and the manager.	 Some employers hired
Indian labourers by kangany gangs so that
membership in a gang tencled to be a form
of job insurance.	 But the chief element
of control in very many cases appears to
have been the indebtedness of the labourer
to the kangany„ who was often a money-lender
- an easy source of small loans. The
kangany's hold over the labourers was
supported by many managers who looked to the
kangany to help reinforce estate discipline
and administer the labour force. For such
services the kangany was paid 'head money',
usually two cents daily for every labourer
who appeared for work (Parmer, 1960:68-69).
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Despite their difference in forms, both the Chinese
system of recruitment and the kangany system had much the
same effect, in that the labourer was either indentured
or obliged to repay to his employer the expenses incurred
in his transportation to Malaya. This means that the
majority of them were already in debt on arrival in Malaya.
They had no choice but to work for their creditors.
	
In
terms of indebtedness, the situation of these Chinese and
Indian coolies was similar to that of the Indians in the
Spanish colonies under the system of debt-peonage system.
The differel•ce was that under the debt-peonage system the
labourer Ip came indebted not through expenses incurred in
his transportation as was the case of the Chinese or Indian
labourer, but through being granted a piece of land or an
advance of wages (Rex, 1970a:40).
Chinese and Indian labour in Malaya was organized on
different lines.	 Chinese labour, whether on tin mines
or on estates, was rarely employed directly by the employer
but rather by a multiplicity of contractors and sub-
contractors.	 In the case of tin mine labourers, they were
often housed in a kongsi (lodging house) and provided with
food and occasionally small loans. Through what came to
be known as the Truck System, the labourers were paid in
goods instead of money or in money on the understanding
that they would buy provisions from their employers. The
labourers were often exploited by being charged high prices
11
for provisions or goods. This would make them remain
heavily in debt and consequently work in the mines for years
(Blythe, 1947:104-6).	 In the case of Chinese estate
labourers, they usually lived in nearby villages and rarely
lived on the estates where they worked. This situation
was in sharp contrast with Indian labourers, the majority
of whom being employed and paid directly by the estate
employers.	 And in almost all cases they lived on the
estates.
The Malays were hardly involved in tin mining and those
who were engaged in rubber estates were generally employed
on a casual basis.	 Like the Chinese, they 1 417-:-4 in their
respective Malay villages.
Thus different methods were employed in th organization
of labour force, based primarily on racial criteria. 	 Instead
of having a unitary labour force consisting of different
racial groups, there emerged in the estates three different
types of labour force: the Indian, Chinese and Malay labour
force. Each was dealt with separately, paid differently and
provided with different working and living conditions (Silcock,
1965:186-7).	 This tended to encourage residential segregation
and separation of the different communities.
Through the influx of Chinese and Indian labour, the
British colonial regime was able to create in Malaya an
export-oriented economy based on the production of rubber
and tin. Because of their technological and organizational
advantage provided by the British administration in obtaining
land for tin mining (Ness, 1967:32-33), the Europeans
dominated many important sectors of the economy, notably in
1 2
large-scale mining, rubber industries and import and export
trade. The immigrant communities, particularly the Chinese,
controlled a preponderant part of the medium-scale units of
production and business organisations, and because of their
involvement in the ancillaryoccugetions of the export-oriented
economy, were able to gain a foothold on the commercial ladder
as small-scale traders and middlemen.
	
The majority of the
Indians were employed on the rubber plantations. The Malay
community was largely undisturbed by the economic development.
British policy towards them was one of paternalism and
protectionism.
	
The 11lay traditional elite, as mentioned
earlier, was as far as ^ossible absorbed into the administra-
tion while the Malay peasants were largely kept on their
land with a subsistence economy through the Malay Land
Reservation Laws which effectively assured Malay ownership
of land.
The occupational specialization of the different ethnic
groups was best reflected by the 1947 census report (del
Tufo, 1949). Nearly three-quarters of the total Malay male
working population was engaged in agriculture (mainly rice
cultivation and rubber cultivation) and fishing. Of the
Chinese male working population, more than one-half was
engaged in mining, manufacture, transport and commerce.
Only one-third of it was involved in agriculture, mainly
rubber cultivation. Over 40% of Indians were engaged in
agriculture (mainly estate labourers) while a substantial
proportion of them was employed in public administration,
public transportation (especially in the railways) and
commerce (del Tufo, 1949:106).
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To the extent that the Malay peasants still clung to
their land and traditional subsistence economy and remained
outside the new and emergent market-oriented economy, they
could be regarded as a kind of 'external proletariat' (Rex,
1970a: 35 & 52).
A form of dualist economy thus developed out of the
colonial situation. 	 This is meant not in the sense as
Boeke (1953) uses the term, meaning the co-existence of a
capitalist and a pre-capitalist economy.	 Rather 9 the term
implies the co-existence of two different orientations and
foci of activity within the same economy (Ness, 1967:28-30).
On the one hand there was the modern colonial sector
concentrating on trade, tin and rubber production. Largely
controlled by the British and other European firms, with the
Chinese and Indians playing a subsidiary role, this modern
sector was concentrated on the west coast and the Straits
Settlements.	 On the other hand there was the traditional
or the peasant sector. This sector was dominated by the
Malays and concentrated in the relatively less developed
states of the east coast and the north. Their main activities
were rice cultivation, fishing and small-holder rubber planting.
In such a colonial society based on a dualist economy,
where the social order consisted of Europeans, natives and
Asian immigrants, social and economic stratification often
involved racial criterion resulting in the European occupying
the top of the social and economic hierarchy, the natives at
14.
the bottom and the immigrants in the middle (Kennedy,
1945:310).	 In so far as the position of the Europeans and
the Malays was concerned, colonial Malaya fitted neatly into
this picture.	 This stratification scheme, however, did not
apply entirely to the Chinese and the Indians. Undoubtedly,
there were Chinese and Indian middle-classes. 	 But there
were also large numbers of Chinese labourers and Indian
estate workers whose social and economic position was no
better than the Malay peasants and who had little chance to
rise in the economic scale (Djojohadikusumo, 1968:14).
The resultant social hierarchy 7- , 4.th the white man at the
top was not without significance.
	
.ae presence of the
colonial power with its firm authority had the effect of
quietening the anxieties and the aggressiveness of the
conflicting groups and of preventing racial feelings from
running high.
	 As Hunter (1966:66) has aptly put it:
The very existence of such an upper class,
towards which so many faces were turned
for favour or protection or, indeed, in
admiration, overlaid in some degree the
violence of feeling between different
subordinate groups; they saw each other
not quite full-face but in relation to a
third.
The central institutions of western enterprises in
Malaya were the merchant and managing-agency firms,
commonly known as the agency houses. They were distinguished
by a variety of functions and a wide range of interest.
Although they differed from one another in their actual
scope, many of these agency houses specialized in imports
and exports, as selling and purchasing agents for foreign
15
manufacturers; as managing agents for rubber estates and
as agents for shipping lines and insurance companies (Allen
& Donnithorne, 1954:52-53).
The agency houses had a particularly dominant position
in the country's economic mainstay - the rubber industry.
They controlled as many as 75% of the total rubber plantations,
through either their large share interest or their executive
authority over the affairs of the companies. Their dominant
position was further strengthened by an interlocking of
directorships of the various rubber companies they managed.5
It is not	 exaggeration, therefore, to say that the agency
houses wer-: 1 a key factor in the organization of the rubber
industry'.
	
As Kathleen Stahl (1951:117) has noted, the
status of these agency houses
derived from the fact that they were large and
old established merchant houses, that they
were the pioneers of rubber planting and
floated and subsequently managed, both in
London and through their local branches in
Malaya, a large number of companies
representing a considerable section of the
industry, and that the heads of these agency
houses took a leading part in shaping the
policy of the industry through the Rubber
Growers' Association.
In tin mining industry, however, the agency houses were
less important. With the exception of a few, there was
very little overlapping investment between the tin and
rubber industry (Puthucheary, 1960:54).	 Still, British
capital has dominated the industry since the introduction of
5. For an example of the interlocking pattern of
directorships see Puthucheary (1960:88).
16
dredges in the first two decades of the twentieth century.6
Like the agency houses in rubber industry, many European
mining companies were linked by interlocking directorships.
More importantly,tti smelting - an important activity in
the tin industry - was monopolised by two British companies,
the Straits Trading Company and the Consolidated Tin
Smelters.	 These smelting companies exercised a measure
of control over the Chinese miners who depended on them for
tin processing and in some cases for credit (Puthucheary,
1960:95).
Considering the fact that about three-quarters of
rubber estates were controlled by the agency kwuss, there
is little doubt that they had a commanding positi-n in the
rubber industry.
	
Commerce was the next importe-Lt activity
of the agency houses.
	
It was estimated that the agency
houses together with other European-owned firms controlled
about two-thirds of the import and export trade in the
1950's (Puthucheary, 1960: Chapter 3).
All this points to the fact that Malaya's economy was
largely controlled by the Europeans, mainly British. The
new economy created by the colonial regime was decisively
commercial and export-oriented. The agricultural and
6. In 1938, about 70% of the total issued capital of
registered mining companies represented British capital
investment.	 In 1941, the number of British tin mining
companies operating in Malaya was over seventy. See
Stahl (1951:113-4)
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mineral products were exported to Britain and other
western markets for industrial use.
	
Little industrial
development was encouraged in the country. There was
for example, very limited development in the manufacturing
sector based upon factory production, a situation typical
of colonial societies. 	 In terms of direction and owner-
ship of the tin and rubber industries, or in the import and
export trade, the share of the natives was insignificant.
While western enterprise was instrumental in developing
the economy of Malaya, the economic structure and develop-
ment of Malaya cannot be described solely in terms of western
enterprise without makiriP reference to the Asian communities.
Indian labour had a significant contribution to the plantation
industry. The rubber small-holdings which constituted
nearly half the total rubber acreage, were almost exclusively
owned by the Asian communities (The 1953 Rubber Statistics
Handbook shows that of a total of 1,369,000 acres under
small-holdings, 47.3% were owned by the Malays, 40.1% by
Chinese and 8.7% by Indians). Tin mining was pioneered by
the Chinese.
	
Small-scale trading and retailing was also
largely in the hands of the Chinese, with Indians constituting
a small proportion.	 In addition, almost all the intermediary
role between the producer and the exporter, and between
the consumer and the importer, was performed by the Chinese
(Puthucheary, 1960:64).	 In this respect they constituted
an important link in the European dominated import-export
chain. Perhaps it was, for the above trader-cum-middleman
capacity that the Chinese were sometimes given the cognomen
of the "Jews of the East".
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Thus far we have touched on the central theme of
colonialism - political and economic domination. 	 We can
now proceed to look at the overall struct pre of the plural
society.
The Growth of a Plural Society
As mentioned earlier, British policy of encouraging
the large-scale immigration of the Chinese and Indians to
meet the great labour demand resulted in the growth of a
plural society in Malaya. 	 Indeed, by 1911 a plural society
had come into being.	 In that year of the total population
of 2,339,000 the Malays constituted 58.6%, the Chinese
29.6% and the Indians 10.2%. Thereafter the percentage
of Malays fell and that of the non-Malays rose as a result
of more immigration, so that by 1947, the Malays accounted
for only 49.5% of a total of 4,908,000, as against 38.4%
Chinese and 10.8% Indians.	 Table 1.1 shows the racial
composition of Malaya, 1911 to 1970.	 This table, however,
fails to show the country's actual demographic structure
because it ignores completely the diversity of racial
composition existing between different regions. Two
points can be said about the residential segregation of the
various ethnic groups.
	
First, as can be seen in Table 1.2
the east coast and the north-west 'rice-bowl' regions were
and still are predominantly Malay while the non-Malays were
19
concentrated on the west coast tin and rubber states of
Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Johore and
Malacca.	 Second, the non-Malays, in particular the
Chinese, were concentrated in urban areas while the
Malays were mainly rural. Table I .3 shows the racial
composition of urban population, 1931-1957.
The urban-rural patterns by ethnic groups are more
evident if we look at the proportion of urban to total
population by each group. The Chinese proportion of the
population living in towns in 1947 was 31.1% as against
7.3% Malays and 25,8% Indians.	 7.1,- -Isorresponding figures
3%.1for 1957 were 44.7%, 1	 and 30.6:- and for 1970,
47.01/0, 14.8% and 34.4% respectively.7
7.	 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia,
Community Groups, p.33, Table XVI.
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This concentration of different ethnic groups in
different regions seems to have important implications
for race relations.
	
To some extent this type of physical
segregation quite effectively restricts contact between
the various ethnic groups.	 In addition, communal
jealousies are also generated by the fact that the west
coast where non-Malay concentration is found is far more
developed and enjoys a higher standard of living than the
predominantly Malay east coast and the north.
Apart from political and economic domination by the
British which we have earlier discussed, three other
characteristics of colonialism present in colonial Malaya
deserve a brief mention in our discussion of the plural
society.
	 First, there was the colour line which acted
as a social barrier dividing the white population on the
one hand from the native and immigrant population on the
other.
	 In common with other colonial situations, the
colour line in Malaya was horizontal, the whites at the
top while the yellow and the brown at the bottom. This
colour line, as long as the whites held the reins of political
power, would tilt but would never disappear - a situation
not dissimilar to that described by Warner (1936:234-7)
in the United States in connection with the relations
between the white American and the Negro American. Warner's
theory of colour-caste, however, as shall be shown later,
fails to explain relations among the non-white populations,
especially those between Malays and Chinese.
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Secondly, there was the lack of social contact not only
between the ruling white on the one hand aad the colonial
peoples on the other, but also between the natives and the
immigrants. The ruling whites had their own exclusive
recreational clubs, friendship circles, residential areas
and other distinct social institutions.	 So had the
natives, the Chinese and the Indian immigrants. 	 Cultural
and social separation between the various segments of the
society was rather pronounced. Partly because of colour
prejudice and partly because of diff;--.7ences of religion 8
and custom, intermarriage between tL whites and the colonial
peoples (and between the colonial peoples themselves) was
rare.
	
Consequently, the proportion of half-castes to the
total population was insignificant in comparison with such
mixed populations as the mullatos in Brazil, the Mestizos
in Mexico or the Cape Coloureds in South Africa. Neverthe-
less, these half-castes, the Eurasians and the babas, though
insignificant in terms of numbers, played some important
role in Malaysian economy and politics.
Thirdly, colonial territories usually exhibited a low
stage of development in the social services. 	 In this
respect, Malaya was luckier than many other colonial
territories in that it received a far better deal.	 Public
8. The Malays are exclusively Muslims. The Chinese are
eclectic in their beliefs, practising a mixture of
Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. There is also a
small proportion of Chinese Christians. The Indians
are mainly Hindus, with a small minority of Muslims
and Christians.
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amenities, especially those related to the expansion of
rubber and tin industries, were fairly well developed.
But on education, very little was spent.
	
This was
probably aimed at keeping education for the natives down
to a minimum.	 Popular education would undoubtedly
produce an enlightened mass which would eventually
threaten and undermine the whole structure of the colonial
regime, that of political and economic superordination and
subordination (Kennedy, 1945:311).
It is interesting to note at this juncture that, to a
considerab.7- extent, what Raymond Kennedy called the 'universal
traits of 9 : ,, Ionialism l were all exhibited in colonial Malaya
(Kennedy, 1945:306-346).	 These traits were the political
domination of the coloniser, its economic exploitation, the
presence of a colour line, the lack of social contact between
the ruler and the ruled and finally a low stage of development
in social services: all of which have been discussed in the
preceding sections.
In order to ensure the separation of different ethnic
groups, four major school systems were maintained or tolerated
by the colonial regime. Malay education was strongly
supported by the government, providing primary education
mainly for the rural Malays. These Malay vernacular schools
had strong religious overtones and did little to prepare
Malay children for life in the modernizing society that was
being created.
	 Chinese education and schools were largely
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left to their own devices. These schools used Mandarin
as the medium of instruction and their curricula were strongly
oriented toward mainland China, their main source of textbooks
and teachers. Indian education was in the main privided
on the estates by respective estate owners, providing
primary education only. The main medium of instruction
was Tamil, with some schools teaching Telugu or Punjabi.
These schools, like the Chinese schools, were oriented toward
their homeland - India.	 Finally, English education was
provided by the government or the Christian missions.
Although these schools provided a common curricull .m to
children of all ethnic groups, they were strongl y oriented
toward England, from where they obtained their textbooks.
Thus, in colonial Malaya, the institution of education
functioned more to preserve the separate cultural identity of
the various communities, rather than to create a united nation
with a common identity. Education was essentially a divisive
force, tending to support and reinforce the plural character
of the society. No genuine effort was made by the colonial
regime to build a unified national education system (Ness,
1967:42-45).	 Some observers have even argued ti-at the
plural educational system was a device to divide and rule
(Tregonning, 1962:420-8).
The separation of the different communities was further
reinforced by a factor arising out of political and military
necessity - the Emergency. The Emergency was declared in
1948 to combat the communist insurrection and lasted for
27
twelve years. The communists were predominantly Chinese.
Their supporters too, were primarily Chinese living on
jungle fringes and rural areas. The government of the day
realized that there was a relationship between the insurrection
and material support and information supply afforded by the
Chinese squatters.	 This realization and the desire to
defeat the communists prompted the implementation by the
government of the Briggs Plan of 1950, under which half a
million or a quarter of the total Chinese population were
resettled in nucleated 'New Villages' (Dobby, 1952 & Sandhu,
1973).	 Altogether morP than 500 such 'new villages' were
created. The Briggs Fn had far reaching effects on race
relations.	 It institutionalized the separation of the
various communities and hardened communal divisions. The
Chinese were bitter at the forcible nature of their
transplantation and the consequent interruption of their
rural economic activities such as market-gardening, pig-
rearing and rubber tapping (Purcell, 1954:78-79).	 The
Malays, on their part, resented the government's effort to
provide amenities to the Chinese 'new villages such as
electricity and water which they themselves lacked (Purcell,
1954:167).
From the foregoing we can discern several important
component elements in colonial Malaya. The first important
group was the colonial administrators and European capitalist
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entrepreneurs. The second group was the natives - the
Malays. Then there was the immigrant group, mainly the
Chinese and Indians. As we have already noted, all these
groups had different functions and the division of labour
was mainly along racial lines.
	
In sharp contrast with
such colonial society as South Africa, tropical Malaya did
not attract white settlers in significant numbers and its
mixed population as a result of miscegenation was
insignificant in numbers.
However, apart from the elements mentioned above, the
role of the missionaries needs to be mentioned briefly.
Christian missionaries played an important role in educatin;
the colonial peoples through the establishment of mission
schools.	 Among the various communities, the Chinese and
Indians were more affected by such missionary activities
than the Muslim Malays, since the government prohibited
Christian missions from proselytising the Muslims.
	
However,
the outcome of a missionary-sponsored English education in
each community was the same: just as missionisation divided
the African population in many parts of South Africa into
the 'school people s and the 'red people s (Mayer, 1971), so
in Malaya it produced in each community a group of English-
educated people as distinguished from the non-English educated,
thus creating divisions within each community. This
situation was particularly 'larked in the Chinese community
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where the English-educated, the 'British colonial Chinese'
as Wolfgang Franke (1968:120) has called them, had the
tendency of looking down with contempt upon their Chinese-
educated countrymen.
With the exception of a small number who were able to
penetrate to the basic values of the western culture, the
majority of these English-educated Chinese had been uprooted
and deculturised and became culturally and spiritually adrift:
on the one hand, their English education was superficial and,
on the other hand they knew practica3ly nothing about
Chinese humanistic tradition.	 In tin ts respect of decultur-
ation there was some affinity between the position of these
'British colonial Chinese' and that t,f the Amerindian in
Brazil (Freyre, 1964:141-3 and Rex, 1970a:79). 	 In both
cases the result was the creation of a group of people
without any identity who were more easily available for
exploitation.
This, then, was the situation in colonial Malaya.
Through the conquest and subsequent indirect rule of the
British, the natives and the immigrants alike were rendered
politically ineffective, if not completely impotent. 	 The
policy of encouraging large numbers of immigrant coolies
into Malaya not only made possible the economic exploitation
of natural resources, particularly rubber and tin by
western enterprise, but more importantly, it led to the
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growth of a plural society in which each community lived
separately. The nature of this society fitted well into
Furnivall i s (1948:304-5) description of the plural
societies in Burma and Indonesia:
In Burma, as in Java, probably the
first thing that strikes the visitor
is the medley of peoples - European,
Chinese, Indian and native. It is in
the strictest sense a medley, for
they mix but do not combine. 	 Each
group holds by its own religion, its
own culture and language, its own
ideas and ways. As individuals they
meet, but only in the market-place, in
buying and selling. There is a
plural society, with different sections
of the community living side by side,
but separately, within the same
political unit. Even in the
economic sphere there is a division
of labour along racial lines. Natives,
Chinese, Indians and Europeans all
have different functions, and within
each major group subsections have
particular occupations.
It is hoped that the above discussion of the colonial
social structure in Malaya is adequate to bring out some
salient features about the basic structure of colonial
Malaya. These were, first of all, the separation of the
various communities with little social contact; secondly,
the differing positions of the various communities in terms
of political and economic power, with the British dominating
both spheres; thirdly, separate educational systems which
produced students with different outlook and orientations;
and finally, the submergence of inter-communal conflict due
largely to the presence of the colonial power as an
arbitrator. All these were directly or indirectly the
outcome of colonial policy.
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This type of plural social structure was quite unique
in several aspects. It did not consist of hierarchically
arranged castes like the traditional Hindu society. There
were no classes in conflict in the real Marxist sense.
Neither was there a system of hierarchical roles and
statuses based on a value consensus as the stratification
theorists seem to imply.
	 Rather, it consisted of segments
which were divided vertically cutting across the strata.
Each segment in the society had its own values, language,
religion, and way of life.
	 The society as a whole was
more characterised by conflict and coercion than
consensus.
	 Indeed, value consensus was and still is
conspicuously lacking.
	 Under such a social system, as we
shall see later, the Parsonian account of strati.eicatjon
fails to work because it depends largely on the existence
of a unitary value system. Neither would the Marxist notion
of class struggle be very illuminating.
Rex (1970a:73-74) has suggested the term 'colonial
estate system' to refer to such composite colonial societies.
Whatever else might be the case in other colonial societies,
colonial Malaya fits without much stress into this
description for at least two reasons.
	 In the first place,
among the various constituent ethnic or racial groups -
the European, the Malay, the Chinese and the Indian - there
was a great degree of occupational specialization, with the
function of each group being defined quite clearly. The
occupational specialization was itself suggestive of a kind
of estate or caste system.
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Secondly, vertical social mobility was low, partly
because of the presence of a colour line, partly because
of the fact that ethnic groups were attached to a few
traditional professions.	 One's social position was, to
a certain degree, determined by one l s birth (Wertheim,
1964:75).
Independence has brought various changes to Malaya.
Politically, its colonial status was ended and replaced by
an independent parliamentary democracy, even though
militarily, the country is still to some extent dependent
on British and other Con-flonwealth forces. 	 Political
independence also means alat the once British-dominated
polity is now largely in the hands of Malaysians, in
particular the Malays, largely as a result of British pro-
Malay policy.
The economy has also undergone several changes so as
to attune itself to political changes. 	 There has been a
greater pace for industrialization as well as rural
development. There is also an indication that the economy
is more strongly oriented to the indigenous labourer and
consumer. In some instances, the state has intervened on
behalf of a particular ethnic group generally regarded as
backward economically.
Despite these changes, however, the economy is still
very much export.oriented.
	 It is still largely dependent
on the two primary products - rubber and tin. More
importantly,in terms of ownership and control, as will be
shown in chapter two, Malaysian economy is still largely
in the hands of foreign companies.
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In the case of the plural society, it is almost
impossible to say with any precision to what extent the
Malaysian society is becoming less pluralistic.
	 The
reasons are, first, there is a lack of data on Malaysian
values that would enable one to make some assessment on
the extent of national consciousness over certain issues;
second, neither are there any studies of voting, opinions,
or attitudes on which the assessment of consensus might be
based (Ness, 1967:69).	 Some general observations,
however, can be made.
	 In the political sphere, there is
increasing joint participation. The number of non-Malay
electors has increased steadily over the years.
	
In economy
there has been an increased Malay participation especially
in commerce and industries as a result of government policies
(Chiew, 1968:73).	 Traditional occupational dividing lines
are also being broken down through modern education. In
the social and cultural spheres, various changes have also
taken place. Increasing numbers of non-Malays are speaking
Bahasa Malaysia today. The number of Chinese Muslim
converts has also increased over the years.
These are some indications of changes that have been
taking place in the Malaysian plural society. To some
extent, they can be taken as changes in the degree of
pluralism,namely that the Malaysian society is becoming less
pluralistic.	 Having said this, we hasten to add that
basically, the main plural features which developed during
the colonial period still persist until the present day.
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It is in this context that we attempt to analyse the
Chinese community in the chapters that follow.
	
Four major
aspects of the community are highlighted, namely, the
community's social structure, Chinese economic activities,
Chinese politics and Chinese education. 	 We are not so
much concerned with the Chinese community in the ethnographic
sense.	 Rather, our main emphasis is the implications of
these various aspects of the Chinese community for the
larger question of race relations.
	
We shall argue that the
various aspects of the Chinese community with their related
institutions and values tend to makim interaction and
integration difficult in the confli,--prone plural society.
On the other hand, despite the tremendous amount of dissensus
and cleavages, Malaysia has managed to survive better than
many other plural societies.
	 Why is this so?	 What
actually hold the Malaysian plural society together? These
are some of the questions which we would try to answer in
this study.
CHAPTER 1 
THE STRATIFICATION AND STRUCTURE
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY
In our 'Introduction' we have tried to analyse the
central theme of British colonialism in Malaya, that of
political and economic domination, as well as the structure
of the Malayan plural society in general. 	 It is against
this wider background that we now look at the internal
structure yi the Chinese community.
Diversities 
The Chinese in Malaysia are far from homogeneous. 	 In
fact they are the most diversified ethnic group among the
local communities, being divided into various sub-communities
or segments.	 It is this fact that has led some writers to
apply a Isegmentary model' to analyse the Chinese community
(Crissman, 1967:185-204).	 The most significant feature of
the structure of the Chinese community is its dialect
differences. There exist at least nine main different
dialect groups speaking different and mutually unintelligible
dialects. The Cantonese originated from the neighbourhood
of Canton in China; the Hokkien from the neighbourhood of
Amoy in southern Fukien; the Hakka from the inland areas
of northern Kwangtung and southern Fukien; the Hainanese
from the island of Hainan; the Teochiu from the Swatow area;
the Hockchew from Foochow, the prefecture of Fukien; the
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Henghua and Hockchia both from the Fukien Province, and
the Kwangsai from the Kwangsi Province. There are various
cultural traits distinguishing these dialect groups, but
they are all equally good Chinese, at least in their own
estimations.
One significant fact about these various dialect
groups is that none of them can be connected with one
particular Chinese province. This is largely because
linguistic and administrative boundaries in China do not
necessarily coincide. 	 As a result, it is often difficult
to draw hard and fast lines of division between 0-e dialect
group and another.
	
The present dialect group c...ssification
in Malaysia, as in other overseas Chinese communities, is
more of a common practice, because logically it is not easy
to justify.
	 For instance, Foochow is the capital of the
Fukien Province, and logically Foochow-speaking people
(Hockchew) should be classified as Fukienese; in actual
practice, however, Foochow-speaking people have always been
classified separately as a group. Under the heading
'Fukien' or Hokkien are placed only those who speak the
southern Fukien dialect - Amoy. The situation is the
same where the Cantonese people are concerned. The Teochius„
the Hakkas and the Hainanese all come from the Kwangtung
Province and should logically be placed under the regional
grouping 'Cantonese'; but in practice these people are
considered separately and only those from the central part
of the Kwangtung Province speaking the Cantonese dialect
proper are considered to be Cantonese (Tien, 1953:11).
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The various Chinese dialect groups are not evenly
distributed in Malaysia. The Cantonese tend to concentrate
in urban centres such as Kuala Lumpur and Ipoh while the
Hokkien concentrate in Penang, Taiping and Johore Bahru.
Unevenness of this sort in regard to physical distribution
is in part accounted for by the fact that Chinese emigrants
tended to go to places where their relatives, friends or
fellow villagers were already established.
	
Wherever a
dialect group is in the majority in an area, its dialect
becomes more or less the 'lingua franca' of that area. Thus
Cantonese becomes the I lIngua franca' of Kuala Lumpur and
Ipoh; and Hokkien is tl-c.
 common dialect in Penang, Taiping
and other areas where the Hokkien dominate. In the
Sitiawan area where the Hockchew dominate, the Hockchew dialect
becomes the common dialect for communication.
The dialect difference, though significant, is but
one aspect of the diversities of the Chinese community.
Along with dialect divisions is occupational specialization,
often identifying with dialect groups. This identification
of occupations with certain dialect groups was most notable
in early colonial days. The Hokkien, for instance, were
most active in trade; the bulk of the Cantonese were artisans
and labourers (especially in tin mining and railway construc-
tion). The Hainanese were chiefly restauranteers and
domestic servants; the Hakkas resembled the Cantonese in
their economic activities, engaging primarily in handicrafts
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such as shoe-making, tailoring, gold and silverware etc;
many of them were also engaged in tin mining. The Hockchew
were noted for their barber shops and coffee shop business.
The Teochiu resembled the Hokkien in terms of economic
activities, being mainly engaged in grocery business
(Naosaku Uchida, 1956).	 The Henghua were and still are
dominating bicycle and spare parts business.
This identification of dialect groups with economic
activities parallels that drawn by Tien (1953) in Sarawak.
Today the Chinese have penetrated into almost every sphere
of economic activity in Malaysia and it is more difficult
to identify them with any particular occupation. The new
generation of Chinese, with modern education, tend to be
less attached to their parents' traditional occupations and
more inclined towards white-collar and professional jobs.
Nevertheless the general pattern of occupational specializa-
tion along dialect lines still persists.
The political actions of the Chinese, like their dialect
differences, are anything but uniform. The Chinese have
been, indeed, described at one time or another as divided
and disunited like a pan of loose sands.	 In the colonial
era, they were divided between the right and the left -
the Kuomintang and the communists.
	
Since Malaya's
independence in 1957, the Chinese have always been divided
among the various Chinese political parties and parties
which owe their existence to Chinese support. 	 It is
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rarely that the Chinese have themselves felt or have been
seen as united (Wang, 1965:171).	 The Chinese participation
in Malaysian politics will be discussed in Chapters three
and four.	 Suffice it to say here that because of their
disunited political actions and their relatively lack of
interest in early Malaysian politics, they themselves were
largely to blame for some of the government policies
which worked to their disadvantage.
A further division which has often been said to have
existed in the Chinese community is the English-educated
and Chinese-educated dichotomy.	 Graduates from the two
different media of education poss6s different values,
style of life, and political positi7;rs, and their attitudes
towards many important issues are ts different. 	 For
instance, on the whole the English-educated group have been
more ready to be loyal to the new Malaysian nation while the
Chinese-educated have more reservations and feel that
independence gives them little advantage. They even find
that their most-valued Chinese education is losing ground
with the implementation of the government's new education
policy (Wang, 1965:176).	 However, the two forms of education
overlap and the division is perhaps not as deep as is often
depicted. What both the English-educated and Chinese-
educated have in common is the belief that as citizens of
Chinese descent they have been unjustly discriminated in
many ways.
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There is also the division between the China-born and
the local-born. The Chinese have settled in Malaysia for
centuries and one of the results of which has been the
establishment of a baba community.
	 It consists of a small
group of individuals whose origin can be traced to the early
settlements of Malacca and Penang.	 They speak a form of
colloquial Malay and their culture is a mixture of Chinese
and Malay cultures.	 Culturally they have been more
assimilated into the Malay society than the China-born
or those born in the Malay states.
The cuncrast between the babas and the rest of the
Chinese	 particularly sharp before the war. While the
baba was 1 r, rRlly oriented, the China-born was more China-
oriented.
	 The baba, because of his inability to speak
any Chinese dialect, was often regarded by the China-born
as 'forgetting his ancestor s and g un-Chinese'.
	
In return,
the China-born was often referred to as 'Chinaman'.
The babas formed a dominant element in the Malayan
Chinese community in the nineteenth century, having been
able to communicate either in Malay or English, or both,
with the Malays and the British. Many of them enjoyed a
kind of elite status during the colonial period.
However, with the influx of Chinese immigrants at the
end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
centuries, the baba community was progressively reduced in
size.	 Also, with the rise of Chinese nationalism and
education in Malaysia, a kind of I re-Sinification l
 process
occurred in the baba community - a process by which the
babas learned the Chinese language and culture and returned
to the majority of the community. 1
	Today, there is only
a small group of babas in Malacca and Penang.
Chinese Associations 
The diversities in the Chinese community discussed
above are manifested in the community's social oreg.anizations
- commonly known as associations.
	 Some studies have been
made on these associations in Malaysia. 2
	Bu Inc,ot of these
studies are historical in nature.
	
A genuinely c-)mprehensive
sociological study on the subject is yet to be (1,,ne.
	 However,
a few remarks on Chinese associations are in order to
demonstrate the complexities of the social structure of
the Chinese community.
1. For a discussion of I re-Sinification l
 process, see
Freedman (1969:431-449).
2. The most notable of these are Wan (1967) and Chee(1971). Both are historical studies.
	
While the
former is confined to a particular state in Malaysia,
the latter restricts its scope to a particular dialect
group.
	 There is, however, a sociological study
which concentrates on the interlocking leadership
structure of Chinese voluntary associations in the
town of Muar.
	
See Li (1965:1-45).
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To begin with there are many types of Chinese
associations.
	
As a result some observers of the Chinese
community have described the Chinese as having a 'passion'
for organization (Hunter, 1966:43-44).	 The most common
types of Chinese associations in Malaysia are dialect
associations or huikuans as the Chinese call them, the
surname associations, benevolent and charitable associations
and the trade guilds. 3 These are what Crissman loosely
3.	 Wan listed a total of eleven types of Chinese
associations and guilds in the state of Selangor.
These are: (i) Huikuans (regional or dialect associa-
tions), (ii) Miao (temples), (iii) special welfare
organization, (iv) guilds, (v) Tsung Ts l i (ancestral
establishments of common surnames), (v1) cultural
societies (libraries, amateur, dramatic and musical
societies), (vii) benevolent societies (such as
funeral and death-benefit), (viii) social clubs,
sports clubs, (x) political organizations and
xi general societies (alumni bodies, Chinese school
committees associations etc). 	 Li found a total of
66 voluntary associations in Muar (with a Chinese
population of 24,775) which could be divided as
follows:
A. Non-community-wide Associations	 No.
1. Speech-group and local group associations 12'
2. Surname or lineage associations 	 12
3. Business associations	 15
4. Clubs and Recreational associations	 17
5. Religious and benevolent associations 	 6
B. Community-wide Associations 
1. Board of Chung Hwa School	 1
2. The Chinese Association of Muar 	 1
3. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce	 1
4. The Malaysian Chinese Association 	 1
Total	 66
Cf. Wan (1967, chapter 4) and Li (1965:43).
43
describes as the 'middle-range community organizations'. 4
On a higher level, there exist the well-known and
powerful Chinese Chambers of Commerce and the Chinese
Assembly Halls.	 Every state in Malaysia has its own,
administratively independent Chinese Chamber of Commerce.5
The Chinese Assembly Hall too exists independently in
every state.	 The objectives of the Chinese Assembly
Halls vary from state to state.
	
But what they have in
common is the concern over the general well-being of the
Chinese community as a whole such as the settling of
disputes.	 A comparison of the stated objectives of two
Chinese Assembly Halls in two different states will serve
to illustrate their common aims as well as their variations.
The Perak Chinese Assembly Hall has its three-fold
objectives as follows:
a. to promote unity amongst the registered Chinese
Associations in Perak and to promote friendship,
welfare, charity and to settle dispute.
4. Crissman describes these middle-range community
organizations as something intermediate between
village communities and language communities.
According to Crissman, a 'village community' is
a small, closely knit, face-to-face, usually
corporate social unit, while a 'language' or
'speech' community is a larger entity such as the
Hainanese community or the Teochiu community.
What Crissman refers to as speech or language
communities are actually dialect groups in Malaysia.
Cf. Crissman (1967:191-2, 196).
5. Some states have more than one. 	 For example, there
are two in Perak, three each in Johore and Selangor.
b. to cooperate with other registered Chinese
Associations having objects similar to this
Assembly Hall.
c. to promote activities relating to culture,
education, science, industry, music and
sports .6
On the other hand, the objectives of the Selangor
Chinese Assembly Hall are:
a. to hold meetings for the discussion of any
subject of importance or interest to the
Chinese community.
b. to provide facilities for addresses, lectures
or debates, marriages and other social functions.
c. to provide a place for dram=ctic or theatrical
purposes or performances.
d. to receive or entertain distinguished personages.
e. to settle disputes or difft_Lence that may arise
between members of the Chinese community.
f. to provide convenient accommodation for the
Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the
Selangor Miners' Association.7
It may also be said that all other Chinese Assembly
Halls in Malaysia have objectives broadly similar to those
stated above, with slight local variations.
In contrast, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in each
state, as its name implies, is more concerned with trade
and commerce of the Chinese in the state. The Selangor
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, for example, has among its
objectives I to safeguard and promote the (Chinese) trading,
industrial, mining and planting interests and the interests
6. Rules of the Perak Chinese Association, p.1
7. Rules of the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, p.1.
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of immovable property owners',. 8 However, because of their
influential position in the community, the Chambers'
activities are by no means restricted to trade and commerce.
As we shall see later, they have been performing valuable
community services.
An examination of the membership of both the Assembly
Hall and Chamber of Commerce in each state shows that these
higher level community organizations are closely related to
the middle-range organizations. The Chamber of Commerce
because of its interest in trade and commerce has its
members 1.27-n--ly consisting of various commercial firms,
companies. . ,krchant and trade guilds whilst the Chinese
Assembly Hall mainly encompasses various dialect and surname
associations.
	
It is clear therefore, that the Chamber and
the Assembly Hall are higher level of Chinese organizations
encompassing the various middle-range organizations, which
in turn consist of different individuals. Apart from
corporate membership, it should be noted, however, that
provisions are also made for individuals to become members
of these higher level organizations. 	 While the Chinese
Chambers of Commerce in various states combine to form a
national body known as the Associated Chinese Chambers of
Commerce of Malaysia, there is not a national body represen-
ting the various Chinese Assembly Halls.
8. Rules of the Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce
(1972), p.l.
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Diagram 1.A may serve to illustrate the relationships
between the higher level and the middle-range organizations.
It would be a mistake,however, to regard Group A and Group
B as separate entities.
	 The two interact and overlap at
various levels.
Before we examine the relationships between Group A
and Group B, it is useful to look at the two groups separately.
At the individual level, a person may become a member of a
guild as well as a member of the Chamber of Commerce (since
the Chamber has corporate membership as well as individual
one).
	 Overlapping membership is thus common.
	
J.I.t another
level, the corporate membership of a middle-rar- organization
(e.g. a guild) in a higher level organization sucki as the
Chamber of Commerce provides opportunities for t l-^ leaders
of the former to hold office in the latter organization.
Participation in ore organization is no bar to participation
in another. Thus one often finds that some prominent leaders
are active in half a dozen or more community organizations.
This is particularly evident near the top of the hierarchy,
where a solid power base in lower level organizations,
together with great wealth, is required to obtain a position
(Crissman, 1967:199).
	
This interlocking leadership of the
various Chinese community organizations is not only true
in Malaysia, it is true also in other parts of South-east
Asia such as Indonesia and Thailand.9
9,	 Cf. Willmott (1960) and Skinner (1958). The latter
gives a detailed and excellent description of the
system of interlocking leadership existing in the
Chinese community in Bangkok.
Individuals 1Individuals
Dialect Associations
Surname Associations
Benevolent Associations
Middle-Range
Organizations
Chinese Chambers
Associated Chinese
Chambers of Commerce
(no national body)Highest Level
Organization
Diagram 1.A Chinese Organizations 
GROUP A.	 GROUP B
Higher Level
Organizations of Commerce
Chinese
Assembly Halls
1
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It provides an easy communication of information and
influence among the various organizations and hence
throughout the Chinese community.
	
It also provides an
efficient polity for the Chinese themselves, and at the
same time it is useful to the government of the host
countfles in maintaining law and order among the Chinese
minority (I.E. Wilmott,1966:258). 	 This last is especially
true during the colonial era in Indonesia and Malaysia
under the system of Kapitan China, a form of indirect rule.
In Malaysia, as in Indonesia, most of the Kapitans appointed
by the British colonial regime were powerful leaders of
community organizations such as the secret societies. 10
Positions in these community organizations are
generally honorary and since the prestige structure of
the community has largely developed from these organizations,
it is an honour to hold office in any of them, especially
those at a higher level.
However, in terms of prestige and power, not all
associations rank equally high. 	 In the prestige hierarchy
the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and the Assembly Halls
stand at the top of the list, followed by the larger
10. For example, in the third quarter of the 19th century,
in Perak, Kapitan Ah Kwee was the powerful leader of
the Hai San secret society and Kapitan Ah Yam was the
leader of the Ghee Hin secret society.
dialect associations, the benevolent associations and the
trade guilds.	 Others such as the religious temples,
cultural societies and social clubs are less prestigeous
and seldom exert any direct influence on community affairs.
In general, however, it is largely through the leadership
of associations that one's social recognition in the community
is achieved. 11
The principle of overlapping membership and interlocking
leadership applies also to the Chinese Assembly Hall and its
lower level affiliated organizations.
	 Here, too, an
individual may become a member of a Hialect association,
a member of a surname association, and a member of the Chinese
Assembly Hall at the same time.
	 111e tile third possibility
is rare in practice, the first two are very common. The
dialect and surname associations are the commonest organizations
formed on the basis of two structural principles, namely,
dialect and surname similarities respectively. 12 In
addition, there are also associations formed on the basis of
11. Newell (1962:127) finds the even election to the school
committee is an honour in itself.
12. The dialect associations (Huikuans) can usually be
divided into three categories:
a. District Associations - members restricted to a
district (hsien) or a combination of two or more
neighbouring districts in China. Example: the
Kutien Association in Sitiawan.
b. Prefectural Associations - members restricted to
a prefecture, an administrative division comprising
a number of districts. Example: the Foochow
Association in Kuala Lumpur.
c. Provincial Associations. Example: The Kwangtung
Association.
Cf. Chee (1971:81-82) and Taku Suyama (1962:193-213).
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shared locality. These various dialect, surname and
locality associations together show the outward visible
signs of the social structure of the Chinese community
(Tien, 1953:19).
	
It should be remembered that it is
impossible to differentiate sharply between associations
based on shared dialect, shared surname, shared locality,
or even shared occupation. 	 As indicated earlier, all
these relationships tend to overlap.
	
As a result, many
members of an association organised on the basis, say, of
surname, may also be related by the same locality, share the
same occupation and speak the same dialect.
	
Such an
associatioL, therefore, comprises, in the words of Tien
(1953:19), 'a cluster of social relationships, usually
embracing all the most significant aspects of Chinese social
life'.
It remains now to consider the relationships between
the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and their affiliated
organizations on the one hand, and the Chinese Assembly
Halls with their affiliations on the other. The two
appear to be separated by their different concern over the
Chinese community; nevertheless, they are as much related
by interlocking leadership and overlapping membership as
others. The Perak Chinese Assembly Hall and the Chinese
Chamber of Commerce, for instance, have always been
controlled by more or less the same group of wealthy and
influential individuals. Moreover, a further look at the
members of the General 'Committee, the governing body of the
Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, is sufficient to show how
closely related this Assembly Hall is with other organizations.
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The General Committee consists of representatives from all
the dialect, locality, surname associations in the state.
In addition, it also comprises representatives from benevolent
associations, guilds, Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Miners,
Association, the Malayan Estate Owner l Association and the
Property Owners' and Rate Payers' Association. 13 In short,
all Chinese interests are being represented in the Chinese
Assembly Hall.
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that the whole
social structure of the Chinese community in Male-xsia is
based on a complex network of inter-related guila and
associations.
	
To a Chinese individual within it, the
Chinese community appears to be a more or less self-contained
and self-sufficient universe, within which the dialect groups
are the main divisions and the associations based on dialect
differences the major institutions.
Almost all Chinese associations are voluntarily organized.
All of them, irrespective of their individual character,
serve to provide mutual-aid functions. During the colonial
days, especially at the peak of the Chinese immigration to
Malaya, Chinese associations assisted the immigrants in
their initial adjustments as well as helped them ease the
13. Rules of the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, pp.2-3.
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disorganizing effect of subsequent misfortunes they might
suffer in the new land. 14 Today, with no further immigration
allowed from China, this aspect of the associations' function
is no longer needed.	 Nevertheless, ttle associations'
mutual-benefit functions still persist.
	
Many associations
continue to carry out worthy charitable work as well as to
promote the welfare of their members.
	
They provide bursaries,
scholarships and even textbook money for members' children
attending secondary schools and universities. 	 Some
associations even run private Chinese schools.
	
The functions
of associations are most aptly summed up by the words of
Coughlin (1960:62) in h i s study of Thailand:
14. Chee (1971:129-137) listed five functions of the Hakka
Associations in the 19th century:
a. to provide a framework of solidarity for immigrants;
b, to provide through its leaders community representa-
tion within the Chinese community as well as in
their dealings with colonial government;
c. with the establishment of the association a social
order which was a modified form of the village
government at home in China familiar to the immigrant
was set up;
d. to provide social services such as temporary lodgings
for the newcomers, financial assistance to destitute
members etc;
e. to organize social gatherings at festive seasons.
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These associations, taken collectively,
provide a continuing system of social
insurance not only for the immigrant but
for his family as well.	 In case of
unemployment, sickness, death, natural
calamity, quarrels and disputes, whether
between groups or between individuals,
some associations provide the required
assistance.	 The individual never stands
alone; even when he has no formal
membership in the associations which
furnish assistance, he is still
entitled to receive their help.
Of all the Chinese organizations, the largest from
the point of view of membership and probably the most
influential are the Chinese Chambers of Commerce. As
previously mentioned, these Chambers of Commerce exist
independently in every state.
	 Membership is open to all
Chinese trade associations, commercial firms, companies
and private individuals engaged in trade or commerce,
industrial pursuits, mining or planting. Like all other
Chinese organizations, the Chamber of Commerce conducts
its day-to-day business mostly in Chinese, except when
it deals with other non-Chinese organizations.
	
Meetings
are conducted in Chinese, and notices and publications are
printed in Chinese.
The ostensible objective of the Chinese Chambers of
Commerce is to promote and safeguard Chinese business
interests. Yet their real activities go beyond the
business interests. They have performed, and are still
performing, valuable community services to the Chinese
community. They are noted in taking a keen interest, so
to speak, in matters affecting the Chinese community as
a whole. A quick look at some of the activities carried
out by the Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce (between 1966-71)
illustrates clearly the Chamber's overall interests in the
community as well as the nation as a whole.
1966 - The Chamber passed a resolution to support
fully the National Language Month campaign
and help commercial firms to translate their
signboards from Chinese to the National
Language (Malay).
1967 - A memorandum was sent to the Minister of
Education requesting him to withdraw the
proposal to increase school fees.
1968 - In response to the call made by the Malaysian
Chinese School Teachers Association, a
resolution was passed by the Chamber to fully
support the establishment of a Chinese
University.
1969 -
a. In view of the May 13 racial disturbance in
Kuala Lumpur the Chamb^r set up a Relief
Committee to which it contributed $M500.
The President and Sec_Jtary of the Chamber
also went to various places to aid in good-
will work.
b. A telegram was sent to the Prime Minister
and his deputy to pledge the Chamber's
allegiance and its support in the former's
effort to maintain peace and prosperity in
the country.
1970 -
a. The Chamber sent a memorandum to the State
Government to protest against the State's
new tax on land.
b. The Chamber, in cooperation with the Malay
Chamber of Commerce, formed an Advisory Board
for the Sino-Malay Economic Cooperation,
Perak Branch.
1971 -
a. In view of the floods in various parts of the
country, the Chamber formed a five-man committee
to collect donations in cash and kind to aid
the flood victims.
	
A total of $M13,250 was
collected.
b. A telegram was sent to the Chinese leader,
Tan Siew .Sin to support him in the Chinese
Unity Movement.15
15. The Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Report for
1971, pp.15-18.
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The activities of the Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce,
in general, are representative of the functions of Chambers
of Commerce in other states.
	 In short, when matters of
community-wide concern arise, one of the Chambers, or the
national body, takes the initiative in calling a meeting of
representatives of various organizations to decide on a
proper course of action.
	
For instance, in 1951, because
of the publication of the Barnes Education Report which
threatened the survival of Chinese education, the Perak
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, in conjunction with the Perak
Chinese Assembly Hall, took initiative to call a meeting
of represe rl tatives of all Chinese organizations in Perak.
The meeting passed a unanimous resolution to oppose the
implementation Gf the Report. 16 In. this case, therefore,
the Chamber and the Assembly Hall acted as spokesmen for
the Chinese community in Perak. 	 The functions fulfilled
by these overseas Chinese associations are by no means
unique.
	
To a large extent, associations in vastly different
cultural areas from Malaysia, such as Sparkbrook, Birmingham,
exhibit very similar functions.	 According to Rex (1973a:
22), the associations at Sparkbrook - the major ones
being political parties, churches, immigrant associations
and the community associations - fulfil four important
functions, namely, overcoming social isolation, affirming
cultural beliefs and values, goal attainment and pastoral
work. Different types of Chinese associations may emphasize
different functions. Yet generally speaking they fulfil in
16. The Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Report for
1971, p.10.
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one way or another all the four major functions described
by Rex.
It would be misleading to think that Chinese organizations
do not change during all these years.
	
The various dialect
and clan associations, as Chee (1971:216-230) has observed,
have become more and more ordinary social and recreational
clubs, where members spend their leisure hours playing
games, gambling and carrying out other cultural activities.
Newell (1962:153) has this to say in regard to the
changed nature of the dialect associations:
Dialect associations are only successJ.al
where there are clear interests of
members to defend vis-a-vis other similarly
constituted groups. Today Teochius bave no
special interests to defend that they do nut
have as Chinese and the dialect assor4ations
are social clubs and friendly societies only.
Another interesting thing about these associations is
that they rarely exist in the Chinese 'new villages' formed
during the Malaysian Emergency. There is also a low level
of participation in associations by these new villagers.
This is particularly true if the new villages are a great
distance from towns where distance makes it more difficult
for them to benefit from such membership. These new
villages consist largely of rural Chinese who were forced
to move away from the locale of their associations during
the Emergency, and by so doing lost their membership by
default (Nyce, 1973:124).	 A small number of them, however,
still retain their membership in the associations.
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The reasons for the virtual absence of dialect or
surname associations in the new villages are threefold.
In the first place, resettlement had a disorganizing effect
which uprooted the villagers both economically and socially.
In time of economic and social crisis, they were more
concerned with their livelihood than to form associations.
Secondly, there was simply a lack of leadership in the
new villages capable of, or willing to, organize the largely
illiterate peasants along dialect or surname differences.
A third reason is t_lat in some new villages, the rise
of political party brank.:ies has supplanted the need to have
dialect or territorial organizations.
	
This is true especially
among the younger generation, where association is based
more upon interest than upon dialect similarity.
In his study of the Chinese new villages, Nyce (1973:
125-6) found that for all practical purposes, the political
party branch has taken over the role of the association as
an effective organization bringing people together for
fellowship and concerted action.
In spite of the change in the nature and role of some
dialect or territory-based associations, and the virtual
absence of them in the new villages, the higher level
organizations - the Chamber of Commerce and the Assembly
Hall - are, if anything, becoming increasingly important in
the community. They are as dynamic as ever, and the Chinese
have always looked up -Co them for leadership in matters
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affecting the community as a whole. 	 This, then, is a
unique aspect of the Chinese social structure.
Apart from serving the various specific social
functions, the overall function of the Chinese associations
is undoubtedly to bring together members of each dialect
group.	 From the point of view of the Chinese community
as a whole, the function of uniting each dialect group has
its dysfunctional aspect too. 	 The various territorial and
dialect associations tend to perpetuate provincialism and
parochialism, and become obstacles to Chinese unity in the
wider sense.
What is important, however, is not so much how this
Chinese passion for organization is dividing the Chinese
community itself, but its implications in terms of race
relations in the plural society of Malaysia.
The various Chinese institutions such as the dialect
associations tend to give the non-Chinese, especially the
Malays, the impression that Chinese 'stick together'.
They then become, in the eyes of the Malays, non-national,
if not anti-national. Accusations of Chinese in-group
sentiments such as being clannish and refusing to assimilate
are not uncommon.
	
Indeed, Chinese associations do serve
to perpetuate social distinctions between the Chinese and
the Malays hindering social integration between the two
groups.
	
In Thailand, where Chinese form less than 10% of
the total Thai population, Coughlin (1960:66) has this to
say about their associations:
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These overseas associations in their totality
are so influential in perpetuating social
distinctions between the Thais and Chinese
population groups that their continued
vitality as going institutions beyond the
immigrant generation can only mean the
indefinite postponement of any major move
toward a more thorough assimilation of the
Chinese minority in Thailand.
To a large extent, the above observation made by
Coughlin in Thailand is also true in Malaysia. The excep-
tionally strong numerical strength of the Chinese makes
racial problem in Malaysia a unique case in South-east
Asia.	 In Malaysia the Chinese are a significant minority.
Their institutional, social and ecu.mic framework is so
well entrenched in the plural soe-I: and yet so distinct
from that of the Malay community that the term 'assimilation'
as used to analyse other parts of S —Ith-east Asia is scarcely
relevant here.	 In the foreseeable future, there seems
little chance that the Chinese community as a whole will be
assimilated.	 Many factors are believed to act in one way
or another to hinder the process, and some of the major ones
will be looked into in the chapters that follow.
Stratification
We have so far been concerned only with group divisions
or differentiation along vertical lines. The remaining
chapter is devoted to another dimension of the division in
the Chinese community, namely, the division along horizontal
lines or stratification.
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To begin with, it is difficult to analyse the structure
of the Malaysian Chinese community in terms of class
distinctions in the Marxian sense. 	 There are at least
two reasons for this.	 First, Malaysia, unlike many western
industrial societies, is still at an early stage of industrial
development.
	
Class divisions on the basis of differential
relations to the means of production are yet to be meaningful
among the bulk of the Chinese as well as other ethnic groups.
In so far as the Chinese are concerned, a large proportion
of them still live in small towns and new villages created
as a resul + of the Malaysian Emergency. 17 Although to a
certain ex ,..7nt class approach is helpful for a study of large
urban centres like Kuala Lumpur and Penang, it is certainly
premature to talk about the rural Chinese in class terms. 18
They are politically less sophisticated and economically and
technologically more backward compared to the urban folk.
17. In 1970, 53% of the total Chinese population were
rural.	 See Saw Swee Hock (1972:119).
18. This view is shared by Wang (1965:171).
	
Nyce (1973:
145-6) in his study of Chinese new villages is of the
opinion that the Chinese new villagers differentiate
themselves on a class basis, such as between the
'haves' and the I have-nots l .	 The present writer
while agreeing that such may be the case in villages
close to urban centres, still feels that the majority
of the villagers do not see themselves in such class
terms.
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Second, with the exception of some western educated
elite and the group which thinks entirely in terms of left-
wing and right-wing politics, there is still little class
consciousness among the Chinese. 	 This is of course not
to say that the Chinese are not aware of the status hierarchy
that has existed in their community.
	
Far from it.	 Indeed,
the Chinese are highly status conscious. 	 It simply means
that for the majority, class distinctions in the form of
bourgeoisie versus proletariat or even in the western form
of middle class versus working class are still vague in
their mind.
It is even doubtful, giving the diversity alid heteroge-
neity of the community, whether there exists a...21.ss-in-
itself• let alone a class-for-itself. 	 Even if i,hey exist,
many Chinese certainly do not think of themselves in such
terms.
Nevertheless it would be misleading to regard this
situation of the Chinese community as a permanent feature
in a rapidly developing and changing society like Malaysia.
There is a possibility that the rapidly changing economic
conditions will eventually transform the bulk of the popula-
tion into workers with common situations and interests as
a result of the domination of capital. This class-in-itself
may finally develop its class consciousness, unity, and
organizations for the defence of its class interests, and
become a class-for-itself (Bottomore & Rubel, 1961:195).
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Whether this situation will emerge in the long run is not
our concern here.	 What we are more interested however, is
that at the moment class distinctions are less meaningful
and less significant than ethnic divisions.
	
For instance,
many political parties are still communally-based. 	 Even
the clandestine class-based Malaysian Communist Party, whose
membership is largely Chinese, receives limited support from
the Malays.
The Chinese, however, do have a general awareness,
albeit a vague one, of the existence of three major groups
in their midst: a smaii group of rich people, a large group
of poor, rural peopl.., al_d between the two groups are what
they call the 'middle-^)-Issi people. 	 In terms of a pyramid,
these groups can be rerresented thus: the small group of
rich people forms the apex with the 'middle-class' people
at the middle and the rural folk forming the base. This,
then, is the nearest thing to stratification in the Chinese
community. 19 The division is based not so much upon a
difference between employers and employees as upon different
degrees of economic well-being.	 Furthermore, there is
also the variation from person to person as to the perception
of the size and boundaries of each category (Willmott, 1960:
122).
19. Willmott (1960) observes a similar phenomenon in
Semarang.
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There are perhaps a number of reasons hindering the
emergence of distinct socio-economic classes and class
consciousness in the Chinese community.
	
Mobility, both
occupational and social, is certainly one important factor.
There is a high degree of occupational and social mobility
in the Chinese community.
	
Opportunities in education,
industry and commerce all contribute to this phenomenon.
With educational achievement, a considerable number of
children from poor family background rise to positions of
importance, both in professional and civil service. Many
employees, with their hard work and initiative, coupled
with the prevailing industrial and commercial opportunities,
become independent and successful businessmen.
	
In addition,
there is a considerable amount of ups and downs of family
fortunes, due partly to the typical instability of Chinese
business enterprise.
Along with the lack of class consciousness, there is
a parallel absence of class antagonism and 'class struggle'
in the Chinese community. There are few specifically Chinese
employee organizations. 20 Moreover, Chinese membership in
multi-racial unions has always been low. The Chinese have
never seemed to show a keen interest in trade unionism. 21
20. This is also true of the Chinese in Thailand and Indonesia.
Cf. Willmott (1960:120) and Coughlin (1960:62).
21. The Chinese in Malaysia have always been reluctant to
participate in trade unions.
	
In 1952, for example,
Chinese only formed 15% of the total union membership;
in 1961, they formed only 17%.	 More recent figures
are not available, but it is believed that the figure
for Chinese is still low in comparison to their working
force. Cf. Purcell (1954;178) and Milne (1967:110).
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The relationship between the Chinese employers and employees
has often been one which is cordial rather than antagonistic.
This is particularly so in small-scale businesses where the
majority of the employees are related to their employers by
kinship or marriage ties.	 At any rate, business class
values are accepted by most of the employees who aspire and
seek material success and whose ultimate aim is to join the
business class themselves some day.
As earlier mentioned in connection with class
consciousness, the Chinese in Malaysia are highly status
conscious.	 Their present status hierarchy, though greatly
modified, has its origin as far tk as the Han Dynasty
(206 B.C. - 9 A.D.).	 The ideal for- of status hierarchy
accepted then was:
The Ideal Traditional Status Hierarchy
Shill	 scholar-officials
Nung 	 peasants and farmers
Kung	 artisans
Shang = merchants and shopkeepers
(Vang, 1965:172)
In practice, however, the ideal hierarchical position
was constantly undermined by the importance of wealth as a
variable in social mobility. And since the Sung Dynasty
(960-1275), the real status of the merchants had, in all
but name, moved up to the second place, pushing the peasants
and farmers to the lowest stratum. The modified hierarchy
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which actually existed was:
The Real Traditional Status Hierarchy
Shih	 scholar-officials
Shang = merchants and shopkeepers
Kung	 artisans
Hung	 peasants and farmers
(Wang, 1965:173)
In Malaysia, as in many other South-east Asian countries
where the Chinese formed a minority group, this traditional
status schei..e had been turned upside down.	 This is accounted
for by the opecial nature of Chinese emigration. The
Chinese had gone overseas in search of wealth, and trade and
commerce were til e only sources of wealth available to them.
As a result, wealth became practically the sole criterion of
success and social status.
	
The scholar-officials generally
did not emigrate.	 The few who didgo abroad to become clerks
and teachers were considered no better than superior artisans.
Most of the immigrants were petty merchants, illiterate
peasants and labourers; and vast numbers of the latter two
categories became plantation and mining labourers. Thus,
there were broadly only two major divisions in the Chinese
community in Malaysia in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries - merchants and those who aspired to be merchants
(Wang, 1965:173).
	
Both the scholar-officials, the most
powerful and prestigeous group, and the peasants, the most
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numerous group in China, found no Chinese equivalents in
Malaysia.	 In Malaysia the upper portion of the Chinese
social status scale was almost completely dominated by the
merchants (Shang), while the kung (artisans, labourers,
clerks etc.) occupied the lower portion.
This situation of merchant-dominated overseas Chinese
in Malaysia lasted until the second decade of the twentieth
century.	 The Revolution of 1911 in China stirred up
Chinese nationalism among the overseas Chinese, and every-
where the Chinese began to show a keen interest in their
education and schools.
	
In Malaysia, there arose a great
enthusiasm to learn the Chinese Kuo-Yu in the 1920 1 s and
1930 I s. Many Chinese schools were established t4 prc,vide
learning opportunities to Chinese children, and oy 1941, a
whole generation of educated young Chinese emerged. This
young educated group consisted largely of teachers coming
from China and those who came back from China after they
had received their higher education. This group of
educated elite was highly respected and was equated in the
Chinese mind with some kind of modernized shih (Wang,
1965:174).
Along with this Chinese-educated group, there was a
group of Chinese who were educated in English schools.
Those who were successful became professional men such as
lawyers, doctors and accountants.	 The less successful ones
became teachers and clerks. There were others who joined
the civil service. This English-educated group was equally
2. Shang
3.i)Kung
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respected, not so much on the basis of wealth, but because
of its association with specialized profession and public
office.
Thus, since 1941, particularly after the Second World
War, along with wealth, education has become an important
factor in social mobility in the Chinese community.
	
This,
in part, is a reflection of the traditional value attached
to education.
	
With education as a new variable, the post-
war social hierarchy of the Chinese can thus be schematically
represented as follows:
The Post-War si-tus Hierarchy22
1. Shih, eLacated elite (professional men,
civil servants,
teachers etc)
r-rchants and shopkeepers
a. artisans
b. urban workers
c. labourers
3.ii) Nung	 peasants and farmers
It must be noted that these are ideal-type situations.
The classification is by no means absolute. As in any other
classifications, there may be individuals who deviate from,
or who refuse to be fitted into the scheme. Looking at the
22. Wang (1965:175) did not include the category of peasants
and farmers in his scheme. This writer, however, feels
that the Chinese peasants and farmers are too important
to be excluded.	 It is rather difficult, however, to
rank the kung and nuns, especially in terms of wealth
and style of life.
	 Because of this, the two groups
are being put in the same category.
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Chinese community as a whole, it is sometimes rather difficult
to disentangle and compare the prestige values of wealth
and education.
	
The two variables often seem to go hand
in hand. People with high academic or professional
qualifications generally come from well-to-do families and
earn high incomes. 	 In other words, education often appears
intertwined with monetary success.
Nevertheless, education may be a sufficient, but
definitely not a necessary condition to high social status.
Quite a number of influential and respected Chinese community
leaders receive little formal education.
	
But almost without
exception they possess the other important variable - wealth.
It vould seem, therefore, that wealth is much more important
as a determinant of social status than education. 23
From the preceding sections, it is not an overstatement
to say that the Malaysian Chinese are wealth conscious,
education conscious and status conscious. 	 The Chinese
community in Malaysia is, indeed, like many overseas Chinese
communities in other parts of South-east Asia, a plutocracy
in which wealth breeds prestige and power (Crissman, 1967:
199). Leadership is mainly based on either wealth or
education, or both.
23. This condition can also be found in other South-east
Asian Chinese communities.
	
Indonesia is one example.
Cf. Wilmott (1960:117).
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Thus, what we have in the Chinese community is a social
order which, as it is objectively understood by outside
observers and subjectively understood by the Chinese
themselves, is heterogeneous and divided. The community
is divided both horizontally and vertically. The horizontal
lines of division are based largely upon wealth and education.
The vertical lines are, on the other hand, based upon group
affiliations, mainly along lines of dialect differences. 24
It must be stressed, however, that none of these dividing
lines is distinctly fixed.	 They arz- merely social boundaries
which are frequently criss-crossed bAr other such forms of
relationships as friendships, marriages and social interactions.
As a concluding remark, it shoula be voted that these
internal divisions are by no means permanent features in the
Chinese community. They apply only in so far as the Chinese
are interacting among themselves. 	 Within a larger context,
namely, in the context of the plural society of Malaysia,
racial bonds are still strong.	 Vis-a-vis the non-Chinese,
these ranks are largely closed whenever external threats to
racial interests arise.
	
It is from this perspective that
we now proceed in the next chapter to examine the role of
the Chinese in Malaysian economy.
24. In Indonesia Willmott (1960) has observed more or less
a similar form of divisions in the Chinese community.
But in regard to vertical divisions, there is an extra
dimension in Indammcia- that of Totok-Peranakan distinction,
which has no equivalents in present-day Malaysia. The
baba population in Malaysia, often regarded as Peranakan's
counterpart, has become very insignificant today.
CHAPTER 2 
THE CHINESE IN MALAYSIAN ECONOMY.
Introduction
Economic imbalance between the Chinese and the Malays,
with its related occupational separation, is still one of
the striking features of Malaysia's social structure, and
constitute- a major source of conflict between the two
peoples. The relatively active participation of the
Chinese in Malaysian economy, especially their overwhelming
concern for commercial activities, has given rise to the
common view that the Chinese as a community are wealthy
and in control of the nation's economy. 	 In terms of race
relations, it is not really so important whether this
popular view is true.	 The important point is that most
of the Malays believe this to be true and this often deter-
mines their attitudes towards the Chinese (Vasil, 1971:5).
Coughlin (1955:311; 1960:12) suggests that the Chinese
minority in Thailand furnishes an illustration of immigrant
adjustment in a social context traditionally characterised
by a two-fold division of the population into the ruling
class and the peasantry, where there was virtually no indi-
genous development of trade and commerce apart from some
dealings in local agricultural produce and locally-made
handicrafts. Much the same can be said of the Chinese in
Malaysia, even though they constitute a significant minority
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in comparison with Thailand. On the eve of British colonial
rule, there existed in Malaysia many states, each independent
of one another, and like many underdeveloped countries, each
was characterized by a two-fold division between the aristo-
cracy (the ruling class) and the peasantry (the subject
class).
	 Each state was essentially agricultural and there
was little indigenous development of trade and commerce.
However, with the introduction of British rule and the
consequent impact of westernization and modernization, the
situation changed drastically.
	
First there was a great
expansion in commerce, resulting in increasing ^rrortunities
in commercial activities, particularly in retaii ,rade.
Secondly, there was an increasing need for commercial
intermediaries to funnel imported consumer goods to the mass
of the population. 	 It was here that the Chinese (to a
smaller extent the Indians too), as an immigrant group,
readily took advantage of these new commercial opportunities
and worked themselves into privileged economic as well as
social positions.
	
Such an immigrant adjustment seems to
be a normal process given the fact that during those days
most of the Chinese immigrants hoped to amass a fortune and
return to their homeland, and commerce was the only opportunity
open to them to achieve their ambitions.	 Moreover, the
indigenous people were very tradition-bound and commercial
activities did not attract them since they fell largely
outside the framework of their traditional class and
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occupational structure. 	 Many Chinese had, in effect, come
to fill what Rinder (1958-59:253-260) has called the
'status gap' in the way the Jews had filled a similar gap
in Europe, the Armenian Christians in Turkey, the Parsees
in India, the Indians in East Africa and Burma, and the
Syrians in West Africa (Wertheim, 1964:75).
There is little doubt that the Chinese have contributed
a great deal in the development of Malaysia. Their contri-
bution began in 1786 when Penang was acquired by the British
by treaty with the Sultan of Kedah. The development and
prosperity of the Stre': Settlements was in the main the
product of British initiative coupled with Chinese labour.
From the Straits Settlements, many Chinese penetrated the
Malay States and helped to open up vast areas of virgin
territory. Many of the tin mines today were and still
are worked by the Chinese; the rubber plantations depend
on the Chinese for much of their labour while the small
traders, the artisans, the urban workers and the employees
of great merchants and firms have been largely Chinese. The
Chinese, many of whom originally came to Malaysia as what
Rex calls 'secondary colonialists' 1 are, however, not
merely confined to these subordinate positions. Today,
many of them are highly qualified professional men in various
1. According to Rex (1970a:75), secondary colonialists
"include capitalist entrepreneurs seeking opportunities
in mining, in manufacture and marketing, small-scale
traders and shopkeepers and workers having a greater
degree of freedom than the native workers or slaves
who preceded them".
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fields and a good proportion of the country's wealthiest and
influential businessmen are Chinese too.
The important role of the Chinese in the development
of Malaysia is borne out by the testimony of many of the
British colonial administrators who served there at one
time or another.	 Captain Light, for example, regarded the
Chinese immigrants as 'the most valuable part of our
inhabitants'.
	
Crawford viewed the Chinese as 'the most
industrious and useful portion of the Asiatic part of the
population'.
	
Newbold considered the Chinese to be 'by far
the most userful class in the Straits Settlements'.
	
Frank
Swettenham and George Maxwell went even further. The
former suggested that 'their (Chinese) energy and enterprise
have made the Malay States what they are today' (Mills, 1966:
204), while the latter described the Chinese as 'the real
pioneers and makers of modern Malaya' (Maxwell, 1943:116).
All this merely indicates the appreciation of the
colonialists with regards to the important role of the
Chinese in the making of Malaysia. It should not be taken
to imply that other local communities are unimportant or
less important.	 Their role, however, falls beyond the
scope of this study.
Chinese contribution to Malaysian economy is beyo d
any doubt.	 They are found in significant proportions in
almost every sector of the nation's economy and at all levels
of activity.
	 They were, and still are, the community that
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covers the widest range of occupations. 	 Vaughan, for
instance, was so impressed by the wide range of occupations
carried out by the Chinese immigrants and their hard work
that he even went so far as to say that 'the Chinese are
everything'. He then went on listing more than a hundred
types of activities or occupations in which the Chinese
were engaged, ranging from such unskilled labour as opium
seller, fruit-seller, hawker to skilled ones as engineers,
architects and surveyors (Vaughan, 1971:16).
However, the great contribution of the Chinese to
Malaysian economy should not be equa'ad with the popular
stereotype that they dominate the nation's economy. These
are two related yet different thing. The stereotype is
the result of at least two factors.	 First, the Chinese
are largely urban people and they are almost ubiquitous in
every major Malaysian town.
	
Secondly, they are engaged
in almost every kind of economic activity, particularly in
the conspicuous commercial activities such as retail trade.
The stereotype is reinforced by the fact that a good number
of urban Chinese are actually wealthy.
The presence of racial stereotypes such as that related
to the Chinese economic domination in Malaysia is not an
unusual phenomenon in a plural society. 	 It is so widely
accepted that the truth of the statement is seldom questioned.
Do the Chinese really control the Malaysian economy? If the
measure of domination of an economy is in terms of the owner-
ship and control of the various factors of production, then
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the stereotype of Chinese economic domination is a mis-
conception, or at best a partial truth.
	 As will be shown
presently, the Chinese do not control the Malaysian economy.
The bulk of the evidence shows that the Europeans were
and still are in control of a major proportion of the
Malaysian economy. Undoubtedly, of the three local communi-
ties, the Chinese have been most actively involved in the
nation's economic activities, and in relation to other local
communities, their capital is by far the most important.
It can thus be said that the Chinese capitalists are the
most import-nt local capitalists (Puthucheary, 1960:133).
This, however, by no means implies that all Chinese are
rich.	 Nel.her are all of them capitalists.	 To treat the
Chinese as a single economically homogeneous group is a
gross oversimplification. They are simply too large a
population to form a homogeneously middle-class group.
Even though Malaysia's commercial and industrial middle-
class has been predominantly their preserve, some three-
quarters of the Chinese belong to the working class
(Freedman, 1960:163).	 There is no doubt that a signifi-
cant proportion of the Chinese are engaged in small-scale
businesses of one form or another, and it is in these that
they are most conspicuous and attract the most attention.
But in terms of wealth they are widely diversified, ranging
from millionaires to paupers.
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In the sections that follow an attempt is made to examine
the Chinese role in Malaysian economy and their relative
economic strength in relation to other communities.
Following this, the government's efforts to correct the
economic imbalance will also be reviewed and their effects
on the Chinese community assessed.
The Chinese in Commerce
Many observers of the overseas Chinese in South-east
Asia agree that commerce is the latter's forte. 2 The
PreciseMalaysian Chinese fit well into this observation.
statistics are not available, but it was estimate-1. that in
1962, out of a total of 112,736 businesses operating in the
country, over 80,000 were run by the Chinese. 3 fhis means
that the Chinese operated about 70% of all businesses.	 In
terms of employment, a more up-to-date data show that in
1970, the Chinese accounted for 65.3% of all people engaged
in commerce, as against 23.5% Malays, 10.7% Indians and
0.5% others (Table 2.1).
These figures clearly indicate that the Chinese pre-
dominate in the country's commercial activities.
	
What is
not apparent from these figures is the type of businesses
in which the Chinese are engaged.	 It is generally believed
2. See, for example, Coughlin (1960), chapter six;
Willmott (1960), chapter three and Tien (1953).
3. These were all registered businesses.
	
Some small-
scale Chinese businesses were not registered. Cf.
Dale (1962:552).
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that the majority are retail businesses dealing with
consumer goods.
Many factors have contributed to the dominant position
of the Chinese in domestic commerce. 	 Cultural explanations
such as industriousness, having more business acumen than
the natives and capable of improvising at short notice
are not uncommon (Mahathir, 1970:50).	 One writer even went
so far as to claim that the Chinese virtues were perhaps
shared equally by the buffalo (Tay, 1962:37).	 Another
writer attributed the ec ,nomic success of the Chinese to
their sophistication in he handling of money. 4 Still
another writer argued that apart from hard work and
sophistication in the handlirg of money and credit, the
Chinese were 'much more skilled at turning a social and
political situation to their own financial advantage' and
that 'their prosperity .... is a result of their capacity
to profit from colonial rule by others' ' (Silcock, 1965:183).
While all these factors might have been possible reasons
at one time or another, an important historical factor should
not be overlooked. 	 This is that, at all times government
regulations discriminated against the Chinese in the
government service in favour of the indigenous people. This
led the Chinese to look more and more to the increasingly
4. According to Freedman (1959:64-65), "The Chinese were
economically successful in South-east Asia not simply
because they were energetic immigrants, but more
fundamentally because in their quest for riches they
know how to handle money and organize men in relation
to money".
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expanding opportunities in commercial pursuits which were
not attractive to the Malays who, because of their
feudalistic attitudes and traditions, were more inclined
to seek employment in government service.
	
Other reasons
favouring the Chinese will be discussed in the sections
that follow.
The Characteristics of Chinese Business Enterprise 
The most striking feature of the Chinese business
enterprise in Malaysia, as in other South-east Asian
countries such as Thailand and Indonesia, is its familism.
This is to say that the business is essentially a family
enterprise often employing family members exclusively.
When outsiders are employed, they are often related to the
owner in one way or another. The business is often passed
on from the father to the son or sons. The family is the
core of the business.
	
It is the basic economic as well as
occupational unit.	 Because of this family-centred nature
of the business, it is often rightly said that to 'become
associated with the business, one must first become part
of the family. This is relatively easy for a Chinese who
speaks the same dialect as the owner of the business. 	 In
the case of a non-Chinese it is a very difficult matter.
For one thing he is handicapped by the lack of knowledge of
the Chinese language which is so essential in Chinese
business.
	
Secondly, many Chinese businessmen are prejudiced
against the non-Chinese especially the Malays, who are
considered to be lazy, stupid, and lack business acumen.5
5. It is interesting to note that a similar prejudice
against the natives exists in Thailand. Cf. Coughlin
(1960:122).
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This partly explains why only an insignificant number of
Malays have been employed by Chinese business enterprises.
A second characteristic of the Chinese business
organization is its small-scale operation, with little
capital or management resources.
	 In 1973, out of 120,000
registered Chinese businesses operating in West Malaysia,
(which amounted to 71% of the total registered businesses
in the country), as many as 65% are in the retail trade.6
As Tan Siew Sin aptly puts it, "the bulk of them (Chinese
merchants and traders) are shopkeepers, large and small,
but mostly small retailers and distr 4 butors".	 (Straits
Times, September 3, 1972).
This leads to a third characteristic - informal
organization.	 Being small, most Chinese businesses are
organized informally, in that there is no fixed system of
accounting, prices are often flexible and written agreements
are rare. Employment in Chinese firms is also secured
informally, often through the recommendations of friends
add relatives.	 This informal system of recruitment is not
without consequences. It tends to favour relatives against
non-relatives and members of one's own dialect group against
other dialect speakers and finally it works to discriminate
6. Figures taken from Malaysian Business, "Why do so many
Chinese family businesses remain small?" February,
1973, p.43.
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non-Chinese in favour of Chinese.
	
Both these characteristics
of informality and familism discussed above are important
factors favouring Chinese control of commerce to the
disadvantage of the non-Chinese.
Instability is another feature of Chinese business
enterprise.	 Constant failures in businesses have given
rise to the saying that Chinese enterprises seldom last
more than three generations. Unwise speculation, fluctuating
world market prices are some of the reasons.
	
More signifi-
cantly, the relatively small scale of their business enterprise
and the ccm-Jquent lack of capital and management knowledge
give no	 for expansion. The business either remains
small or sinks.	 In many cases there is no one to take
over the fa ther's enterprise and the business dies with the
father.
Recently, concern has been shown over the future of
Chinese small-scale family businesses in the wake of
Malaysia's industrialization and modernization under the
New Economic Policy. Tan Siew Sin, the Malaysian Finance
Minister, addressing a MCA Annual Assembly, said, "far too
many of our businesses are family businesses which, by their
very nature, are unable to adapt themselves to take advantage
of the opportunities available." Tan even went to the extent
of describing family businesses as "the bane of the Chinese
community" because "quite often they become smaller, instead
of larger with the passage of time". (Straits Times, September,
3, 1972).
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While the description of family trade as the bane of
the Chinese community may be an overstatement, it is
nevertheless true that most Chinese family businesses have
remained small.	 A host of factors are believed to have
contributed to this state of affairs.
	 One important
reason concerns the nature of Chinese family enterprises.
As indicated earlier, the bulk of them are small retailers
engaging in buying or selling. Moreover, many of these
retail businesses are located in, and serve particular
areas. There is strictly no basis for them to expand.
Equally important is the economic reason. Yleing
small, most Chinese family enterprises lack capital or
management resources, which in many ways restrict the growth
of the businesses. 	 (Malaysian Business, Feb. '073:43).
Thus far we have discussed some of the factors
contributing to the dominant position of the Chinese in
commerce and some features characteristic of Chinese business
enterprise.
	 It is true that small-scale commercial
activities are largely controlled by the Chinese. 	 But it
is not the same as saying that the Chinese control trade and
commerce of the country.
	
It is the foreign companies owned
by Europeans that really control Malaysia's trade and commerce.
Before Independence, it was estimated that European-owned
firms controlled about 70% of both Malaysia's export and
import trade (Puthucheary, 1960: xiv-xv).	 In 1970 of the
total p15,289 million share capital, as many as 60.7% was
82
accounted for by foreign interests compared with 22.5% by
Chinese, 1.9% by Malays and 1.0% by Indians. 	 In commerce,
the Chinese accounted for 30.4% of the share capital, as
against 63.5% by Europeans, 0.8% by Malays and 0.7% by
Indians (see Table 2.2).
	
These figures indicate that a
large proportion of Malaysia t s commerce is still in the hands
of the foreigners, but among the local communities, it is
true that Chinese have the largest share.
The Chinese in Manufacturing Industries 
The Census of Manufacturing Indt/=-tries, West Malaysia,
listed a total of 9,013 manufacturiv,3- establishments operating
in the country in 1968. These included among others, the
manufacturing of food products, beverage, tobacco, processing
of estate-type agricultural products off-estates, textiles,
footwear, furniture and fixtures, paper products, printing and
publishing, chemicals and chemical products, rubber products,
mineral products, metal products, machinery and transport
equipment. 7
 For one reason or another, the Census did not
provide a racial breakdown of ownership. Neither did it
show the racial composition of the labour force. This makes
it difficult for us to assess the extent of Chinese partici-
pation in manufacturing industries.
7. Department of Statistics, Census of Manufacturing
Industries, West Malaysia, 1968, p.17, Table 1.
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However, in terms of employment by ethnic groups, some
light can be gleaned from the 1957 Population Census.
	
In
the manufacturing sector the total economically active
population in 1957 was 135,382 of which 97,502 were Chinese,
26,588 Malays and 10,086 Indians and the remainder others. 8
This means that in terms of employment the Chinese accounted
for approximately 72% of the total as compared to 20%
Malays.	 The figures for 1970 were more revealing.	 The
figure for the Chinese had dropped to 65.4% while Malay
employment in manufacturing had increased to 28.9% (Table
2.1).	 The increase of Malay employment was largely the
result of the governmeilL imposition of the racial quotas in
the recruitment of fe-4....;-y employees.
As in commerce, ma-l-facturing industries in Malaysia
have never been controlled by the Chinese. In terms of
share capital in manufacturing, of the total $M1,348
million in 1970, only 22% was owned by the Chinese, as
compared to 59.6% foreign interests, 2.5110 Malays and 0.750
Indians (Table 2.2).
The majority of the Chinese firms are under individual
proprietorships and partnerships with small capital.
Though such firms accounted for as many as 86% of the
total manufacturing establishments in 1969, they only
contributed 22% in terms of value added and 10% in terms
of capital assets (Second Malaysia Plan:151).
8. 1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya,
Report No. 14, Table 11.
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The Chinese in Mining
The main minerals mined in Malaysia are tin, iron,
bauxite and crude oil.	 In terms of employment, value added
and foreign exchange earned, tin is by far the most important
of the minerals.9
In 1967, in terms of employment 68,000 persons were
engaged in various mining and quarrying activities. Of
these 58,000 were engaged in tin-mining.
	
Although mining
only constituted less than 2.5% of the employed labour force
and 7% of the GDP at that time, mineral products amounted to
over 30% of the value of exports.	 By mid-1970 the number
in employment in mining dropped to 64,000 and output to
6.5% of the GDP, and mineral products accounted for 29% of
the total export earnings. 10
Mining is another sector where Chinese labour predominates.
In 1967, for example, the Chinese constituted 67.2% of
the employed labour force. The figures for Malays and Indians
were 21.4% and 10.3% respectively (Second Malaysia Plan:173).
The corresponding figures for 1970 still show Chinese
predominance in mining activities, even though their percentage
9. In 1971 and 1972, tin accounted for 23.1% and 22.9%
respectively of Malaysia's total export values. 	 See
Department of Statistics, Preliminary Figures of External
Trade for December 1972, p.12 and March 1973, pp.12-13.
10. There is a slight discrepancy between the figures given
in the Second Malaysia Plan (p.170) and those provided
by the 1967 Census .of Mining Industries.
	
The latter
gave the total employment in mining industries for 1967
as 61,063 of which 55,134 were engaged in tin mining of
one form or another. 	 See Department of Statistics,
Census of Mining Industries in West Malaysia, 1967.
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point dropped to 66% as against 24.8% Malays and 8.4%
Indians (Table 2.1).
The earliest tin mining activities in Malaysia were
mainly carried out by the Malays before the arrival of
the British. The Chinese began tin mining on a small-
scale in approximately 1824.
	
Their participation in the
industry increased with the discovery of tin ore in Perak
and Selangor, until eventually they came to control most
of the tin mines in these two states. 	 In the beginning,
the Europeans took little part in tin mining. 	 Their
relative share in the industry began :o increase only since
the turn of the century, with the ir' —oduction of gravel-
pump and bucket-dredge mining.
	
Despite some initial failures,
the European tin-mining sector continued to exist and expand,
so that by 1910 22% of the total tin output of the Federated
Malay States was produced by European mines (Lim, 1967:50).
The Chinese had nearly full control of the tin mining
industry in the beginning.	 In the last three decades of
the 19th century, nearly all the tin produced in the country
was mined by the Chinese.	 By 1910 they still produced 78%
of the total output.
	
Since then the Chinese sector of the
industry began to decline slowly.	 By 1920 the percentage
of the Chinese sector was reduced to 64%, and by 1929, only
49% (Table 2.3).
	
While the output of the Chinese mines was
declining, that of the Europeans was on the increase. This
pattern persisted until 1961, when the European sector
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produced as many as 65% of the total output (Table 2.4).
By 1963, the production of European sector dropped slightly,
but it still constituted 60% of the total output.
	 Subsequent
production figures according to racial origin are not
available.	 But there is no reason to believe that the
predominant position of the European mines should have
changed.	 In 1967, in terms of value of minerals produced,
more than 50c;0 of it was accounted for by foreign companies. 11
The relative and absolute decline of the Chinese sector
of the tin mining industry was, to a large extent, the
result of technological changes in mining methods introduced
at the turn of the century, namely, the adoption f dredges.
The dredging method was highly capital intensive and required
relatively less labour. 	 The rapid growth of th,e dredging
sector made it difficult for the Chinese miners to compete
for mining land with European mining entrepreneurs. Another
important factor resulting in the decline of the Chinese tin
mining sector was the exhaustion of known mining land
suitable for non-dredge mining (Lim, 1967:55).
The majority of Chinese mines are small-scale operations
owned by a large number of individual entrepreneurs. In
1967, of the total of 1,389 mines owned by Malaysians (of
whom the bulk of them were Chinese), as many as 968 were
under individual proprietorship and partnership, only less
11.	 Department of Statistics, Census of Mining Industries
in West Malaysia, 1967, p.53,
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than one third were private and public limited companies.
Furthermore, in terms of methods of mining, most of the
Chinese mines belong to the following categories: gravel-
pumping, hydraulicing, open-casting, underground and dulang
washing. This is in sharp contrast with European mines,
the majority of which are limited companies employing
dredges.
In terms of share capital in mining, there is no
doubt that foreign companies occupy a pre-eminent position.
In 1970 foreign interests accounted for 72.4% of the total
share capital of limited companies in mining and quarrying.
The share of the Chinese was only 16.8%. Malay and Indian
ownership was insignificant, amounting to 0.7% and 0.4,C.
respectively (Table 2.2).	 But the strength of the Chinese
in mining lies in small-scale operations under individual
proprietorship and partnership. Together these small
operations produce 40% of the total output. 	 It is thus
clear that even though the industry is foreign-dominated,
the Chinese have the largest share vis-a-vis the Malays and
the Indians.
The Chinese in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
In contrast with commerce, manufacturing and mining -
where the Chinese have a dominant position over the Malays
- the Chinese have never been very active in agriculture,
12
12.	 Department of Statistics, Census of Mining Industries,
p.10.
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forestry and fishing, which provide employment for nearly
one half of the population.	 The 1957 Census shows that of
the total of 1,245,000 persons gainfully employed in
agricultural sector, the Chinese constituted only 310,000,
approximately 25%, as against 60% Malays. 13	In 1970, as
can be seen from Table 2.1, the Chinese accounted for only
21.4% of the total employment in agriculture, forestry and
fisheries.
	
The Malays, on the other hand, constituted as
many as 67.6%.
It is clear from these figures that employment in the
agricultural sector is dominated b y tne Malays. 14 However,
what is less obvious is that many a_lcultural Malays are
to be found in traditional low productivity activities.
In terms of ownership of assets in modern agriculture,
Malay share in the corporate sector was only 0.3% in 1970.
But their share in the non-corporate sector amounted to
47.1%.
	
The Chinese share in the corporate and non-corporate
sectors was 25.9% and 32.8% respectively (Table 2.5).
It mus. t be noted that Chinese participation in the
agricultural economy is largely concentrated on rubber
13. 1957 Population Census, Report No.14, Table 11.
14. In 1967-68, 65% of the Malay working population were
engaged in agricultural occupations. The correspon-
ding figures for Chinese and Indians were 30.1% and
47.0% respectively.	 This shows that among the three
local communities, the Chinese are least engaged in
agricultural pursuits.	 See Choudhry (1970:100).
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industry and to a smaller extent other agricultural products
requiring substantial processing such as palm oil and coconut.
The 1957 figure shows that about two-thirds of the Chinese
employed in agriculture were engaged in rubber industry.
Chinese participation in market-gardening (vegetable growing)
is also remarkable. 	 In 1957, they accounted for more than
80% of the total of 46,000 engaged in market-gardening.
However, in the rice cultivation, fishing and other miscel-
laneous agricultural pursuits, Chinese role is relatively
unimportant.	 In such instances it is the Malays who
predominate. 15
The Chinese in the Rubber Industry,
Rubber is the most important agricultural pzoduce as
well as the largest export industry of Malaysia.
	
In 1971
the total planted area under rubber was 4,246,000 acres, of
which 1,561,000 acres were under estates (holdings of 100
acres and above) and 2,685,000 acres under small-holdings.
The Chinese have a fairly big share in the rubber
industry, both in terms of ownership and employment. The
1953 statistics (Table 2.6) shows that 22.8% of the estates
and 40.1% of the small-holdings were owned by Chinese.
Taking the rubber estates and small-holdings together, the
Chinese share of the planted acreage was about 30%, as
against 42% Europeans and 19% Malays.	 If one takes Asian
15.	 Cf. 1957 Population Census, Report No.14, Table 11.
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Table 2.6: Ethnic ownership of rubber estates
and small-holdings, 1953 (percentage
distribution) 
Race
European
Estate
69.6
Small-
holding
-
Estate and Small-holding
All Races	 Asian only
41.6	 -
Chinese 22.8 40.1 29.7 50.9
Malay 0.6 47.3 19.4 33.3
Indian 5.6 8.7 6.8 11.7
Others 1.4 5.0* 2.4 4.1
Total	 * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total 1000
acres
2,029.7 1,369.8 3,399.5 1,987.1
includes some medium small-holdings owned by Europeans.
Source: Lim Chong Yah, op.cit. p.117.
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ownership only, the Chinese accounted for one half, the
Malays one third and the Indians owned the bulk of the
remainder.
The 1953 figure shows clearly the predominant position
of the Europeans in rubber estates.
	
This situation
persisted even though the total planted acreage owned by
Europeans have declined and those of the Asian sector have
increased steadily.
	
By 1966 the Europeans still owned
55.8% of the total estates.
	
By 1970 foreign control of
the rubber estates was still evident.	 Of the total planted
estate acreage foreigners owned slightly more than 50%. 16
The bulk of the remainder was owned by the Chinese. The
Malay ownership of estates is insignificant.
	 Of the rubber
small-holdings (slightly over 2 million acres in 1970),
Malays and non-Malays shared about equally in ownership.
Taking the rubber estates and small-holdings together (4.2
million acres in 1970), the Malays owned 375/0,
 the non-Malays
42% and the foreigners 21% (Second Malaysia Plan:39-40).
In terms of the size of the estates, those owned by
the Chinese are generally smaller than the European-owned.
This is clearly shown by the 1971 statistics on estate
ownership. Even though the Chinese and other Malaysians
accounted for only 44% of the total planted estate acreage,
16.	 At least three factors have contributed to the decline
of European rubber acreage both absolutely and
relatively.
	 First, during the Japanese Occupation
period, thousands of acres of European rubber estates
were destroyed.
	 Secondly, there was the constant
subdivision of rubber estates into small holdings
during and after the War and finally, some European
estates shifted to oil-palm cultivation.
	 See Lim
(1967:112).
97
as against 56% owned by European and other foreign interests,
they owned as many as 1,480 estates out of a total of 2,014.
Moreover, they accounted for only 62 estates with 2,000 acres
and above, while the corresponding figure for foreign
companies was as many as 153 (Rubber StatistiallHandbook,
1971:14 & 30).
The main reason for the smaller size of China se estates
in comparison with the European ones lies in the difference
in capital supply and economic organization of both communi-
ties. The Europeans could mobilize much more capital and
technical know-how to build up and maintain large-scale
estate operations through their asilLy houses, secretarial
firms and joint-stock companies.
	
rTYI-9 Chinese had no such
advantages. The majority of them erated under individual
proprietorship and partnership with relatively smaller
capital 17 and could only operate and maintain smaller scale
estates (Lim, 1967:116).
It is impossible to estimate the total number of Chinese
and Malays engaged in rubber small holdings. However, it
is reasonable to believe that a substantial proportion of
the working population of both communities are involved in
small holdings.
In terms of estate labour, Table 2.7 should provide a
rough guide.
17. In 1971, nearly half of the estates owned by Chinese
and other Malaysians were under partnership and only
60 out of a total of 1,480 were public companies.
See Rubber Statistical Handbook (1971:12).
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It is evident that all the three communities are
substantially involved in estate employment.
	
The trend
seems to be that while the labour force of Chinese and
Indians is declining, that of the Malays is on the
increase.
The Chinese in other Industries 
Another industry where the Chinese have a significant
control in terms of labour force and ownership is
construction.	 In 1970 the Chinese share in the labour
force of the industry was 72.1% as compared to 21_7% Malays.
In terms of share capital of limited companies in the con-
struction sector, the Chinese owned 52.8%.	 In transport
and communications, the number of Chinese employed is also
substantial, even though the number of Malays is even greater.
In 1970 the Chinese share of the total employment in this
sector was 39.6% as compared to the Malay share of 42.0:.
Banking and insurance is another area in which the Chinese
play an important role. 	 Even though in terms of ownership,
a large proportion of the share capital is in the hands of
foreigners (52.2% in 1970), the Chinese are the most important
local group in banking and insurance. Among the local
communities, they have the largest share in the share capital
(24.3% in 1970).	 Moreover, in terms of employment, the
Chinese constitute a very significant number.
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Ownership and Control of Malaysian Economy
Thus far we have indicated the participation of the
Chinese in Malaysia's major industries.
	 In terms of
employment there is little doubt that they occupy a pre-
dominant position.
	 This is particularly so in mining,
commerce and manufacturing. 18
 However, in terms of
ownership and control, the Chinese are far from dominating
Malaysia's economy.	 As can be seen from Table 2.2, it is
the foreigners, mainly Europeans, who have the largest share
in the share capital of limited companies, amounting to
60.7% of the total as against 22.5% by the Chinese. 	 The
Malay share amounts tu o.,Lly 1.9%.
Moreover, in terms of planted acreage, foreigners own
71% of the corporate sector of modern agriculture; in
industry, their share is 57 of the total fixed assets. The
corresponding figures for the Chinese are 25.9% and 26.2%
respectively, and for the Malays, 0.3% and 0.9% respectively
(Table 2.5).	 If these figures are any indications then
it is clear that important sectors of the Malaysian economy
are largely controlled by the foreigners.
The Chinese role is only secondary vis-a-vis the
foreigners.	 But among the local communities, they dominate
many vital sectors of the economy.	 The Chinese economic
18. Under the New Economic Policy introduced in 1971 which
among others favours the Malays in commerce and industry,
it is believed that the relative position of the Chinese
might have declined, even though the general picture is
still one of Chinese preponderance, especially in the
managerial and entrepreneurial ranks.
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position has been succintly summed up by Puthucheary
(1960:133):
Chinese capitalists, taken together, control
a sizeable part of the economy.
	 In most
industries they are subsidiary to European
capitalists.	 In capitalist agriculture their
share is small.	 This is also true of export-
import trade. They have a larger share of
the mining industry.
	
In minor industries
such as manufacture, transport and enter-
tainment they hold the dominant position.
Chinese capitalists are by far the most
important local capitalists.
The very substantial economic strength of the Europeoms
has been emphasized by Puthucheary. Much of Malaysials
economy, according to him, was and still is controlled by
big European companies. Of these the merchant and managing--
agency firms are by far the most important.
These (merchant and managing-agency firms)
have the strongest claim to being regarded
as typical of Malayan enterprise.
	
Several
of them were originally merchant houses
which in the later years of the nineteenth
century dominated the commercial life of
Singapore and later nursed the rubber
industry of Malaya.
	
Others began their
career as merchants in Great Britain or
Europe. A few started as planters and went
into merchanting later on. These houses
of which there are about a dozen of
importance, link together the agricultural and
mining activities of the mainland with the
commerce of Singapore, the technical
expertise of the Midlands and North Britain,
and the finance of London 	 The managing-
agency system is in essence a method of
industrial and commercial organization
designed to reduce the risk of foreign
investment in countries where business
expertise and managerial skill are scarce...
(Allen & Donnithorne, 1954:52).
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The main task of the managing-agent is, therefore, the
administration and sale of the produce (in the case of a
rubber estate, for example) of a company. 	 However, the
functions of merchant and managing agents are frequently,
though not necessarily always, carried out by the same
firm. Firms that combine merchanting and managing functions
are generally referred to as the agency houses.
As has been indicated in 'Introduction' of this study,
these European agency houses perform a wide range of economic
activities and control a considerable part of Malaysia's
economy. They specialize in imports and exports especially
as selling or buying agents for for 'sn manufacturers.
They are also managing-agents for many foreign enterprises.
In addition, they control a good part of tin mines and rubber
estates.	 In mining, for example, three mining agencies -
the Anglo-Oriental, Neill and Bell, and Osborne and Chappel
- together owned and controlled 74 out of the 108 dredges
in 1954 (Lim, 1967:70 and Puthucheary,. 1960:85). 	 In
rubber industry, two readily available examples are Harrisons
& Crosfield and Guthries.
While the Chinese do not control Malaysia's economy,
it is beyond any doubt that the vast majority of the local
capitalists are Chinese.	 In terms of incomes, the Chinese
are comparatively better off than the Malays and Indians
Figures show that the mean household income for the Chinese
is M$387, as against M079 for the Malays and M$310 for the
Indians. The median household incomes are given at MO271,
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M1122 and M$196 respectively (Table 2.8). 	 The percentage
pattern of incomes shows more clearly the relative position
of the three communities in regard to incomes. 19 The
Chinese spread of income is more even and their percentage
in the higher income groups is higher than that of the
Malays, who predominate in the lowest categories. 	 The
Indians are slightly better off than the Malays.
Chinese predominance in commercial life and the fact
that many of the local capitalists and millionaires are
Chinese have created some difficulties in race relations.
In the first place, apart from a handful of educated elite,
few peopl	 i Malaysia today realize that the bulk of the
national ecr-lomy is controlled by foreign companies. 	 Many
people still firmly believe that it is the Chinese who
really control Malaysia's economy. 	 This belief is parti-
cularly prevalent among the ordinary Malays, who often envy,
and not infrequently even feel resentful towards, the success
of the Chinese in a country the Malays regard as their own.
There are even some Malays who believe that their economic
backwardness is the direct outcome of Chinese exploitation
in the form of middlemen and creditors. All this has
affected their attitude unfavourably towards the Chinese.
19. There are no reliable recent data on the distribution
of national income by ethnic group.	 Estimates made
in 1957 showed that the Chinese received 54% of the
total national income of 143,675 million, compared
to only 30% for the Malays and 13% for the Indians.
The per capita ineome of CDlinese, Malays and Indians
were M$848 1 M4359, 14691 respectively. 	 See Silcock
and Fisk (1963:3).
Table 2.8: Income distribution of households by
percentage & race, West Malaysia 1970
TotalIncome+range per month Malay Chinese Indian other
$1 - 99 22.9 2.6 1.3 0.2 27.1
$100 - 199 19.1 7.8 4.4 0.1 31.4
$200 - 399 10.4 11.9 3.5 0.1 25.9
$400 - 699 3.0 5.3 1.2 0.1 9.6
$700 - 1,499 1.1 2.9 0.6 0.1 4.7
$1,500 - 2,999 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 1.1
$3,000 and above * 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
Total 56.7 31.3 11.2 0.8 100.0
Mean household income
Monthly $ 178.7 387.4 310.4 950.0 268.7
Median household income
Monthly $ 122.3 271.1 195.5 324.2 168.6
+Income includes cash income, imputed income for
earnings in kind plus transfer receipts.
*The percentage is negligible in relation to the
total.
Source: Mid-term Review of the Second Malaysia
Plan 1971-75.
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As long as this Chinese economic I myth l persists, it is
unlikely that the conflict stemming from it will disappear.
The second point concerns Chinese reaction against
Malay belief in the Chinese economic 'myth'.
	
The Chinese
firmly believe that their better economic position vis-a-
vis the Malays is the natural outcome of their industry,
thrift and their flexibility to modern ways, and that
Malay backwardness is the result of their laziness,
thriftlessness and conservatism.
	
(Silcock, 1965:182-3).
They feel strongly that —hatever economic position that
they have today is throurrh sheer hard work rather than
exploitation.
	
They ieei they deserve every bit of their
success.
Thus, there seem to be some elements of opposition
between the two positions and this has created a certain
amount of prejudice, uneasiness and friction between the
two peoples.
Thirdly, the informal nature of Chinese business
organizations together with their emphasis on familism
tends to exclude Malays and other non-Chinese. This is
particularly true of small-scale enterprises which are the
most characteristic of Chinese business.
	
The ethnocentric
nature of the Chinese and their prejudice against the Malays
serve further to reinforce the exclusion.
	
To some extent
this has evoked resentment among the Malays who feel that
the Chinese are unduly clannish.
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Finally, economic imbalance between the Malays and
the Chinese has been exploited and made a political issue
by some unscrupulous politicians.	 As a result, the
difference between the Malays and Chinese in terms of
income and wealth is so much exaggerated that conflict
tends to focus on this issue only.
	
Even many of the
government policies and corrective measures tend to concen-
trate on economic differences between ethnic groups,
rather than between the poor and the rich.	 These policies
which are based on racial rather than economic criteria
may serve to please the Malays who benefit from them,
but they have alienated those non-Malays who occupy similar
or even lower socio-economic strata as the poor Malays.
Measures to Correct Economic Imbalance,
Realizing the economic imbalance between the Chinese
and the Malays, various attempts have been made by the
government to uplift the socio-economic position of the
Malays so as to narrow the racial economic gap. The
most important measures taken are in the form of Malay
Special Rights and more recently the New Economic Policy
incorporated in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-5).
The Malay Special Rights date back to the colonial
era. The first laws giving the Malay community special
rights were those concerning Malay Land Reservation.
These laws were essentially the product of colonial policies
designed to promote economic development, while at the same
time protecting the Malays from the disruptive effects of
107
economic development resulting from the influx of European
enterprises as well as vast numbers of Chinese and Indian
immigrants.
Under these laws, large areas of land were designated
as 'Malay Reservations'.
	
Only Malays were entitled to own
or lease land in these special areas.
	
The laws also
prohibited the Malay from transferring or leasing his land
to a non-Malay under any circumstances. In other words,
non-Malays were not only prevented from holding mortgages
on any land in the reservations, but they were also
prohibited from seizing the land in aischarge of debts. 20
Apart from the Land Reservat±^..-, the Malays were
also accorded privileges in public services by the colonial
administration. The Malay College -A Kuala Kangsar was
established in 1905 to train sons of aristocratic Malays
for positions in the public service.	 The Malay Administra-
tive Service, a junior service to the Malayan Civil Service,
was specially created to provide employment opportunities
exclusively for Malays who qualified for junior administra-
tive positions in the government.
In the field of education, the Malays were given
preferential government support.	 Only Malay education
was provided free by the colonial government, in contrast
20. The first Malay Reservation Enactment was made in the
FMS in 1913. Similar legislations were enacted in
Kelantan (1930), Kedah (1931), Perlis (1935), Johore
(1936) and Trengganu (1941). There is no Malay reser-
vation legislation in Penang. In Malacca, the Malacca
Customary Rights Ordinance, which dates back to 1886,
has a similar effect as the reservation legislation.
See The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, The Economic Development of Malaya
(Baltimore, 1955:311-313).
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to Chinese or Indian vernacular education which was largely
provided for by the respective communities or by the
missionaries in the case of English education.
These Special Rights accorded to the Malays reflected
the pro-Malay attitude of the colonial authorities.
	
But
in no way was the colonial policy genuinely designed to
achieve economic uplift and social transformation of the
Malay community.
	 Indeed, the Special Rights were designed
for the opposite objectives - to preserve the traditional
patterns and structure of the Malay community and its peasant-
based economy: the Malay Land Reservation was designed to
preserve ;,1i*_. traditional life style of the Malay peasants,
while Speci-1 Rights in the public service and education
were aimed cat preserving the status of the Malay aristo-
cratic class thus making them more effective junior partners
in the colonial system (Means, 1972:36).	 Only in later
years were these discriminatory policies considered to be
appropriate measures to uplift the economic backwardness of
the Malay community.
With Malaya's independence in 1957, the Malay Special
Rights were given specific constitutional sanction and
protection, contained in Articles 89 and 153: the former
Article concerns land reservations and the latter deals
with the reservation of quotas in respect of public service
appointments, educational facilities and business licenses.
Article 153 of the Constitution authorizes the Yang Di 
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Pertuan Agong (the Paramount Ruler) I to safeguard the special
position of the Malays' in the public service, scholarships
and training privileges, and the issuance of licenses for
the operation of any trade or business.
	
Article 89 sanctions
the system of Malay Land Reservations and permits the State
Legislatures to increase the area of the Reservations. 21
In short, there are four main areas of special rights
which the Malays have over and above other communities.
These are land reservations, preferential quotas for public
service appointments, educational special rights and
preferential quotas for business permits and liceses.
All these aim at helping the Malays achieve economic
advancement.	 Nonetheless, they are forms of aiscrimi tion
based on ethnicity and cannot avoid affecting tb Chinese
and other non-Malays in one way or another. 	 In the public
service, for instance, the job opportunities open to the
Chinese are restricted as a result of the quota system 'n
favour of Malays: the administrative elite of the public
service - the Malayan Civil Service - maintains a 4 to 1
recruitment ratio in favour of Malays; the External Af irs
Service, the Judicial and Legal Services and the Customs
Service all maintain a Malay and non-Malay ratio of 3 to 1.
21. The Constitution also provides that when a new area is
added to Malay reservations, at least an equal ar a sho id
be made available for general alienation and that the
new area should not include any land already owned by
non-Malays. To allay the fears of the non-Malays,
Article 153 gives an assurance that 'the legitimate
interests of other communities' would be safeguarded,
even though no guidance is provided as to what these
'legitimate interests' are. Article 153 further assures
that no person shall be deprived of any public office
already held by him or of any privilege or license
already enjoyed or held by him solely for the purpose
of reservations for Malays.
110
In other Special Rights areas too, the Chinese are
affected.	 Malay Land Reservations mean that there is less
land available for the Chinese.
	
Preferential quotas in
scholarships result in some bright but needy Chinese students
being deprived of an opportunity to further their studies.
Quotas in business permits and licenses make it more
difficult for the Chinese to start a business than the Malays.
The New Economic Policy, upon which the Second Malaysia
Plan is based, is designed to promote the overriding objective
of 'national unity'. 	 T-7 achieve this, two main objectives
are set forth under the Policy: first, the eradication of
poverty among all Malaysians, irrespective of race; and
second, the restructur1-2„ of Malaysian society t in order to
correct the racial economic imbalance (Second Malaysia Plan:1).
These two objectives - which are in many respects
inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing - are to be pursued
in the context of an expanding economy. This in turn means
that increases in the Gross National Product are major means
by which the two objectives are to be achieved. 22 In
particular, special attention will be paid to the Malay
community in an attempt to achieve economic balance and to
eradicate the identification of race with economic activity.
22. The Second Plan aims at a 6.5% GNP growth annually.
This means per capita income will grow at 3.7T. annually,
increasing from M$1,080 in 1970 to M$1,300 in 1975.
In employment, the Plan calls for the creation of more
than 119,000 new jobs per year during 1971-75 and
the maintenance of unemployment rate of no more than
7.3%.	 See Second Malaysia Plan, pp.51 & 101.
111
In the rural sector of the economy where the Malays
predominate, modern techniques will be introduced increasingly
to 'transform the rural sector into a genuine dynamic force
for agricultural and economic development'.	 More new land
will be opened up for cultivation with modern techniques. 23
To 'speed up the exposure of rural inhabitants,
particularly Malays and other indigenous people, to the
influences of an urban environment' efforts will be made to
foster the development of modern industries in rural areas
and the migration of rural Malays to urban areas. 	 Projects
to increase Malay participation in modern industrial activitio-i
include preferential treatment in business premises, finance_
technical and marketing advice, training etc.	 Quota system
in employment will be continued and extended to ensure that
the employment pattern in business enterprises reflects the
multi-racial composition of the population.	 Furthermore,
the various government agencies specially set up to aid
Malays will provide financial and technical assistance as
well as to set up new industries for the participation of
the Malays. 24
23. The target of the Plan is to develop over a million
acres of land - more than twice the acreage under the
previous plan.
	
Since the emphasis is on rural
development, the Malays will be the primary beneficiaries
under the land development programmes.
24. These agencies are Majlis - Amanah Rakyat (Council of
Trustees for Indigenous People), Perbadanan Nasional
Berhad (National Trading Corporation - PERNAS), Urban
Development Authority (UDA), State Economic Development
Corporations (SEDC's) and Malaysian Industrial Develop-
ment Finance (MIDF).
	 Cf. Second Malaysia Plan, p.45.
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The government also realizes the importance of education
as a major component in the development process. Programmes
of improvement of rural schools are introduced to raise the
quality of education.	 Greater attention will also be given
to ensure that the Malays have greater access to higher
education facilities especially in the sciences and other
disciplines 'essential for effective participation in modern
activities' (Second Malaysia Plan:44).
All these programmes and measures are in effect pro-
Malay and designed to correct the ececomic imbalance that
exists between the Malays and the nor Malays, and finally
to achieve national unity. 	 The government has stated
clearly its target of creating an efiective Malay entre-
preneurial class.	 That is to say, within two decades
there should be at least 30% Malay participation in terms
of ownership and management in all categories of commercial
and industrial activities (Second Malaysia Plan: 158-9).
With regard to special rights and other preferential
policies, the Chinese reaction can be divided into at least
three groups.	 The more moderate Chinese agree that Malays
are economically backward and that they should be given
special privileges until such time as they are capable of
competing with other communities without any help.
	
By
contrast, the more extreme Chinese denounce the whole idea
of special privileges as contrary to principles of democracy
and equality.	 Both groups are, however, more concerned with
the future of the special privileges and are agreed that they
1 1 3
should not be made on a permanent basis (Ratnam, 1965:114-7).
Between these two groups, there is a small group with an
indifferent and 'couldn't care less' attitude.
	
Members of
this group feel that the Special Rights is a problem between
the government and the Malays.
	
It is none of their concern. 25
Effects of Special RiFhts and the New Economic Policy.
We are concerned here only with how the Special Rights
and the New Economic Policy have affected the Chinese community.
To begin with, it should be noted that the discriminatory
policies in favour of the Malay community have at no time
appeared to he blatantly anti-Chinese.
	
They have always
been couched in languages in sUch a way as to allay Chinese
fears.	 Arl.,cle 153 on Malay Special Rights is careful to
guarantee tne Chinese that their 'legitimate interests'
would be safeguarded by the Yang Di Pertuan Agong and that
no one would be deprived of any privilege as a result of
the special rights provisions. 	 With respect to the New
Economic Policy, the government gives assurances that 'no
particular group will experience any loss or feel any sense
of deprivation' in the implementation of the Policy (Second
Malaysia Plan:1).
	
The Prime Minister assured, "The rights,
properties and privileges now belonging to whichever groups
25. In a study of communalism among the Chinese, Hong
(1971:98) reported that among his informants (a total
of ninety), 51% agreed that the Malays should be given
special rights, 24% were 'jealous' andldissatisfiedl,
20% were indifferent while only 5% were against such
rights.
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or individuals will not be taken and be given to others.
What is envisaged by the government is that the newly
created opportunities will be distributed in a just and
equitable manner". 	 (Malaysian Digest, July 15, 1971).
Yet the government measures mentioned above are
clearly discriminating against the Chinese and are regarded
as such by the latter. Thus far, special rights and other
preferential policies have definitely affected some Chinese
individuals unfavourably, even though the Chinese community
as a whole has not been seriously disturbed economically.
The Malaysian Chinese, unlike the Chinese in many other
Southeast Asian countries, are a significant min.-ity.
As immigrants, there are bound to be some discrimination
against them in favour of the indigenous. 	 But cases of
economic persecution like those occurred in Indonesia and
the Philippines are not heard of.	 By and large, the
Chinese in Malaysia are in no way an oppressed minority.
Because of their wealth and shrewdness, Chinese
businessmen have even been able to circumvent the special
rights and other government restrictions. 	 The most
common way to comply with government regulations is to take
on Malays as business partners and make them 'directors' of
the companies or firms. 	 Very often, these Malay 'directors'
are a show-piece who are paid fixed monthly salaries but h
little effective control over the companies they 'direct'.
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Related to this is the 'Ali-Baba' business set-up.
This results from the government's preferential policy for
the Malays to obtain business licenses or permits.
	
As it
is relatively easier for the Malays to obtain business
licenses, such as in transport, there is a tendency for the
Chinese who own capital and technical know-how to go into
partnership with them.	 The partnership in itself is
perfectly legitimate - the Malays provide the license while
the Chinese provide the capital. 	 But what normally happens
is that once the partnership has been set up, the Malay
partners for one reason or another are content to receive a
fixed sum for the liceilz-s they obtain and leave the effective
control and management	 the business to the Chinese.
Through this so-called 'Ali-Baba' business partnership -
which is in actual fact an abuse of the Malay Privileges by
the Malays themselves - the Chinese are able to operate in
businesses largely reserved for the Malays.
Apart from the above arrangement, the Chinese are
sometimes able to compensate for some of the discriminatory
effects through bribery and other forms of payments, even
though such payments increase their cost of doing business
and are resented by them.
	
There are even cases when the
Chinese have been able to buy land under Malay Reservations
from the Malays through corruption. 26 In short over the
years the Chinese have been able to get their way around most
26. This happened at least in one district where the
writer used to live.
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of the government regulations, and consequently their
relatively dominant economic position has not suffered
badly.
It is still too early to assess the effects of the
New Economic Policy on the Chinese community.
	
One thing,
however, is clear, and that is the advancement of Malays
would mean that to some extent the Chinese would have to
restrain their rate of progress and in many cases would even
have to retreat from the position already reached.
According to the Second Malaysia Plan, in terms of
employment, it is projected that by 1990 the Malays would
account for about 50% of the labour force in manufacturing,
commerce and mining.	 This means that the Chinese, who
dominate these three industries (accounting for more than
65% of the labour force in 1970) will have their share
reduced to 40% by 1990.
In some respects the Special Rights appear to be a
zero-sum game: the more is given to the Malays the less
is available to the Chinese.
	
The quota system in higher
education to ensure more opportunities for the Malays,
for example, has begun to affect the non-Malay communities,
especially the Chinese.
	
In 1970, the Chinese constituted
49.2% of the total higher education enrolment as compared
to 39.7% Malays.	 The position by 1973 has been reversed:
Malays accounted for 52.7% as against 38.8% Chinese. 27
27. Mid-term Review of theSecond Malaysia Plan, cited in
Dewan Masyarakat, January 15, 1974, p.21.
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In 1975, of the total enrolment of the country's five
universities, the Malays accounted for 58.5c% as against
35.5T. Chinese (New Straits Times, December 3, 1975).
This quota system to satisfy the Malays inevitably denies
equal competitive opportunities to some deserving Chinese
students.	 Many Chinese students resent the fact that
Malays with minimum academic qualifications have been given
higher education opportunities whereas with equal or better
qualifications, they are denied these opportunities.
While no serious economic damage has yet been encountered
by the Chinese community, these varied discriminatory measures
have given rise to some unintended oonsequences. 	 In the
first place, many ambitious young Chinese have been alienated
by what they consider to be 'unfair' and -unwarranted'
special rights. They feel apprehensive and resentful for
the simple reason that as citizens, they are not entitled
to all the privileges accruing from such a status. The
majority of them therefore feel that they are only treated
as second-class citizens, even though their citizenship is
obtained on the basis of jus soli.	 This being the case,
they are unprepared or even reluctant to identify themselves
emotionally with the Malaysian nation.
Secondly, the effect of pro-Malay policies has been
to sow fear, insecurity and a sense of frustration among
the Chinese. This has in turn resulted in driving the
Chinese further from integration with the Malays and encour-
aged them to look more and more to their own ethnic organiza-
tions and leaders. Unwittingly perhaps these policies have
actually helped to draw the Chinese closer together.
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In this chapter we have tried to show several things
with regards to Chinese role in Malaysian economy: first,
the relative economic position of the Chinese vis-a-vis other
local communities and foreigners; second, the fact that
Chinese do not control the Malaysian economy; third, the
Malay Special Rights and the New Economic Policy and their
effects on the Chinese; and finally how Chinese predominance
in the economy has affected race relations.
Chinese economic activities and dominance, however, are
not the only factors generating conflict among the two
communities.	 Their participation in politics has also
been seen as creating problems.
	
It is on this subject that
we would loeus our attention in the next two chapters.
CHAPTER 3 
CHINESE POLITICS IN MALAYSIA: THE PRE-WAR PERIOD 
Introduction
Politics in Malaysia, like politics in many other plural
societies, has always been a 'sensitive' and fascinating
subject: sensitive because it has largely been inter-
twined with communal issues; fascinating because in sharp
contrast with racially more homogeneous societies, many
issues which do not normally constitute political problems
in such societies assume political importance here.
Earlier we have noted how British colonialism had
resulted in the growth of a plural society in Malaysia. We
have also drawn attention to some structural features which
had developed during the colonial period. Many of these
structural features still persist today.
In the first place, Malaysia still remains an example
of a plural society par excellance, in which the bumiputra -
the sons of the soil - have a pre-eminent position in the
politics, government and administration of the country.
The Chinese, and the Indians to a smaller extent, on the
other hand, have a relatively dominant control over the
country's economic and commercial life. 	 This division is
important politically; nevertheless it constitutes but one
aspect of the diversities and heterogeneities among the
various communities.
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Secondly, there is as usual, a complete lack of
cultural homogeneity.	 The three major ethnic groups
differ very sharply from one another in their languages,
religions, customs and habits.
	
These cultural differences,
apart from constituting a serious problem to national
integration, are politically significant in another sense.
Certain cultural matters such as language, education and
religion have constituted some of the most difficult and
sensitive political issues (Ratnam, 1965:1).
It is important to note another difference - the
regional variation in the racial composition of the popu-
lation.	 Broadly speaking, the Malays are con ppri: rated in
the rural areas on the east coast and in the no7,-;,., while
the non-Malays are primarily found in the west coast and
urban centres. This regional distribution of population
to some extent quite effectively restricts social contact
between the two groups.	 Of more importance, however, is
the fact that the west coast is far more developed and
urbanized and thus enjoys a far better standard of living
than the east and the north. 	 Communal jealousies are to
some-extent being generated by this discrepancy (Ratnam,
1965:2).
A further issue which has had a great impact on the
political process of Malaysia is the question of the
Special Rights accorded to the Malays by virtue of being the
sons of the soil.	 These Special Rights, as mentioned in
the previous chapter, date back from the British colonial
rule. The Special Rights give the Malays certain concessions
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and privileges in the field of civil service appointments,
education, granting of licenses and reservation of land.
They essentially preserve the political supremacy of the
Malays. The Malays insist that as the bumiputra, their
interests should be guarded through the Special Rights
enshrined in the Constitution to help them catch up with
the non-Malays. The non-Malays, on the other hand, while
accepting the need to help the Malays, seek to ensure that
the Special Rights should not be a permanent feature.
Thus, there is a conflict between the Malay's traditional
claims and the non-Malay's demands.	 And this conflict
has, until 1971, become .... salient political issue. 1
It is only seen ir the context of this general
background of the communal framework that Chinese politics
is more meaningful. As noted at the very beginning of this
chapter, politics in the Malaysian plural society is
fascinating.	 This is taken to imply that the politics of
the Chinese, who account for more than a third of the total
population, is fascinating too. Indeed, Chinese politics
in Malaysia has been a subject of almost international
interest, particularly so during the past two decades.
This may be explained in terms of the fact that the Malayan
Communist Party consisted largely of Chinese; that it was
Chinese politics in Singapore (part of Malaysia from 1963
to 1965) that produced the phenomenon of Lee Kuan Yew; and
1. In 1971, a Parliamentary Amendment banned the public
discussion of the question of the special position of
the Malays.
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most recently that the May 1969 communal disturbance in
Kuala Lumpur is widely thought to have been an effort to
stem a Chinese challenge to Malay supremacy (Wang, 1970:1).
There is little doubt that the Chinese in Malaysia, in
sharp contrast with their counterparts insuch countries as
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, have been more
actively involved in the politics of their country of
adoption since the beginning of the British rule. 2 As a
matter of fact, it was the dispute between two rival Chinese
secret societies (two factions of tin-miners) which aided
British intervention and occupation of the Malay states.
During the Japanese Occupation, it was the Chinese who formcld
the bulk of the anti-Japanese resistance group. The sub-
sequent history of Malaysia saw Chinese involvement in the
Malayan Union of 1946 and the Federal Agreement of 1948.
The Communist Revolt (1948-1960) was organized by a communist
group consisting largely of Chinese. The Malayan Independence
movement was actively participated in by the Chinese.
	 Finally,
in the contemporary era, the Chinese are more and more active
in party politics - participating in both the nation's ruling
party as well as the opposition parties.
	 In short, the
Chinese have always been aware of the importance of power
and they are certainly more politically alert and conscious
than has been assumed by many western observers.
2. In countries like Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines,
the governments are relatively free of local Chinese.
123
In common with the Chinese in other Southeast Asian
countries, the Chinese in Malaysia fall broadly into three
distinctive groups of political orientations. 	 The first
group (Group A) includes people who maintain contact with
China's politics, either directly or indirectly, and is
always prepared to identify with China's destiny.
	
The
second group (Group B), which includes the majority of
the Chinese, i more concerned with the politics of their
own overseas community.	 It is concerned with the low-
posture and indirect politics of trade and community asso-
ciations.
	
This group is modest in its aims and frequently
appears to be non-political.
	
The	 group (Group C)
consists largely of local-born Chin--a - the babas, the
Malaysian nationalists and others. 	 It is Malaysia-
oriented and focuses its attention on local politics.3
It should be noted that these divisions are by no means
rigid and the lines between the three groups are often
difficult to draw. There have always been instances of
mobility from one group to another. 	 For exanple, a Group A
Chinese may become disillusioned with his political conviction
and join Group B or even Group C or vice versa. There are
also those 'marginal men' who are not certain which group
they belong to, just as there are some who possess the key
attitudes of one group but would pretend that they belong
to another.	 Finally, there exist also a few individuals
who reject all the three groups (Wang, 197):6). 	 It is
also important to note that each of these three groups is
not absolutely homogeneous. All three are divided among
themselves by political ideology and party affiliations.
3. For a thorough discussion of the three groups, see
Wang (1970:1-30).
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Before we proceed further, a number of qualifications
are in order.	 In the first place, as has been discussed
in chapter 1, the Chinese are heterogeneous.	 There are
many lines of divisions in the community: dialect separate-
ness, different educational background, differences in
political affiliations, and before the war, the division
between the China-born and the local-born.
	
All these
divisions have been important at one time or another and
in one way or another, in affecting the political ideas
and attitudes of the Malaysian Chinese (Wang, 1970:3-4).
Secondly, before the war, in the beginning of their
settlement in particular, the Chinese were generally
apatheti,„ t.,orards Malaysian politics.
	
This was partly
explained in terms of their dividedness itself. 	 Other
factors	 as the greater attractiveness of the politics
In China, the traditional Chinese political philosophy
which they brought with them and the general agreeableness
of the British government to their thoughts and customs,
certainly contributed.	 The most important reason, however,
lay in the nature of their immigration. The Chinese had
originally come to Malaysia for the purpose of earning a
livelihood and looking for wealth, and the majority of
them were transient sojourners during the period, especially
before 1900 (Soh, 1960:35).	 Being largely transient in
nature and economic in motivations, it is understandable
that there was little incentive for them to engage actively
in the political developments of their host country.
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A third qualification relates to the prevailing
misconception that the Chinese are non-political; and that
when they do engage in politics, they do so in a secretive
and inscrutable way.
	 These views, as pointed out by Wang
(1970;1), are anarchronistic and misleading because they
are based on the concept of politics in the modern democratic
tradition.
	
Chinese, Malay and colonial political systems
have been in varying degrees, authoritarian, and the
political life of the Chinese should be seen in that context.
With these qualifications, we are now in a position to
consider pre-war Chinese politics.
The Secret Societies 
The origin of Chinese secret societies in Malaysia can
be traced to the Triad Society in China, otherwi .,_ known as
the Hung League Ato or the Heaven and Earth Society
(i2At) 	 The Triad Society was originally a quasi-religious
cult, with the virtuous aim 'Obey Heaven and Act Righteously'(•4-71 )	 In the 18th century, however, the Society
became involved in revolutionary movements.
	
Its main aim
was to 'overthrow the Ch'ing and restore the Ming' (6.441 ).
That is to say, the organization directed at restoring the
native Chinese Ming dynasty by attempting to drive away
the foreign Manchu dynasty which had overthrown the former
in 1644.4
4.	 For a traditional history of the secret societies, see
Comber (1956, 1959) and Blythe (1969).
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In Malaysia, the secret societies were very powerful
organizations in the nineteenth century. 	 Since their
members were confined largely to the Chinese, it was not
surprising that these organizations were mainly concentrated
in the Chinese dominated Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca
and Singapore.	 Later, however, their activities and influence
spread to the Malay states.	 In the Malayan setting, the
patriotic motive of the secret societies - to overthrow
the foreign Manchus - could find little expression.
	
Their
activities were mainly of a freemasonary nature with mutual
aid and brotherly love as some of their main objectives.
Later, they gradually d-senerated into criminal organizations
with constant factior -Plfats and riots.
The role and usefu ; -ess of the secret societies in the
early days of Chinese settlement could hardly be disputed.
The majority of the Chinese immigrated to Malaya as indivi-
duals and in the new land they had to find some form of
association for their mutual benefit. 	 In the absence of
other forms of associations, the secret societies therefore
provided the institutional framework of the social and
economic order within which they lived, and were the means
by which, in the last resort, they were disciplined (Jackson,
1961:49).
During those early days, the government of the Straits
Settlements impinged but little upon Chinese life. There
were hardly any British officials who were equipped with
the Chinese language and culture.
	 As a result the Chinese
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were largely left to their own devices. The influence of
the secret societies thus became all-pervading. 	 They
settled disputes, provided mutual aid and protection to the
new immigrants and their leaders even acted as buffers
between Chinese community and the British officials.	 It
is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that the Chinese
community governed itself largely through the various secret
societies in its early days in Malaya (up to 1870).
On the other hand, the evils of the secret societies
should also be recognized.	 The system enabled the unscrupu-
lous headmen, the employer, the professional tough, and the
I laukheh t (old hand) to dominate, intimidate and even exploit
the often helpless 'sinkheh l (new-comer).	 Moreover, there
were frequent clashes over the right to control lucrative
'rackets', mining areas, and sometimes as a result of
jealousy over women. All these were constant sources of
serious disorder causing grave concern on the part of the
British colonial administrators.5
It is not proposed here to assess the relative merits
and demerits of the Chinese sectet societies.	 What we are
more concerned with, however, is the political significance
5. Throughout the first three quarters of the 19th century,
there were a series of serious secret societies clashes
in Singapore, Perak and Penang. 	 In view of this, the
Chinese Protectorate was established in 1877.	 It was
staffed with officials well-equipped with the Chinese
language and customs.	 Its major concern was the various
aspects of the Chinese problems, particularly the problem
posed by the secret societies.	 By 1890, with the enact-
ment of the Societies Ordinance, the secret societies were
outlawed. This by no means spelt the end of the secret
societies which continued to exist illegally. However,
the role of the societies as the dominant form of
association among the Chinese was gradually replaced by
the more open dialect, surname and benevolent assocxatl_ens.
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of the secret societies.
	
That is to say, our concern is
specifically the role played by the secret societies in the
making of Malayan history.
The early history of the Straits Settlements and the
Malay states was largely characterized by fights and clashes
between the rival Chinese secret societies.
	 There were
serious secret societies riots in Singapore in 1824, 1846,
1851 and 1854.	 In Perak, the faction fights occurred in
1862, and from 1872 to 1874.	 Fights also occurred in Penang
in 1867 (Comber, 1956:150-1; Blythe, 1969).	 Of these
fights, the one occurred in Perak which later came to be
known as the Larut Wars (1862-74) had the most far-reaching
effects in shaping the course of vets, and therefore merits
our special attention.
The two secret societies involved in the bloody Larut
Wars in Perak were the Ghee Hin and the Hai San. It is
generally believed that the former consisted largely of
Cantonese and the latter were predominantly Hakkas. 6 What-
ever their dialect origin it is important to note that the
main cause of the clashes was over the ownership and control
of mining land.
	 The clash went on intermittently since 1862.
Started in 1862 in Perak, it spread to Penang in 1867 and
flared up afresh in Perak (Larut) from 1872 to 1874.
	 It is
significant to note that the wars were not purely Chinese
fighting among themselves over the control of tin-mines;
to a great extent, they were intermingled with the dispute
over the succession to the Perak Sultanate.	 Rival Malay
candidates for the throne appealed for the support of, and
6. Blythe (1969:175-6) however, suggests that the mining
labour of Larut was predominantly Hakka, and that the
principal participants in the Larut Wars were, on both
sides, Hakkas from different districts in China.
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allied with one or the other Chinese factions, making the
Larut Wars more complicated.
At the peak of the Larut Wars (end of 1873) a large
number of men were mobilized and stockades built in many
places around Larut by the rival factions.
	 There was
widespread concern among both the Chinese and European
mercantile communities in the Straits Settlements over the
safety of their capital.
	 There was also a deep fear that
the disturbance would spread to the Settlements if not
stopped in time.	 Numerous pleas for intervention in the
internal affairs of the Malay states were made by various
sections of the population - particularly the mercantile
community, both in the Malay states and in the Settlements -
to the Gov-:. aor.
	 The Governor, Sir Harry Ord followed
strictly tlie policy of non-interference.
	
It was not until
Sir Andrew Clarke took over office from Ord as Governor that
the British Government decided to put a stop to the disturbances.
The action was prompted by Raja Muda Abdullah, one of the
claimants to the Perak throne, who wrote to Clarke at the
end of 1873 suggesting that a new treaty be made with the
British Government and asking for someone to be sent to
Perak to show him a good system of government (Blythe,
1969:186; Emerson, 1964:119).
A joint meeting between the Governor and the headmen
of the contending secret societies and the major Malay
chiefs of Perak was called to resolve the civil disorder
and the succession dispute in Perak.
	 The meeting took
place on the island of Pangkor in January 1874, resulting
in the famous Treaty of Pangkor. Under the Treaty, the
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Chinese secret societies agreed to disarm themselves and
have their stockades destroyed, and both factions were to
be at liberty to return to their mines in Larut.
	 Of more
importance, however, was the agreement of the new Sultan to
accept a British Resident 'whose advice must be asked and
acted upon on all questions other than those touching Malay
religion and custom'. 	 The Treaty was the first in a series
of treaties that provided the basis for British indirect
rule in the Malay states. 7
Apart from providing an opportunity for British
intervention in the Malay Peninsula, the secret societies
were politically significant in another sense. 	 nost of the
Kapitan China in Malaya through whom the British --uled the
Chinese, were themselves secret society leaders. 8 The
appointment of these headmen as Kapitans was a recognition
of their influence in the community. Some of these head-
men, however, were even brought into the official administra-
tive framework.	 For example, the Perak State Council,
established in 1877, consisted among others of two Chinese
members who were both headmen of the secret societies.9
7. For a detailed account of the British intervention, see
Parkinson (1960) and Cowan (1961).
8. Examples TAlare Yap Tek Loy, Kapitan China of Selangor, who
was headman of the Hai San. In Perak, Kapitan Ah Kwee
and Kapitan Ah Yam were leaders of Val San and Ghee Hin
respectively.
9. The two were Kapitan Ah Kwee, headman of Hai San and
Ka itan Ah Yam, headman of Ghee Hin e
 Cf. Blythe
1969:25O).
131
The history of the Chinese secret societies in Malaya,
had, at all times, manifested two striking features.
	
The
first of these was that the movement had been almost entirely
confined to the Chinese.
	 The second important feature
was that the Chinese had been the principal victims (Blythe,
1950:14).	 Other communities were generally unharmed in the
secret society disturbances.
	
Vaughan, for example, reports
that l in all the riots between secret societies, or clans,
or tribes, the government authorities and Europeans in general
and all other classes have been scrupulously respected, and
allowed to pass unharmed through streets filled with armed
parties of opposing fer'+ ; ons i (Vaughan, 1971:101).
The Larut Wars, lityiNver, appeared to be an exception to
this general rule in th?' while the warrirg parties were
largely Chinese, the MEI.lay Chiefs and some Malay secret
societies were involved in both factions.
	 The Ghee Hin had
the Malay secret societies, the White Flag as their allies
while the Hai San had the Red Flag as their allies.
	
Both
factions were patronized by rival Malay Chiefs, the Ghee Hin
and the White Flag by Raja Abdullah and the Hai San and the
Red Flag by the Menteri of Larut, who supported Raja Ismail
as the Sultan (Purcell, 1967:107-110).	 The Larut Wars,
in a sense, marked the beginning of the Sino-Malay coopera-
tion in politics.
	
In both warring factions there were
Sino -Malay coalitions and it is significant to note that
the conflict was based upon political and economic interests
rather than on race.
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The people involved in the secret societies fights were
mostly China-born Chinese.
	
During those days they were
regarded as sojourners who came to Malaysia to seek fortunes
and would return to their homeland some day. The Chinese
themselves viewed their situation in the same way.
Considering themselves to be the I llua Ch l iau l (overseas
Chinese), Malaysia was regarded at most as their second
temporary home.	 The majority of them at this time still
maintained strong ties with their homeland through having
families and relatives there.	 Those few who had political
consciousness almost invariably belonged to the China-oriented
group who looked to China for inspiration. 	 The bulk of thc_,-.7.7
Chinese, however, had little interest in politics.
	
They we:-
more concerned with their livelihood in the foreign land.
In view of this background, there is little reason to believe
that the Chinese would be interested in local politics in
the sense of active participation.
	
It would therefore 9 be
wrong to assume that the secret societies which provided the
British a rationalization to interfere with the internal
affairs of the Malay states were interested in local politics
as such. Their involvement was more out of necessity and
expediency. The Chinese fought over the control of tin
mines in Larut. They did not fight because of the disputed
question of succession to the Malay throne. The succession
dispute was mixed up in the faction feud because all parties
concerned had in one way or another a stake in the tin mines.
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The secret societies enforced their own system of law
and order throughout their membership. They were believed
to aim at establishing an imperium in imperio, and governing
the Chinese community as they pleased, without outside
interference.
	
At no time were any of the secret society
disturbances and riots directed against the local government.
They had been entirely faction fights (Blythe, 1969:77).
The lack of interest in local politics on the part
of the secret societies in particular and the majority of
the Chinese in general could also be partly confirmed by
the fact that even as late as the 1933 1 s many Chinese were
still not active in local politics.
	
Part of the explanation
for this, of course, lay in the transient nature of the
Chinese.	 As we shall see later, only whcn the Chinese
population became more settled did they begin to show a
deeper concern over their local political rights.
	
This
did not occur until the 19401s.
The Kuomintang
With the official suppression in 1890,the secret
societies were driven underground and their discipline loosened.
Since then they have degenerated into gangs of thugs and
their political power largely broken. 	 But the suppression
by no means spelt the end of Chinese political activities in
Malaya.
	
It only meant that one of the main currents of
influence working on the pre-war Chinese community in
Malaya was being controlled.
	
For before long another
important current of influence, the Kuomintang, began to
1
exert its influence on the Malaysian Chinese. 0 In the
10. The following account on the Kuomintang draws largely
on the work of Png (1961:1-32 and 1962:214-225).
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last few years before the close of the nineteenth century,
there was growing sign of political consciousness among the
Chinese when local Chinese press began to show an interest
in and concern over the political development in China. They
were more drawn towards Chinese politics when Kang Yu Wei and
Sun Yat Sen visited Malaya at the turn of the century.11
During this period, from the turn of the century until
the Second World War, the Kuomintang (KMT) dominated the
political life of the Malaysian Chinese. 	 The KMT was formed
in China in 1912, after the successful Revolution of 1911, in
which the Manchu dynasty was replaced by the Chinese Republic.
During the same year, a KMT branch was formed in Singapore.
Througho--t . .lie next year many branches were set up in Malaya.
In all a t^* .al of thirty branches were known to have been
registered in Malaya.
Prior to the formation of KMT branches, some revolution-
aries had already come to Malaysia and other Southeast Asian
countries with the specific purpose of developing and spreading
patriotism among the overseas Chinese, and of obtaining
11.	 Kang Yu Wei, a reformist, arrived in Singapore in
February, 1900 after having fled from China at the
time of the coup d l etat.	 With the support of a local
Chinese, he started the Pao Huang Hui or the Royalist
Party, thus introducing to the Overseas Chinese the
idea of organized support of politics in China.
	
Sun
Yat Sen, commonly known as 'the father of Chinese
Republic,' first visited Singapore in 1900 seeking
support from the Overseas Chinese for his revolutionary
movement in China. Later, in 1906, he formed the
Singapore branch of the T i ling Meng Hui, a revolutionary
organization, which became the nucleus of the subsequent
KMT organization in Malaya.
	
See Khoo (1973:130).
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material support for the Revolution in China. It is for
this reason that politics in China had a great bearing on
the Chinese in Malaysia.
It is not known the actual amount of financial support
the Chinese in Malaysia and other overseas territories
contributed towards the Chinese Revolution of 1911.	 But
certainly their financial support went a long way in helping
to bring about the Revolution.
	
Apart from material
contributions, there were also reports that some young men
fired with patriotism left for China to take an active part
in the Revolution. 12 In view of this, it is not surprising
that Sun Yat Sen called the overseas Chinese the . Mother of
the Chinese Revolution'.
The success of the Revolution in China brought jubila-
tion to the Chinese in Malaysia, particularly Sun's
supporters.
	
More importantly, it served to strengthen
the sense of nationalism and patriotism among many overseas
Chinese. With the formation of KMT branches in various
parts of Malaysia, the Chinese became more and more involved
in Chinese nationalism and patriotism. The KMT set up the
Reading Societies or the Shu Pao Sheh ( 4#g	 )	 as a
medium through which the Chinese were informed of the
12.	 In the Huang Hua Kang Rising ( 	 415.14V Z
of 1911 - the most important attempt before the Wuchang
Rising finally brought about the fall of the Manchus -
a sum of M$47,906 was sent by Malaysian Chinese to
help finance it.	 Of the 72 martyrs who died, 14 were
from Malaysia.
13 6
happenings in China. 13
Apart from spreading nationalist ideas, the KMT had
another important role to perform in the midst of overseas
Chinese.	 This was the wooing of capital and the collection
of funds.	 Before 1911, material support was needed to
finance the Revolution.
	
Now that the Republic was established,
money was again needed for economic reconstruction. 	 In this,
China again sought assistance from the overseas Chinese, who
were urged to help China/s national development by investing
in its industries.
Before World War Two KMT influence was widespread in
Malaysia.	 This was particularly so among the Chinese
merchants, shopkeepers and school children. 	 The influenc-,
was kept alive by a constant stream of propaganda through
the reading material and teachers from China. Textbooks
with a China-oriented content also played a part. The
result of all this was that the Chinese were very attracted
by the politics in China.
	
There was at that time relatively
little local politics in Malaysia.
	
At any rate it did not
arouse much interest and enthusiasm among the Chinese. The
majority of them were, so to speak, involved in the politics
of their homeland. 	 China was all important to them.
Despite the fact that the KMT aimed at perpetuating among
13. The Reading Societies were the vital organs of the KMT.
Their primary funation was to propagate political ideas
through reading material. But their avowed aim was
always education.	 For this reason the Reading Societies
were less vulnerable to government bans than the purely
and openly political organizations.
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the Chinese a national loyalty towards China, the Malayan
Government in the beginning adopted a tolerant attitude.
However, between 1924 and 1927, a spate of anti-British
agitation, disturbances and strikes was carried out by the
more extremist KMT left-wing elements, some believed to be
communists. 14 Grave concern was expressed, and the Govern-
ment began to fear the KMT to be an imperium in imperio 
just as it had feared the secret societies in their heyday.
Thus, in 1930 the KMT was officially banned both in the
Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay states. 	 Never-
theless the KMT supporters continued to exist by carrying out
their activities under the cover of educational or charitable
organizations.
Before the official ban was imposed there had been a
split in the KMT into the left and right. This was prompted
by Chiang Kai-Shek's action in 1927 when he purged the KMT
with its communist elements. 	 Its effect in Malaysia was that
the Communists split off into various organizations of their
own, notably the South-seas Provisional Committee of the
Communist Party and the South-seas General Labour Union.
These organizations then began to compete with the KMT in
gaining the support of the Chinese.
Two points need to be stressed in connection with the
split of the KMT.
	
Firstly, the Malaysian Chinese were already
14. Between 1924-1927 the KMT opened its doors to the
communists.
	
It is believed that the subversive
activities were mainly the work of the communists who
worked under the KMT banner.
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at this time divided ideologically between the left and the
right.	 Secondly, Chiang's purging movement in China and
its immediate repercussions in Malaysia indicated that Chinese
politics in Malaysia was still largely an extension of China's
politics.
	 It had little to do with local politics.
There was apparently a good reason for the British
colonial government to fear the KMT as an imperium in imperio.
All along the Chinese government had claimed that all over-
seas Chinese were citizens of China and as such it was
China's responsibility to look after their welfare. 	 Further-
more, the KMT in China sent agents to Malaysia to extend its
membership among the local Chinese. The local KMT branches
were also active in inculcating amo:.) ,e the Chinese a sense of
Chinese nationalism.
	
This keenness to protect the overseas
Chinese must have led the British to think that the KMT's
aim was to impose an imperium in imperio.
However, a closer look at the KMT's activities in
Malaysia indicated that China's keenness to show concern
over its overseas Chinese did not amount to an overt desire
to impose an imperium in imperio, and hence the British fear
was uncalled for.	 China was at all times interested in
Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries where the
overseas Chinese settled.
	
But its main interest was
the wealth of the Chinese, not the territories as such. As
indicated earlier, financial support had been sought from
the Chinese abroad to help bring about the Revolution, and
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during the post-Revolution period, money was again needed
for economic reconstruction and national development. This,
China again looked to the overseas Chinese for support. In
order that the Chinese in Malaysia would continue to give
China material support, China and its KMT branches had to
show concern over them, if possible protecting them, and to
kindle in them the flame of patriotism. 	 Finally, the
patriotic flame had to be kept burning. 	 The KMT in Malaysia
aimed precisely at these activities.	 It was purely China-
centred.	 Malaysia was only regarded as a temporary stage
where it could play China's politics. 	 This partly refuted
the popular view among 	 British officials that the KMT
or the Chinese regarded rialaysia as terra irredenta 15 which
China would annex some day.
Two further reason- suggested that the KMT had at no
time regarded Malaysia as terra irredenta. 	 Firstly, China
and Britain most of the time had friendly diplomatic
relations. There was simply no reason for China agitating
for the Malaysian Chinese to rise against the' local British
government.	 In the second place, post-revolution China was
hard put to the task of economic reconstruction and national
development. It is inconceivable that a nation which was
hardly able to stand on her own feet could seriously think
of annexing territories overseas.
15. Governor Clementi, who banned the KMT in 1930, made
this claim.
	
Cf. Proceedings of the Legislative
Council of the Straits Settlements (1930), 13.26,
14o
Our discussion of the KMT activities so far seems to
point to one thing: that before the Second World War, with
the exception of some local-born, the loyalty of the Malaysian
Chinese was to China.
	
This was particularly true of the
China-born or the Group A Chinese as Wang (1970) calls them.
Their loyalty was clearly demonstrated in the event of the
Sino-Japanese War of 1937.	 The war sparked off in Malaysia
a spate of anti-Japanese activites and roused Chinese patrio-
tism to its apogee.
	
The KMT, the Communist organizations,
Chinese guilds and associations and schools were all brought
together in an all-out effort to give the maximum support
to China in her moment of danger. The slogan 'Save the
Nation' echoed throughout the Chinese community. 	 A large
sum of monetary contributions was collected towards China
Relief.	 Some Chinese who were fired with patriotism even
went so far as to return to China to fight in the war. 16
It is significant to note in this connection that in
time of national danger and in an effort to save the nation
(China), the Chinese in Malaysia acted quite solidly as a
united group.	 Their feelings towards China were so strong
that the ideological differences that had existed amongst
them appeared to be of secondary importance arid had largely
disappeared for the time being. This was the time when the
ranks were closed. They no longer thought of themselves as
Cantonese, Hokkien, Hakka, or as Group A or Group B or Group
C Chinese, but simply as Chinese.
16. Between 1937 and 1940 Malayan Chinese sent M$146 million
to China.
	 In 1941 alone, M$110 million was remitted.
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Apart from official reactions, there were voices of
disapproval and resentment among the Malays as regards the
China-centred politics of the Chinese in Malaysia. News-
papers both in English and Malay were often frank about the
excesses of noisy Chinese nationalists. 	 Now and then these
Chinese were asked to show their loyalty to Malaysia by
keeping China politics out of the nation.
	
On the other hand,
sympathetic voices were also raised on behalf of the loyal
and accommodating Chinese and the hard working and peaceful
majority (Wang, 1970:14).	 On the whole, however, the
Chinese were quite free to play their KMT and some left-wing
politics, as long as the,- did not stir up too much anti-
British feeling and threaten the stability of the status
quo.
We need to have a general understanding of the pre-war
political situation in Malaysia in order to assess the
implications of the politics of the Chinese. 	 To do this,
some appreciation of pre-war British policy is essential.
As indicated earlier, the Larut Wars in Perak finally
ended with the Pangkor Engagement which served as an opening
wedge and as a model for the further expansion of British
influence in Malaya.	 The Residential System established
in Perak in 1874 was followed by Selangor and Sungei Ujong
(one of the nine territories constituting Negri Sembilan) in
the same year.	 Pahang came under the system in 1888. Each
of these states had separate administration until 1895 when
the four states combined to form the Federated Malay States
with a fairly centralized administration.
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The four northern Malay states were under Siamese
suzerainty until the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 which
transferred to Britain rights of suzerainty.
	
With Johore in
the south, these five states formed the Unfederated Malay States.
In terms of administration, the Unfederated Malay States had
more autonomy and were less directly under the control of the
British as compared to the Federated Malay States.
Thus, there were three major political entities in pre-
war Malaya, the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States
and the Unfederated Malay States, as we have earlier discussed.
The Straits Settlements were under the direct control of the
Governor who was at the same time the High Commissioner
of the Federated and Unfederated Malay States. The
Resident in each of the Federated Malay States was subject
to the central direction of the Resident-General and the
High Commissioner. The Unfederated Malay States accepted
British Advisers but retained greater autonomy and remained
more traditional in their political system. 	 In view of the
fact that each Malay state still retained a certain amount
of autonomy, it was not surprising that many historians
referred to the country at this time as having no less than
ten governments - the government of the Straits Settlements
and the nine State governments. This anomaly was, if
anything, indicative of the lack of political unity at the
time. This lack of political unity may partly be attributed
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to the population itself.	 The Malays at this time were
still deeply concerned with regional loyalties, and had not
yet developed a common national spirit. 	 The Chinese were
pre-occupied with improving their economic position while
the Indians were primarily labourers on the estates whose
main concern were to eke out a living (Ratnam, 1965:36).
The pre-war policy of the British administration had
a pro-Malay bias while at the same time remaining benevol-
ently humanitarian towards the immigrant communities.
Basically, the pro-Malay policy followed three principles:
firstly, as laid down in the treaties, the legal position of
the Sultans was largely safeguarded; secondly, i„Lie political
structure of the Malay government was largely1 .. ..-tzerved; and
finally, the Malays were regarded as the indigerwis people,
and the government accepted special responsibility for their
welfare and the preservation of their rights as the 'sons of
the soil' (Means, 1970:43).
	
While helping to preserve the
traditional pattern of the Malay society and its peasant-
based economy, these policies did not in any way equip the
Malays to face the challenge of a competitive economy.
These pro-Malay policies served to maintain Malay
supremacy in the administrative and political field vis-a-
vis other local communities.
	
As far as the British were
concerned, the governments were virtually in their hands
because the 'advice' given to the sultans by the British
Residents or Advisers had to be 'acted upon'. 	 British
control was most evidently manifested by the fact that the
higher positions in the civil service were overwhelmingly
staffed by British officials.
144
British indirect rule seemed to have functioned well in
dividing the local communities into their separate compart-
ments: the Malays were quite happy as long as they were
given special concessions and the Malay trappings of the
government retained; the non-Malays were also contented so
long as they were left alone to go about their business.
As a result, few complaints were made.
	
The policy was
remarkably effective in discouraging widespread political
activity.
	 Membership in the State Legislative and Executive
Councils was largely appointed rather than popularly elected,
and these councils had limited political power and merely
served as advisory bodies to the government.
In	 of the discouragement on the part of the
British authority, some organizations with political objectives
did develor in pre-war Malaya. The notable Malay organizations
were the Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (Singapore Malay Union),
Persatuan Melayu Selangor (Selangor Malay Union) and the
Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Union of Malay Youth). 17
 The Chinese,
as indicated earlier, had their organizations such as the KMT
and Communist organizations. The most notable Indian
organizations were the Young Men's Indian Associations and
the Central Indian Association of Malaya. The former was
founded in 1922 while the latter in 1936.18
17. The Singapore Malay Union was founded in 1926 by Mohammad
Eunos bin Abdullah, the founding of which marked the begin-
ning of organized political activity by the Malays in
Singapore. By 1937, smu branches were formed in Penang
and Malacca. The Selangor Malay Union was formed in 1935.
It was the first of a number of similar Malay associations
formed in other Malay states. The Union of Malay Youth, a
radical Malay nationalist party, was formed in 1937. Cf.
Means (1970:21-23).
18. During the 1930's the Central Indian Association of lealaya
became an important vehicle for Indian nationalism in
Malaya. Cf. Means (1970:39).
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Of all these organizations, only those belonging to the
Malays were more concerned with developments in Malaya. 19 The
Chinese and Indians were more drawn towards nationalist
movements in China and India respectively. Thus we had a
situation in which the three communities were facing different
directions politically: one was essentially local-oriented
while the other two foreign-oriented. 	 There was practically
no need for intercommunal cooperation in politics. 	 The
political interests of the three communities were different.
This was significant in that as a result of this, the ethnic
communities were not as inclined to regard each other as
political protagonists.
	
Politics was therefore not an
important factor in communalism. 	 From the point of view of
race relations, this situation at least provided a partial
exp3anation of the relatively low intensity of communal
conflict in pre-war Malaya (Means, 1970:44).
Turning back to Chinese politics, the pre-war period
saw Group A Chinese most outspoken and active. The KMT
consisted largely of Group A Chinese.	 So were the communist
elements that split off from the KMT after 1927.	 In short,
they dominated local Chinese politics.	 In order to extend
their influence, they dominated the two related fields of
education and publishing. Their strength grew rapidly as
literate Chinese were imported to become teachers and to edit
newspapers and magazines.	 Their ultimate aim was to encourage
Chinese consciousness and make all the Chinese dedicated to
China alone.	 Nevertheless, in spite of their enthusiasm
and their near monopoly, in education and the Chinese press,
19. A qualification is necessary in this connection. Even
the Malays became politically motivated partly as a
result of reactions to events in Egypt, Turkey and
Indonesia.
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they were unable to surmount some of the difficulties
facing them.	 First of all, they lacked financial resources.
Their leaders were primarily modern Chinese literati and
their supporters school-boys and poorer artisans and urban
workers.	 Secondly, there were government restrictions on
their activities.	 They could not preach and criticize as
they pleased.	 Some of their more extreme leaders were
even deported. (Uang, 1970:11).
With these limitations, Group A Chinese therefore
depended on Group B Chinese majority for their support in
order to carry out their mission.	 But the latter's support
was not easy to come b y .	 Group B Chinese have always been
noted for their low-pore politics and their cautions and
reservations. They were not prepared to risk their working
arrangements with the colonial government and their control
over well-established community organizations in order to
fully support Group A Chinese. Being reserved and cautious
Group B Chinese often adopted the middle-course and their
aims were moderate.	 Some of them did support the KMT or the
communist-dominated organizations. 	 Their general attitude
was that so long as they were assured of their community
identity, there was room for a variety of political activities
(Wang, 1970:12).
As for Group C Chinese who identified with the British
power, their influence was still found in the colonial Legisla-
tive Council of the Straits Settlements.
	
In both the FMS and
UMS, however, they were less prominent. 	 In both cases, their
identification with the British power had probably caused them
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to lose some of their earlier ability to communicate with
the political elite.	 Furthermore, both the FMS and UMS
favoured Malays in the civil service.
It is significant to note the Chinese image of them-
selves at this time.
	
Group A Chinese were the most
outspoken and their main target was the Group C Chinese.
It was not uncommon for Group A Chinese to attack Group C
Chinese for not being able to speak Chinese and for their
collaboration with the British imperialists.
On the other hand, towards Group B Chinese, Group
A's attitude was often gentle, mainly because the former
was numerous and many of them rich.
	
In order to gain
their support, the tone must be persuasive and appealed
to Chinese sentimentality. 	 Occasionally, however, there
were criticisms about Group B's timidity and opportunism
when they were seen to be over-cautious.
Group C Chinese were generally defensive because of
their l UnChineseness l
 in the eyes of other Chinese. 	 But
now and then, they counter attacked Group A Chinese for
their emotionalism and China-centred political actions
which might endanger the Chinese community as a whole in
the eyes of the local government.
	
Occasionally, they also
condemned Group B Chinese for their fence-sitting and
their tendency to seek the best of all worlds.
Group B Chinese, who were attacked on both sides,
rarely made any counter-attacks. They generally considered
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politics to be a double-edged weapon to be used with great
care.	 Because of their relative silence, it is difficult
to determine what they really had in mind.	 But some
evidence can be gleaned from Chinese newspapers editorials
that they did have some admiration for Group A Chinese for
their political convictions and were only critical of their
methods.	 They also envied Group C's official and professional
positions but were sorry for their loss of IChinesenessl
(Wang, 1970:14-15).
The Malayan Communist Party
We have thus far seen two main c . trrents of influence
in the pre-war Chinese community in ...Alaya - the secret
societies and the KMT.
	
It was not until the outbreak of
the Second World War that there appeared the prominence
of another influential current - communism through the
Malayan Communist Party (MCP).
	
Beginning some time before
the War, the Communist's influence remained a strong force
even well after the war.	 In 1948, the MCP launched an
armed insurrection, and triggered off a twelve-year
guerilla-type warfare, affecting the whole Malayan nation
in general and the Chinese community in particular.
As far back as the 1920 1 s, Communist elements were
beginning to become active in the KMT organizations.
Chiang Kai-shek's purging of the Communists in China in
1927 had its repercussions among the Chinese in Malaya.
There was a similar split in Malaya, causing most of the
communists to go underground. 	 But it was not until 1930
that the MCP was clandestinely formed to replace the Nanyang
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Communist Party established in 1922.	 The declared intention
of the MCP was to work for a Soviet Republic of Malaya
(0 1 Ballance, 1966:23). The party was active in trade
unions and responsible for labour unrest and sabotage in
the mid-1930 1 s.	 The MCP was never popular in its early
days, its supporters being mainly Chinese labourers and
workers.	 The reception from other ethnic groups has
always been cold.
	
Among the Chinese dialect groups, the
Hainanese and Hakkas appeared to be especially attracted
by Communism.	 It is difficult to determine why this was
so.	 And there was little evidence to support Purcell's
(1967:214) view that tne Hainanese and the Hakkas were
distinctly different ffu.A other mainland Chinese and their
disposition to left-wirE politics was partly to increase
their prestige in the Chinese community by drawing attention
to themselves.
The Japanese Occupation of Malaya in 1941 had a great
impact on the country as a whole. 	 To begin with, the
Occupation destroyed the belief of the people in the
invincibility and permanence of British rule. What had
earlier seemed to be the 'superior protecting power' had
now suffered a disastrous and humiliating defeat after
some ineffective fighting.
The Occupation also severely disrupted the hitherto
relatively harmonious relations of the different ethnic
groups in the country. The policy of the Japanese was
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essentially one of 'divide-and-rule'.	 Various attempts
were made to win over the Malays. The authority and
sovereignty of the sultans was recognized and the Malays
continued to serve in the civil admini tration of the
country.	 Some of the prominent Malay nationalists such
as Ibrahim Yaacob, Ishak bin Haji Mohammad and Ahmad
Boestamam were released from British imprisonment to be
given employment in the Japanese administration. 	 The
Japanese also sponsored the Pembela Tanah Ayer Army
(Avengers of the country) whose members were exclusively
Malays.
Most important of all, from the point of vier of race
relations, the Japanese used the almost exclusively Malay
police force to fight the Chinese resistance moNafflent. 	 Thus
. the resistance movement and its opposition became, in
effect, a communal war.	 Under the order of the Japanese,
the Malay (and some Indians) units launched attacks against
Chinese guerilla forces.
	
This led to strong resentment on
the part of the Chinese, and immediately following the
surrender of the Japanese there were a number of communal
clashes in retaliation and counter-retaliation (Purcell,
1967:264-5).	 Fortunately, though bitter, these communal
clashes were isolated and did not spread throughout the
whole length and breadth of the country.
The bulk of the Indians, like the Malays, was not
particularly active in the resistance movement. To the
Indian nationalists, the Japanese appeared to be the poten-
tial liberators of their homeland. 	 The Japanese supported
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and encouraged the formation of the Indian Independence
League, and recruited an Indian National Army in Malaya.
It is clear that the Japanese' interest in the Indian
Independence Movement was mainly in terms of their own
pan-Asian ambitions, and this, they tried to achieve through
making use of the Malayan Indians (Ratnam, 1965:18).
Of the three major communities, the Japanese
Occupation aroused the greatest animosity and bitterness
among the Chinese.	 It was the Chinese who suffered most
under the Japanese tyrannical rule.
	
Because of the long-
standing enmity with China, the Japanese regarded the Chinese
in Malaya as their natural enemies. The community as a
whole was blamed for being uncooperative, and many communists
and nationalists were promptly executed.	 When Singapore
fell, it was reported that the Japanese ordered for the
execution of 50,000 Chinese who were suspected of being
communists, nationalists or of having connections with anti-
Japanese movements.
	
It was estimated that only half the
number was eliminated. For the Japanese finally halted
the massacres after realizing that it was impractical to
execute such a large number of people (Means, 1970:46).
The Chinese had no liking for the Japanese invaders
either. They had earlier expressed their hostility and
hatred towards the Japanese (e.g.boycott of Japanese goods,
called them Nippon Devils) immediately after the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the Sino-Japanese war
in 1937.
	
It is therefore hardly surprising that the
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Chinese, irrespective of KMT members or the communists,
formed the bulk of the resistance movement. 	 But it was
the MCP which was most active of all.	 The MCP offered
assistance to the British to fight the Japanese. The
latter accepted the offer and trained some MCP men who
later formed the core of the Malayan People's Anti-
Japanese Army (MPAJA).	 The MPAJA, consisting almost
entirely of Chinese, and controlled by the MCP, was the
only important resistance group fighting the Japanese
troops.	 Later, after the war, it was the same group of
people who launched an armed revolt against the British
colonial government in an attempt to establish a People's
Republic of Malaya.
Apart from the fact that the wer experience strengthened
Chinese nationalism and their sense ^f communal identity,
two other important changes occurred in the Chinese community
during the Occupation period.	 In the first place, there
was a change in the community's leadership structure, at
least for the time being.
	
The wealthy, traditional leaders
either fled the country, or they remained and were executed
or forced to come to terms with the Japanese. 	 As a result,
the pre-war merchant-dominated elite was largely discredited.
Their place tended to be filled by the younger, more
vigorous communist leaders or their sympathizers (Means,
1970:47).	 The second change - which was more important -
was that the Chinese participation in the defence of Malaya
against Japanese rule was a clear indication that they were
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now beginning to take a more direct interest in local
politics than ever before.	 Unlike the KMT, the MCP was
local-oriented, its aim being to establish a Peoplels
Republic.	 Furthermore, there is no sound evidence that
the MCP received any aid from or had any contact with either
Moscow or Peking during the Japanese Occupation.
	
The MCP
had done it all alone to fight the Japanese (01Ballance,
1966:58-59).
We are not concerned with the war between the MCP and
the Japanese or between the MCP and the British colonial
regime.
	
What we are interested, however, is how communism
has affected the political position c•.r the Chinese in Malaya.
In this connection, the Chinese in "-- , laya have been affected
by communism in at least two ways. The MCP, which launched
an armed revolt leading to an Emergency lasting for more
than a decade, consisted almost exclusively of Chinese.
This close association of the Chinese with communism leads
to an over-generalization, though illogical, that most
Chinese are either communists or their sympathizers. 	 The
over-generalization has been reinforced by the historical
fact that the Chinese community as a whole did not actively
support the Malaysian government in. its effort to suppress
communism.	 Secondly, the emergence of a powerful communist
regime in China in 1949 has put the Malaysian Chinese into
an embarrassing position.
	
Not infrequently, they are being
regarded by other communities as enemies within the gates,
especially in the wake of a rising local nationalism
(Freedman & Willmott, 1961:247-8).
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There were thus three main currents of influence - the
secret societies, the KMT, and the MCP - affecting the
political life of the Chinese in pre-war Malaya. The
secret societies were on the whole Chinese community-
centred in that they had little to do with other communities.
The KMT focused its attention on China and was merely an
extension of China's politics, while the MCP can be regarded
as Malayan-oriented because its aim was the establishment
of a People's Republic of ;Ialaya.
As regards the Chinese community itself, the community
as a whole was gradually becoming settled, even though links
with China - especially sentimental ones - were still strong.
Politicall , however, the majority of the population were
still apathetic, at least towards local politics.	 Most of
the Chinese seemed to hold the impression that it was more
profitable to attend strictly to their own business, rather
than to engage in politics which appeared dangerous and
unprofitable.
CHAPTER k
CHINESE POLITICS IN MALAYSIA: THE POST-WAR PERIOD 
The post-war period saw a more settled Chinese population
in Malaya. Consequently, the Chinese were showing more
concern over their political rights. The MPAJA I s achieve-
ments during the war and during the interregnum period before
the return of the British also gave the Chinese a new spirit
and a sense of pride. For the organization had always been
looked upon as a Chinese guerilla army. This ne.; spirit
was coupled with a determination to take a more 5...:tive part
in shaping the future of the country. The war experience
had brought home to them that life in China was not tKat
attractive after all. The thoughts and ambitions of many
Chinese were now switched from their homeland and re-focused
on Malaya (0 1 Ballance, 1966:62).
The major political event that took place immediately
after the war was the proposal to set up the Malayan Union.
Under the new scheme, two major changes were introduced.
First, the pre-war administrative structure was to be re-
adjusted whereby the nine Malay states together with the two
Settlements of Penang and Malacca were to be merged into a
single political entity known as the Malayan Union. Singapore
was to be excluded from the Union and remained a separate
Crown Colony. Secondly, a common Malayan Union citizen-
ship was to be created; so that equal citizenship rights
would be given to all who were born and resident in Malaya
(Ratnam, 1965:45).
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The new proposal unfavourably affected the Malays in
two ways.
	
First, the sovereignty of the Sultans was
undermined, and the government under the new policy would
be carried out directly under the name of the British Crown.
Secondly, the pre-war 'special position s accorded to the
Malays was to be ended as a result of the new citizenship
proposals. Under these circumstances, the severe agitation
against the proposals on the part of the Malays at that time
is understandable. Mass demonstrations and rallies were
held throughout the country by the Malays to voice their
opposition to the Union scheme. Within a matter of weeks
the Malays had even formcd a political organization - the
United Malay National 0-,-P-anization (UMNO) - to protest
against the new constitution. They also boycotted the
installation ceremony of the new Governor of the Union on
April 1, 1946. The agitation continued until the Union
Scheme was dropped two years later and in its place a
Federation was substituted. 1
The Union Scheme, while undermining the pre-war
privileged position of the Malays, was certainly very much
to the advantage of the Chinese. The most obvious gain
of the Chinese was the creation of a common citizenship that
would give them equal status with the Malays. But to the
astonishment of many, the Chinese did not greet the proposals
1. For an excellent and scholarly account of the birth
and demise of the Malayan Union, see Allen (1967).
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with any particular enthusiasm. In terms of either
intensity or the extent of popular support, the reactions
of the Chinese community did not in any way equal those of
the Malays. By and large, general apathy was the keynote
of Chinese reaction. Those who opposed the proposals
generally belonged to the left-wing intellectuals and did
not gather much mass support, and those who supported them
made little effort to counter Malay opposition (Ratnam,
1965:49).
While the Malays opposed the new proposals for the
proposed equal citizenship and the abandonment of 'special
rights' and the manner in which the sultans had been
consulted, 2 the Chinese who opposed seemed to deplore the
manner in which they themselves had not been consulted.
They also objected to the exclusion of Singapore from the
mainland (Purcell, 1967:286).
The three major Chinese political organizations at the
time - the MCP, the KMT and the MDU 3 - all showed no more
than lukewarm attitude towards the Union proposals. The
MCP, although endorsing a unified Malaya in principle,
objected to the details of the proposals. Nevertheless,
the party did no more than confining its activities to press
comments through its daily The New Democracy (Sin Min Chu).
2. It was generally felt that the proposals were introduced
in an arbitrary and high-handed manner without much regard
for the opinions of the sultans. Cf. Ratnam (1965:47).
3. The MDU (Malayan Democratic Union) was founded in 1945 in
Singapore. It was not a purely Chinese organization;
rather, it was a non-Malay, leftist organization. Its
supporters consisted largely of English-educated, western-
ized elements among the Chinese, Indian and Eurasian
communities.
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The KMT was essentially not interested in Malayan politics
except in so far as it impinged on China's politics. The
MDU favoured the Union scheme, but was critical of the new
constitution for not giving full power to a completely
elected legislature. All in all no sustained effort was
made either to support or to oppose the new policy (Purcell,
1967:286-7).	 There was no attempt, for example, on the
part of the MDU to hold any counter-demonstrations to oppose
the UMN0. 4 Neither was there any gesture made to the
colonial government that it could count on the MDU support
in the event of its defending the Union proposals against
Malay pressure. The real opposition from the UMNO to the
Union proposals so much to the adva_tages of the Chinese was
largely ignored (Silcock & Aziz, 1950:29-30).
While the Chinese as a whole shrwed little enthusiasm
in the Malayan Union scheme of 1946, they certainly took a
keener interest in the Federation Proposals designed to
replace the former. 5 This change of attitude from one of
indifference to keener interest was mainly due to the
realization that their interest was threatened under the
4. The KMT and MCP were illegal organizations and as such
they could not hold demonstrations openly.
5. The Federal Proposals were in a sense a reversal of the
Malayan Union scheme, which the British felt imperative
to abandon as a result of strong Malay opposition. The
new Federal scheme reverted to the pre-war pro-Malay
policy. The sultans' position was strengthened and the
special position of the Malays reintrodaced. Under the
scheme, it was possible for non-Malays to become citizens,
but the regulations governing their eligibility were more
stringent as compared to those of the abortive Malayan
Union Scheme.
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new scheme. They objected to the exclusion of Singapore
with its predominantly Chinese population as well as the
restrictions of citizenship. 6 They also demanded the Malay
membership in the new Legislative Council be reduced from
31 to 20, for fear that their economic interests would
suffer under the Malay majority.7
In protest, the Chinese community led by Tan Cheng
Lock8
 staged a one-day hartal (stoppage of work) in Malacca
on September 9, 1947.	 Apparently pleased with the result,
6. The 1947 Census figures show that the total population
of Malaya (including Singapore) was 5,848,910, .of which
2,614,6-h/ were Chinese.	 Singapore alone accounted for
940,C24, of which 730,133 were Chinese. Excluding Singa-
pore, the number of Chinese in Malaya was reduced to
1,884,524 (38.4%) out of a total of 4,908,086, giving the
Malays a numerical superiority (about 49.4%) over the
Chinesc. See del Tufo (1949:40, 132-3).
7. The total number for the Council was 75 of which 50 were
Unofficial members. Of the 50 Unofficials„ 22 were
Malays, 14 Chinese, 7 Europeans, 5 Indians, 1 Eurasian
and 1 Ceylonese. This distribution gave the Malays an
overall total of 31 seats, i.e. 22 Unofficials and 9
representatives from State Councils, and thus the greatest
racial minority.
	
See British Malaya vol. XXII, No.11
(1948:352-3) and Simandjuntak (1969:54).
8. Tan Cheng-lock (18831960), a Straits Chinese, was the
foremost political leader in the Chinese community. He
served in the Legislative and Executive Councils of the
Straits Settlements in the 1930 / s. He was Chairman of
the All-Malaya Council of Joint Action, founder-president
of the Malayan Chinese Association and Joint Chairman of
the Alliance National Council. He was knighted in
1933.
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he successfully persuaded the AMCJA9 to hold a nation-wide
hartal on October 20, 1947. The move was supported by the
Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce, the MCP and its
affiliated trade unions. With the exception of the east
coast and Johore, the hartal was generally a success,
affecting in particular Chinese businesses and factories.
Nevertheless, Chinese and Indian opposition to the new
scheme did not in any way represent a forceful and sustained
effort compared to the Malay effort to oppose the Malayan
Union Scheme, and did not secure any major political
concessions from the British. The Federation of Malaya
was finally established in February 1, 1948.
The political and constitutional developmenf between
1946 and 1948 had far-reaching effects in Malayan history,
particularly on communal relations. The Union
though abortive, served to divide the Malays and the non-
Malays, particularly the Chinese, and intensify communal
tensions that had already been generated by the Japanese
Occupation.
Both the Union and Federation proposals also inspired
an unprecedented interest in politics among the Malays, and
(to a lesser extent) the Chinese, though for different
9. AMCJA - All-Malaya Council of Joint Action was formed
with the primary aim to oppose the Federation Proposals.
Its membership comprised a mixed bag of organizations -
the MDU, the Malayan Indian Congress, The Straits Chinese
British Association, 12 Women's Federations in Malaya,
the Malayan New Democratic Youth League, the Malayan
Peoples' Anti-Japanese Ex-service Comrades' Association
and the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions. Three
Malay radical nationalist organizations - the Malay
Nationalist Party, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API) and Kesatuan
Melayu Muda - also joined the AMCJA for a short while.
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reasons. This in turn resulted in, for the first time in
Malayan history, the emergence of organized communal agitation
for political and constitutional ends (Ratnam, 1965:43).
Despite the intensification of communal tensions as a
result of political agitations, the years between 1946-1948
also witnessed inter-communal co-operation in the political
scene. The AMCJA, which was predominantly non-Malay, had
as its members three Malay radical organizations - the Malay
Nationalist Party, the Angkatan Pemuda Insaf and the
Kesatuan Melayu Muda. This inter-communal coalition had
in common the object of fighting the Federation proposals,
commonly considered a prr.duct of British-Sultans-UMNO
negotiations. After a t-hort while, the Malay organizations
withdrew from the AMCJA to form their own 'front' under the
name of Putera. 10 A coalition between AMCJA and Putera
was then effected in a joint effort to oppose the Federation
proposals.
The co-operation between AMCJA and Putera had always
been tenuous because af some fundamental differences on
communal issues. No doubt, both were unhappy with the
proposed Federation Agreement. But their objections were
based on different premises. The AMCJA's main bone of
contention was the pro-Malay bias of the new scheme and
demanded equality for all races while the Putera's main
10. Putera is the abbreviation for Pusat Tenaga Rakyat 
Ta71717e for People's Force). Its major aim was to
agitate for constitutional revision, and among its
members were the MNP, API, the Angkatan Wanita Sedara
and several other small associations.
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objection was the continuation of colonial rule under the
new constitutional proposals.
	
In order to facilitate co-
operation, however, some concessions and compromises had
to be made. 11 But the conflict between the demands by
AMCJA for equal rights and the demands by Putera for Malay
special privileges remained largely unresolved.
As things turned out, this first major inter-communal
coalition 12 failed to win popular support from either the
Malays or the non-Malays. It finally became defunct with
the outbreak of the communist revolt and the subsequent
declaration of the Emergency, since most of its left-wing
member organizations were outlawed.
Many factors were responsible for the coalition's
failure to win popular support. The non-Malay population,
even though more settled and more interested in local
politics as compared to pre-war years, still had a general
disinclination to engage actively in politics. The bulk
of the commercial and professional classes were uninspired
by the anti-colonial slogans of the AMCJA-Putera coalition,
and was generally suspicious of left-wing politics (Ratnam,
1965:151).
11. Putera supported AMCJA's "People's Constitutional
Proposals" which inter alia, demanded Malaya's
independence including Singapore. AMCJA, in return,
agreed that Malay representation in the Federal
Legislative Assembly should be 55%, and that Malay
should be made the official language. Cf. Means (1970:
85-91).
12. Since the membership of the AMCJA was predominantly
Chinese, and the Putera consisted exclusively of Malays,
the coalition was essentially one of Sino-Malay co-
operation.
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The vast majority of the Malays at this time seemed to
be more attracted to the right-wing UMNO which had identified
with Malay interests alone. There is also reason to believe
that the strong communist element in the coalition 13 might
have frightened away the Malays (Ratnam„ 1965:151).
Above all, the coalition's failure to win widespread
support may be paradoxically explained in terms of its
emphasis on ideology and on a common Malayan nationalism
(Ratnam, 1965:152).	 At a time when communal interests
dominated the political arena, neither the Malays nor the
Chinese, were sophisticated enough and prepared to commit
themselves to such a seemingly 'non-ammunal l inter-communal
organization.
The Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.)
As earlier mentioned, the Fede- r-1 Constitution came
into effect in 1948 despite some opposition from the non-
Malays and a small number of Malay left-wing radicals. The
new Constitituion severely restricted the citizenship rights
of the non-Malay communities, in addition to restoring to
13. Some member organizations within the AMCJA, particularly
the Malayan New Democratic Youth League, the Malayan
Anti-Japanese Ex-service Comrades' Association and the
Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions were communist-
controlled.
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the Malays their former special privileges. 14 Two major
communally-based political parties had emerged at this
time, the UMNO representing the Malays and the MIC (Malayan
Indian Congress) for the Indians. The Chinese community,
however, had no single, Malayan-centred political party
to foster and further its interests.
	
Generally speaking,
the political strength of the community' was dispersed
and consequently it spoke with no clear voice on matters
concerning the community as a whole. Even the commonly
considered powerful Chinese Chambers of Commerce and the
Chinese Assembly Halls which represented the conservative
14. The 	 1..are two categories of citizenship: a) citizenship
by operation of law, and b) citizenship by naturalization.
Under *he first category, the following persons were
defined as citizens:-
a. a -ubject of the Ruler of any state;
b. any British subject born in either of the Settlements
(Penang or Malacca) and permanent resident in any
part of the Federation;
c. any British subject born in Malaya whose father was
either born in Malaya or had resided in Malaya for
a continuous period of at least 15 years;
d. any person born in Malaya, and both of whose parents
were also born in Malaya and had resided there for
a continuous period of at least 15 years;
e. any person whose father was, at the time of that
person's birth, himself a Federal citizen;
f. any person who habitually speaks the Malay language
and conforms to Malay custom;
The following persons were to fall into the second category:-
a. either (i) he was born in Malaya and had been resident
for 8 out of 12 years preceding the date of his applica-
tion, or (ii) he had been resident in Malaya for 15 out
of 20 years preceding the date of his application;
b. that he was of good character,
c. that he had an adequate knowledge of Malay or English,
d. that he would be willing to take an oath of allegiance
to Malaya.
Cf. The Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, pp.40-43.
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Chinese appeared at this time to have little effective
influence on the government. With all these unfavourable
circumstances, it is understandable that the political
fortunes of the Chinese at this time were described as 'at
a low ebb' (M.Roff, 1965:40-41).
	
Furthermore, the bulk of
the Chinese community were shaken by the MCP decision to
resort to armed struggle against colonial rule. The
Emergency that followed immediately the revolt almost sealed
the fate of the Chinese in Malaya. The reason was that
the colonial government regarded most Chinese as communists
or communist sympathizers. There was even a suggestion to
deport half a million Chinese squatters who were suspected
of aiding communists on masse to China.
The founding of the first Malayan-centred Chinese
political organization did not come into being lyntil 1949.
On February 27, 1949, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA)
was formally inaugurated with Tan Cheng-lock as its first
president. 15 The main aims of the MCA seemed to be the
promotion of solidarity among the Chinese, safeguarding of
Chinese rights and interests, and the preservation of
inter-communal harmony. 16
15. There were different versions as to how the MCA was
originated. The MCA version is that its formation was
first initiated by the then High Commissioner who
summoned "Chinese leaders, headed by Dato Cheng-lock
Tan to a meeting and asked them to organize the Chinese
in aid of the government". See The MCA 20th Anniversary
Souvenir (1969:55), and Soh (1960:51).
16. The MCA has been characterized by a note of ambivalence
since its formation. On the one hand, the MCA tries
to assure the Chinese that it is committed to safeguarding
Chinese rights and interests, and on the other hand it
tries to convince the Malays that it aims at promoting
inter-communal harmony and achieving a united Malayan
nation. This is the tightrope that the party has been
trying to walk ever since. Cf. M.Roff (1965:42).
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The response to the MCA was very encouraging. Within
a year its membership was estimated to be over 100,000. 	 In
1951 the figure was put at between 160,000 and 200,000.
Although these figures and subsequent ones are doubtful, the
fact remains that the MCA had a good start and the growth was
continuous (Soh, 1960:52).
The MCA was essentially a conservative, right-wing
organization whose leadership was dominated by wealthy
Chinese. As a conservative party, the MCA was regarded as
a 'super-organization' loosely co-ordinating the various
traditional Chinese organizations such as the trade guilds
and dialect associations.	 In this sense, therefore, the
vast majority of the MC— supporters consisted of what Wang
(1970:19) called Group B Chinese.	 The MCA leadership,
however, was not confined to Group BChinese. Prominent
Group C members were included among its leadership
hierarchy. 17 This was found necessary because it was
recognized that only by including Group C Chinese leaders
who were acceptable to both the British and the Malays could
the Association function in an effective manner.
Thus, the formation of the MCA was essentially based
upon a co-operation between Group C and Group B Chinese.
Generally speaking, Group C Chinese provided the leadership
(and their connections with the British and the Malays) and
17. Tan Cheng-lock was a good example of Group C Chinese.
Born a Straits Chinese, he was committed to the ideal
of a united Malayan nation with equality for all races.
For an account of Tan and his political views, see
Soh (1960) and Tan (1947)0
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Group B Chinese provided the supporters. The formation of
MCA not only provided an opportunity for Group C Chinese to
claim a strong political base, but also launched the majority
of the Group B Chinese into full participation in local
politics (Wang, 1970:20).
During its early years of existence, the MCA did not
compete against, nor did it ally with other communal parties.
However, it co-operated with the Government in its anti-
communist campaign. The Association helped the Government
in the resettlement of Chinese squatters into 'new villages'.
It also organized a regular lottery the proceeds from which
were used to provide amenities for residents of the 'new
villages°. 18 In addition, it also helped the Government'R
drive to recruit the Chinese for the Home Guard movement,
Police and Military services.	 From its activities, it
would seem that the MCA at this early stage was more like
a social welfare organization. 19 It was not until the
introduction of local elections in 1952 that the MCA became
a full-fledged political party, deeply involved in the
politics of the day.
Apart from safeguarding the interests of its members,
the MCA also set itself to promote inter-communal harmony
18. The lottery was put to a stop in 1953 by Sir Gerald
Templer, the then High Commissioner, who feared the
lottery funds to be used for political purposes.
19. The MCA, however, has claimed that it started as a
purely political organization. 	 See The MCA 20th
Anniversary Souvenir (1969:55).
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and unity in the country. In his inaugural speech, Tan
Cheng-lock said:
It is a matter of supreme significance
and indisputable necessity that a basic
purpose of this organization must be the
attainment of inter-communal understanding
and friendship, particularly between the
Malays and the Chinese. (Ratnam 1965:154)
In another address, Tan again stressed the MCA l s aim to
promote inter-communal unity:
One of the basic aims of the MCA is to
help in co-operation with the Malay and
other communities, the development of
the process of making the whole of Malaya
one country, one people and one government
We aim at inter-communal unity and
fraternity, national libnrty and racial
equality, which are the Voundation of true
democracy. (Tan, 1966:3)
Inter-communal harmony and unity still remains to be
one of the main objectives of the MA today. 20
As a conservative, right-wing organization, MCA support
has always come from the conservative elements of the
Chinese community, particularly the business class. Before
Merdeka (Independence), the support MCA received from the
Chinese community had been very encouraging, partly because
it was the only major Chinese political organization purporting
to represent the Chinese. However, over the years, as will
20. The 1970 MCA Constitution listed among its aims "to
maintain, foster and promote goodwill and harmony
among the citizens of various races in Malaysia so as
to ensure the peaceful progress and growth of a strong
and united nation".	 See Constitution of the Malayan
Chinese Association (1970:2).
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be shown later, the party has been troubled by internal
conflict and become weaker and weaker, both in terms of its
support within the Chinese community and in terms of its
influence in the Alliance. 	 It is certainly true that the
MCA has never had a firm hold on Chinese loyalty to the
same extent as the UMNO has on the Malays. Thus although
the MCA is the organization which is supposed to represent
the interests of the Chinese community in the present ruling
party - the Alliance, there is no assurance that its views
are representative of those of the Chinese community at large.
1952 was an important year for Malaya as well as the
MCA. For the former, it was the first time local elections
were intd1,ed; for the latter, it was the year when the
MCA became r political party proper by contesting the local
elections.	 Of more importance, perhaps, is the fact that
the two major communal parties - the UMNO and the MCA -
decided to form an electoral alliance to fight the Kuala
Lumpur Municipal Elections. Unlike the earlier AMCJA-PUTERA
coalition, this UMNO-MCA cooperation in politics proved so
successful that it paved the way for subsequent inter-
communal co-operation; The present Alliance Party (
consisting of UMNO„ MCA and MIC) had its beginnings in this
first electoral co-operation.
In order to understand how the UMNO-MCA electoral
alliance came about, it is necessary to introduce the
Independence of Malaya party (IMP) into the picture. The
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IMP was formed in 1951 by Dato Onn bin Jaafar. Its
formation was the first major attempt to bring together people
of different ethnic origins into one non-communal party.
It is significant to note that the attempt was made by
Dato Onn, leader of the Malays and the then UMNO. Dato Onn,
committed to the cause of non-communalism, and having
obtained assurance of full support from the leaders of the
Chinese community and the MCA, resigned as the leader of
the UMNO to establish the IMP. The new party had some
encouraging beginnings, with support from people of different
ethnic origins, notably the Indians. But it was not long
before it became clear that the IMP failed to win -'ass support,
either from the Malays or from the Chinese. 21
The electoral alliance between the MCA and V-ie UMNO
began just before the first Kuala Lumpur Munic4,1 elections
in 1952. It was clear at that time that the IMP posed a
menace to the two major communal parties, the MCA and the
UMNO. It was felt by the leaders of the two communal
organizations that if the IMP was not defeated, there would
be defections from their organizations. Mutual opposition
to the IMP was therefore an important factor to prompt the
formation of the Alliance. Another personal consideration
was also important in bringing about the Sino-Malay co-opera-
tion,
	 It was related to the initiative of Colonel H.S. Lee,
21. The Malays were particularly alarmed at IMP 9 s efforts
to provide more rights and opportunities for the non-
Malays. The Chinese, after seeing Dato Onn i s failure
to obtain support from his own community, began to
doubt his leadership and lose interest in the
organization.
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who was the then MCA's Vice-president and President of its
Selangor Branch. The Colonel had earlier been completely
ignored by the IMP and was not too happy about the incident.
Thus he became the prime mover to seek MCA-UMNO Alliance
in an attempt to defeat the IMP (Soh, 1960:56).	 In view
of the circumstances for its formation, it can be said
that the earlier MCA-UMNO Alliance was nothing more than a
'a marriage of convenience'.
The electoral alliance, however, proved to be very
successful at the Kuala Lumpur Municipal elections. It
was continued at other similar elections, with equally
encouraging reeults. 22 This success led leaders of both
parties to think more r-2 ,-iously about their temporary
alliance. A series of negotiations were held between the
leaders of both organizations and some agreements were
reached.
Some time before the 1955 Federal elections, the MIC
was added to the fold of the Alliance. This was then the
beginning of the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance embracing the three
major communities in the country. The Alliance has become
the country's ruling party since its landslide victory in the
first Federal elections of 1955.
22. The MCA-UMNO Alliance captured 9 seats at the Kuala
Lumpur Municipal elections. The IMP won 2 seats, and
1 seat went'to an Independent. 	 During 1952 and 1953,
the MCA-UMNO alliance won 94 out of a total of 124
seats contested in various municipal and town councils
elections throughout the country.
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While the Kuala Lumpur elections of 1952 was a victory
for the UMNO-MCA Alliance, it spelt disaster for the non-
communal IMP.	 Several factors contributed to the very poor
showing of the IMP. Lack of organizational base and lack
of middle and lower level leadership were some of them.
But most important of all, the atmosphere at that time was
strongly communal. Voting was largely based on communal
considerations (Vasil, 1971:59).
The failure of the IMP to gain popular support and its
dissolution after only two years of existence 23 was a clear
indication that talk of non-communal politics at this time
was premature and perhaps meaningful only at the academic
level. The elections had still to 13 fought and won on
communal platforms.
	
This still seems to be the case today.
Communal consideration continues to be an integral part of
party programmes in the Malaysian political scene. The
Alliance party, which consists of three communal parties,
is far from non-communal. Although it fights elections as
a single organization, there is little doubt that its
constituent bodies continue to function an communal lines
(Ratnam, 1965:161).
In so far as the Chinese community was concerned, the
first half of the 1950 1 s witnessed a distinct trend towards
increased participation in political activity by the MCA in
particular and the Chinese community in general. There
was also a trend towards inter-communal co-operation in
23. The IMP dissolved itself in 1953.	 It is interesting
to note that its most notable achievement was 'the
indirect and ironical one of bringing about the forma-
tion of the UMNO-MCA alliance. 	 See Soh (1960:56).
173
politics. This last seems to be an interesting feature
exhibited by many plural societies during their pre-indepen-
dence era. Different circumstances might have given rise
to different reasons for inter-communal co-operation. But
one reason in common among many plural societies was the
presence of colonial rule. In order to render colonial
exploitation as costly and as unsuccessful as possible,
members of the middle-class from different ethnic groups
often co-operated with one another in the political arena
(Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972:75).
Since Tudependence (1957), as one might have expected,
a number or changes have occurred in the politics of the
Malayan CliilLese. To begin with, a greater number of Chinese
have qualif'sd to be citizens and increasingly they have
turned thelJ.. attention towards local political problems
that confront them. This change of attitude is important
because the more the Chinese become identified with Malaya
(Malaysia since 1963), the more they are dissatisfied with
the discriminatory policies of the government in favour of
the Malay community. Consequently, many become disillusioned
with the political party that claims to represent them, like
the MCA, which they think has done little to safeguard their
interests. A great number of them shift their support to
other Chinese political organizations, thus weakening the
MCA. There are also those Chinese who are dissatisfied
with the present position of the Chinese language and educa-
tion which they feel have been losing ground over the years.
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A major development since Independence has been the
intensification of party politics and the rise of Chinese
political organizations. 24
 
These political organizations
may now be briefly considered to provide a background for
our discussion.
The United Democratic Party (U.D.P.)
The UDP was formed in 1962 by a group of MCA dissidents
who left the party following the 1959 crisis in the Alliance.
Led by Dr. Lim Chong Eu, who was the MCA president before he
left it, the UDP was essentially a Chinese organization: its
leadership was dominated by those who had left thc MCA in
1959; its supporters were also largely those 0. :-._ese who
had become disillusioned with the MCA.
The claim made by its leaders, however, was that the
party was for all and non-communal. Dr. Lim Chong Eu, for
example, declared at the inaugural meeting of the party:
We are forming a truly patriotic national
organization in which all citizens will
enjoy equal rights...
	
It will not think
in terms of communalism but/will work
positively as a united nation, (Straits
Times, April 22, 1962).
To convince the public that the party was a genuinely
non-communal party, several Malays were elected to the
Executive Committee. This included Dato Zainal Abidin bin
24. Chinese political organizations here refer to either
those with purely Chinese membership or those that owe
their existence mainly to Chinese support (i.e. Chinese-
dominated parties),
	 It should be remembered, however,
that not all these parties were formed after Independence.
The Labour Party, for example, was founded before
Independence (in 1952).
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Haji Abas, a very prominent Malay who was elected the
President of the party at its first General Assembly in
1963. Despite this non-communal image, the party had
very little support from the Malay community. This was
clearly shown in the 1964 General Election, in which the
party put up 36 Malay candidates, and none of them was
successful. 25
The bulk of the party's membership was Chinese. It
comprised largely the Chinese-educated, middle-class people
who were at one time the supporters of the MCA. It is thus
hardly surprising that the rank and file was largely committed
to securing a rightful rLace for the Chinese language and
education which they 	 the MCA had neglected. It is
also significant to note that a large part of the membership
was young people below the age of thirty-five (Vasil,
1971:266-7).
The UDP had never been a strong party. It had a
poor performance in the 1964 General Election, presumably
due to lack of a clear position on important issues such as
Chinese language and education, and lack of proper organiza-
tion. It was concerned with winning some Malay support
and in so doing it let down and lost the support of many
Chinese who had earlier regarded it as a champion of their
interests (Vasil, 1971:265).	 The UDP dissolved itself in
1968 and many of its members then joined the Gerakan Rakyat
Malaysia,
25. Among its Chinese candidates, only five were returned,
all in predominantly Chinese constituencies.
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The Labour Party
The Labour Party was formed from a group of regional
(state) Labour parties in 1952.	 In its early years of
existence, the party's leadership was dominated by a group
of moderate, socialist oriented professional people, both
Chinese and non-Chinese, who were closely associated with
the Malayan Trade Union Council. Almost all the earlier
Chinese leaders in the organization were English-educated.
Until 1969, the Labour Party had been the main ideolo-
gically based and socialist oriented party in Malaysia. 26
Still, in an atmosphere where communal considerations were
important, the Labour Party was not able to free itself from
communalism. It was originally founded as a genuinely
non-communal organization, and thanks to its leaders, the
party was able to stick to its principles and assume its
non-communal character during the pre-Independence period.
But after Independence, communal pressures manifested themselves
more intensely. Increasingly many Chinese-educated
Chinese who had been dissatisfied with the MCA swelled the
ranks of the party. These people were able to establish
almost full control over the party by 1961. The Labour
Party then found it increasingly hard to maintain its non-
communal orientation and eventually became a pro-communist
Chinese communal party (Vasil, 1971:93).
26. In 1969, the Labour Party decided to opt out of
constitutional politics and boycotted the 1969 general
election. The party has become defunct since then.
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The programmes drawn up by the Labour Party in its early
years of existence were moderate. Regarding Malaya's
Independence, for example, the party recommended a 'gradual
transfer of power s , i.e. Malaya's independence should be
established in three stages, to be completed by 1964
(Straits Times, Oct. 25, 1953).	 Nothing was mentioned on
the rights and interests of the Chinese community especially
with regard to their language and education. The party at
this early stage was very much under the influence of Britain,
because most of its leaders were government servants or
associated with unions of government servants.
The character of the party be 	 to change in 1954,
when a more socialist-oriented gr,11-; joined it. 	 In 1955,
before the first Federal election, the party issued a ten-
point manifesto, which among other things pledged immediate
self-government for Malaya (and union with Singapore to
create a common Malayan nation) and a planned economy. It
also recommended public ownership of the means of production
(Straits Times, May 10, 1955).
In 1956, in its memorandum to the Reid Constitutional
Commission, the party advocated racial equality for all in
the country. 27 Among other things, it also recommended
Malay as the National Language but that 'English, Chinese and
Indian languages be taught in schools and spoken in the
28councils'
27. The Reid Constitutional Commission was set up by the
British Government to draw up a Draft Constitution for
Malaya. It was made up of entirely non-Malayans.
28. Memorandum to the Reid Constitutional Commission,
submitted by the Labour Party of Malaya, Penang,
Sept.25, 1956.
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It is important to note that throughout the pre-
Independence period the Labour Party was faithful to its
ideology and principles. It did not deviate from its
principles purely to adjust to the compulsions of the plural
society. No communal appeal was attempted. Neither did
it make any significant compromises just to please one
community or another. (Vasil, 1971:119).
After Independence, however, as indicated earlier,
membership was swelled by the Chinese educated Chinese. The
party gradually lost its non-communal character and assumed
the role of championing the cause of the Chinese.
The cilange in the policy orientation of the Labour Party
was accoa-led by a significant change in the character of
its memberYip. During the early fifties, when the party
was in its infant stage, support came largely from ordinary
and English-educated white-collar workers, many of them
Indians. The support was primarily concentred in some
urban centres, particularly Penang and Kuala Lumpur. Since
Independence, with the replacement of its English-educated
leadership by the Chinese-educated, the party had found a
strong support from the Chinese-educated in the urban centres
and new villages. There was an insignificant number of
non-Chinese members (Vasil, 1971:162).
The Labour Party together with the Party Rakyat launched
the Socialist Front (SF) in 1957. 29 The SF was built on an
29. Party Rakyat, the foremost Malay radical left-wing
party was formed in 1955 by Ahmad Boestamam, a Malay
nationalist.
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Alliance-type formula, but unlike the Alliance Party, it
was a left-wing alliance.	 In 1964, a new component, the
National Convention Party30 was added to the SF fold. This
ideologically-based SF was formed originally in the hope of
strengthening both the Labour Party and Party Rakyat,
since support for the former was mainly Chinese in urban
centres and the latter was based on rural areas and consisted
primarily of Malays. The National Convention Party was
also restricted to rural Malay support. 	 Despite its
ideological orientation, the SF could not escape the threats
of communal differences. The partnership finally broke
up in 1965 mainly as a result of disagreement 0v-A communal
issues.
The People's Progressive Party (PPP)
Formed in 1953 by two brothers ofCbylon Tamil origin,
the influence of the PPP is almost exclusively restricted to
Perak, especially in Ipoh and its surrounding towns. The
party claims to fight for equality for all racial groups.
To achieve this, it recommends the abolition of the special
rights accorded to the Malays, equal treatment in the selection
ofjobs and the abolition of different classes of citizens.
On the important question of language and education policy,
the party demands that an independent committee be set up to
30. The National Convention Party was formed in 1963 by
Abdul Aziz bin Ashak, who was a former Minister of
Agriculture in Tengku Abdul Rahman's Cabinet, and one
of the vice-presidents of UMNO. He left the Cabinet
and UMNO as a result of clashes with Tengku over
policies.
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formulate a policy suitable and acceptable to the needs and
aspirations of the people.	 It further presses for the
recognition of Chinese and Tamil as official languages in
addition to Malay. 31
Due to its image as the champion of the cause of the
non-Malays and the powerful personal appeal of the
Seenivasagam brothers, the party has done fairly well in
Perak, particularly in Ipoh. 32 But its influence never
goes beyond the state of Perak. The bulk of its membership
comes from Chinese workers, many of whom live in new villages
and are Chinese-educated,.
The Democratic Action Pa-ty (DAP)
The DAP was officially formed in 1966. 	 of
its coherent and clear-cut policy, it has been able to provide
the leadership and rallying point for non-Malay discontents
and disillusionment with the MCA and the MIC, and emerged
as the major opposition (Vasil, 1972:16).	 In the 1969 General
election, the party captured 13 out of a total of 104 seats,
and polled 13.73% of the votes.
31. PPP, 'Malaysia for Malaysians', People's Progressive Party
of Malaya Manifesto, May, 1969.
32. The party has controlled the Ipoh Municipal Council for
a number of years. It is represented by 4 members in
the present Parliament. Cf. Vasil, (1971:247, 249).
33. Its founder was Devan Nair, who won the 1964 General
Election on a PAP ticket. When Singapore seceded from
Malaysia in 1965, Devan Nair, as a Malaysian citizen by
birth, chose to remain in Malaysia and led the Malaysian-
based PAP. However, the Government was reluctant to
allow the PAP to operate in Malaysia on the ground that
it was now foreign-based. The party was deregistered
in September 1965.	 As a result, Devan Nair formed the
DAP (whose programme was very similar to Singapore's
PAP) which was registered in March, 1966.
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The party's 'basic guiding policy and principles' are
contained in 'The Setapak Declaration' announced in July,
1967.	 To begin with it is committed to 'the ideal of a
free, democratic and socialist Malaysia, based on the
principles of racial equality, and social and economic
justice1.34
On the important question of language, education and
culture, the DAP accepts the use of Malay as the National
Language, but emphasizes the constitutional guarantee to
give freedom to the use of languages of the other communities.
It regrets, however, that this constitutional guarantee is
'rendered sterile by an educational policy which does not
permit the free use of the Chinese and Tamil languages as
media of instruction and of examination in national-type
secondary schools'.	 The party seeks the use of Chinese,
Tamil and English languages for official purpose as well as
media of instruction and of examinations in secondary schools.35
In its manifesto for the 1969 General election, the
DAP put forward three main objectives: political democracy,
social and economic democracy, and cultural democracy.
Under political democracy the party asserted that all citizens
regardless of race, language, Or religion should enjoy equal
political status, rights and opportunities, that 'all Malay-
sians must have an equal place under the Malaysian sun'.
34. Democratic Action Party, 'The Setapak Declaration',
1967, p.3.
35. Ibid.) pp.5-6.
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Under social and economic democracy, the DAP called for the
ending of exploitation of man by man, class by class or race
by race, and the eradication of economic, social and
educational imbalance between rural and urban sectors. As
regards cultural democracy, the DAP listed the following among
its main objectives:
a. Official status for the Chinese, Tamil and English
languages, and acceptance of Malay as the National
Language to serve as the common language of expression
and communication among Malaysians.
b. Free use of Chinese, Tamil and English in the
Parliament, State Assemblies, and in public notices
and government correspondencc.
c. Abolition of the distinction between national and
national-type schools.
d. Immediate solution of the question of recognition
of Nanyang, Formosan, India) . ; Middle Eastern and
Indonesian degrees and qualifications, on the basis
of internationally accepted standards of assessment.
e. Government support for the National University and
the Merdeka University projects.36
The DAP s s
 stand over cultural democracy was clear. This
is significant because it related to issues of vital interests
to the non-Malay communities. It was the only major party,
apart from the Perak-based PPP, that demanded the recognition
of Chinese and Tamil languages as official languages in
addition to Malay. The party soon emerged as the champion
of the cause of the non-Malay communities. For this reason,
it is hardly surprising that its support comes largely from
the non-Malays especially the Chinese-educated Chinese.
Presumably many of these Chinese are formerly MCA or Labour
Party supporters.
36., Democratic Action Party: DAP General Elections Manifesto,
'Our Triple Objective s , Towards a Malaysian Malaysia.
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The Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan)
The Gerakan, a non-communal party, was inaugurated in
March, 1968.	 Its key sponsors were Dr. Lim Chong Eu (the
founder of UDP), Dr. Tan Chee Khoon and V. Veerapan (both
were former leaders of the Labour Party) and a few intellec-
tuals including Professor Wang Gungwu and Professor Syed
Hussein Alatas. A striking feature of the party was that
its leadership consisted mainly of English-educated moderates,
many of whom left their former parties after finding it
difficult to maintain their non-communal character (Vasil,
1971:304-5),
The Geictkan's aim was to build a genuinely non-communal
party based on moderate socialism and democracy. To sustain
its non-communal character, it was quite concerned with
winning the support of the Malays. For example, in its
policy statement issued in April, 1968, it recognized 'the
need to accord special attention and emphasis on the economi-
cally weak Malays and other indigenous peoples' and maintained
that 'they should be protected from exploitation and assisted
to compete with other communities on a just basis in business,
trade and the professions' (Vasil, 1972:61).
On the contentious question of language and education,
the party adopted a compromised position. It upheld the
status and position of Malay as the National Language and
at the same time pressed for the 'legitimate use of all
languages'.	 It also called for 'parallel development' of
184
the different media of instruction in the educational
institutions from primary to tertiary levels (Vasil, 1972:64).
The party attempted to attract the support of trade unions
by electing to its committee several trade union leaders. 	 It
also issued a Workers Charter dealing with problems of workers
and trade union movement.
The party won eight Parliamentary seats in the 1969
General election and polled 8.57C° of the votes.
	
Despite
its non-communal character, the party's membership and support
comes largely from the non-Malay communities.	 Its strength
is concentrated mainly in Selangor, Perak and Penc .nge In
Penang the party captured the State Government, TAnning 16
out of 24 seats.
A significant fact about all these major non-Malay
opposition parties is that there are no fundamental differences
in respect to ideology and political programmes. 	 All of
them attempt to fight for equality of rights in an integrated
Malaysian nation. Their main differences are the intensity
of their commitment to the interests of the non-Malays and
the value they attach to the necessity of establishing contact
with the Malay community (Vasil, 1971:307).
With this brief background in mind, we are now in a better
position to look at Chinese participation in Malaya's party
politics. This, we will do by examining the various general
elections that have been held.
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The Chinese and the
	
Federal Election
The 1955 election was the first major general election
held in Malaya before it attained Independence. The most
outstanding feature of the Malayan electorate at this time,
as Ratnam (1965:186) puts it, l was its uneven communal
composition'. The Chinese community was very much under-
represented.	 Of a total of 1,280,000 registered electorate,
84.2% were Malays, less than 5% Indians, and Chinese only
accounted for 11.2%, as can be seen form the Table below
(Ratnam, 1965:187).
Table 4.1 The CommuniA Breakdown of the 1955 
Malayan Elctorate
Communal Group Voters Percentage
Malays 1,078,000 84.2
Chinese 143,000 11.2
Indians 50,000 3.9
Others 9,000 0.7
Total	 1,280,000	 100.0
It is estimated that only half the adult Chinese popu-
lation, approximately 600,000 were eligible to vote, and of
this number obly 143,000 (roughly one in four) registered.
As a result, only about one Chinese in eight actually cast
a vote (Carnell, 1955016)a
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This low rate of Chinese participation in the 1955
election has been explained by one observer as indicating a
general lack of interest in public affairs (Mills, 1958:94).
It has also been explained as reflecting a lack of interest
and of confidence in the electoral process (Economist,
June 25, 1955).	 Still another writer suggests the main
cause as 'the feeling of ineffectiveness which a minority
group so often feels' (Tinker, 1956:260).	 While all these
might have been possible reasons, one important factor should
not be overlooked. Lack of citizenship rights effectively
excluded a large number of Chinese and Indians from the
electorate.	 Nearly half of the 1,200,000 adult Chinese were
aot qualified for citizenship at the time of the election,
and hence ineligible to register as electors (Carnell, 1955:
316 and Haas, 1967:67).
As a result of the uneven communal distribution of the
electorate, the urban electorates in particular were, in
effect, largely unrepresentative minorities. 	 The best
examples of this were the two Kuala Lumpur constituencies
(Kuala Lumpur Timur and Kuala Lumpur Barat)„ where out of a
total population of 255,000 only 22,000 (less than 10%) were
registered as electors.	 Of those who registered, 64% were
Malays. But the Malays, as a community, were heavily out-
numbered by the Chinese and Indians in Kuala Lumpur.
Therefore, it can be said that the Chinese opinion in these
urban areas remained largely untested (Carnell, 1955:316;
Ratnam, 1965:188).
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When the election results were announced, the inter-
communal Alliance Party had a landslide victory, capturing
51 out of a total of 52 seats. 37 The party received a
total of 79.6% of the valid votes. 	 Commenting on the
election, Carnell (1955:315) wrote: "The most surprising
thing about the election for the new Malayan Legislative
Council was not the triumph of the Triple Alliance of the
United Malays National Oragnization, the Malayan Chinese
Association and the Malayan Indian Congress - this was
generally expected - but that this party should have so
completely annihilated its opponents".
Even more significant, however; is the fact that all
the 15 MCA candidates were successful. Many of these
candidates stood in predominantly 1/1.-ay constituencies and
defeated their Malay opponents from Party Negara by large
majorities. Although all the MCA candidates were elected,
there was no way to determine the real strength of the party.
Too many Chinese had been excluded from the electorate.
And whether those who were not eligible to vote would have
supported the MCA is a moot point. The election results
did not tell us whether the businessmen-dominated MCA really
spoke for the whole Chinese community or only for a small
segment of it (Haas, 1967:74).
On the whole, the election results showed that there
was little evidence of voting along strictly communal lines.
Malay electors outnumbered non-Malays in 50 out of the 52
37. The only seat lost by the Alliance was in Krian (Perak)
where its Malay candidate was beaten by a PMIP candidate
by a small majority of only 450 votes.
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constituencies. Yet all the 17 non-Malay (15 Chinese and
two Indians) candidates were returned. Had there been
communal voting, it is likely that some Malay candidates
from the PMIP and Party Negara would have been elected.
Tengku Abdul Rahman referred to the election results as
'the first step towards racial harmony' in Malaya (Straits
Times, July 29, 1955).	 Undoubtedly, the voting was a
'first step', but not a complete demonstration of non-
communal voting since only the Malays had a full chance to
exercise their franchise. 	 The election was at best a Malay
triumph over communal appeals. The voting behaviour of
the Chines r. -Ind Indians was largely untested, since they
comprised -,.Ly a small proportion of the electorate.
There 1.- -.re only two constituencies - George Town and
Ipoh-Menglc-bu - where Chinese electors had a clear majority.
There were no Malay candidates in either of these consti-
tuencies. In George Town all the three candidates were
Chinese, while in Ipoh-Menglembu there were two Chinese and
two Indians.
	
In both constituencies, Chinese candidates
were returned. This clearly means that the ability of the
Chinese to vote non-communally or otherwise was not effecti-
vely tested.
	
The fact that in both instances the Chinese
candidates elected belonged to the Alliance Party can be
taken as an indication that the Chinese had voted along party
and not communal lines, and they seemed to have preferred
inter-communal politics (Ratnam, 1965:199).
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The 1959 General Election
The 1959 General Election was the first election that
took place after Malaya's Independence. The background and
setting of the 1959 election was different from those of 1955
in three important aspects. 	 First, the British had left,
and Malaya had been given Independence. 	 Second 9 there was
a great change in the size and composition of the electorate,
resulting in a great increase in the voting strength of the
Chinese. Third, a change in the leadership of the MCA
occurred in March, 1958. The new leaders proposed changes
in the Alliance's policies on language and education. The
UMNO was confronted with the prospect of working .--th a new
set of Chinese leaders.	 The possibility of di'-q-ension in
the Alliance Party on a highly contentious issue was also
evident (Haas, 1967:91).
In the 1955 election, the Alliance's slogan Merdeka
overrode all communal concerns and assured it an over-
whelming support from all communities. The hope to achieve
merdeka also gave the Alliance politicians an unifying issue.
Now that Merdeka had been achieved, domestic issues of
communal significance became of more immediate concern.
The Alliance partners had to find a mutual agreement on
contentious issues such as citizenship, language and education.
It was largely in these areas that Sino-Malay differences
remained. The question before the 1959 election was
whether the Alliance partners were able to find sufficient
Table 4.2 Communal Breakdown of the Electorate • • Election
19 0
common ground to continue the inter-communal co-operation
(Haas, 1967:92).
	
There were signs as to the problems of
reconciling the demands of the Chinese and the claims of the
Malays within the party.
In so far as the electoral process was concerned, there
were two important changes that affected the 1959 election.
First there was a marked increase in Chinese voting strength,
both absolutely aid relatively. The following table reveals
the Chinese voting strength in relation to other communities:
Communal Group Voters Percentage
Malays 1,217,000 56.8
Chinese 764,000 35.6
Indians 159,000 7.4
Others 4,000 0.2
Total
	 2,144,000	 100.0
(Ratnam, 1965:200).
By 1959, the Chinese electorate had increased from 11.2%
in 1955 to 35.6%, so that in 1959, the communal distribution
of electors was much more in proportion to the country's
ethnic composition. 38
38. Smith (1960:40-41) suggests that the increase in Chinese
and Indian electorate was due to (i) the new Malayan
Constitution of 1957 which made it easier for non-Malays
to obtain citizenship, and (ii) special concessions
were given to those who applied for citizenship within
12 months after Independence. See also Ratnam (1965:201).
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The Second electoral change was the increase in the
number of elected seats, hence constituencies. The former
Legislative Council became the Dewan Rakyat (House of
Representatives) after Independence and the original 52
constituencies were now increased to 104.
This increase in both the Chinese electorate,and
constituencies had two important outcomes. 	 In the first
place, the electorate became far more representative of the
general population. This was especially true of urban areas
where most of the Chinese tended to settle.	 Secondly, in
1959, the Malay electorate only predominated in 66 out of the
104 constituencies. 	 In the 1955 election they had heavily
outnumbered the Chinese in all but two of the 52 constitues.
All in all, in so far as the Chinese were concerned,
the situation was a great deal better and more satisfactory
than it had been in 1955.	 'The feeling of ineffectiveness'
In the electoral system had largely disappeared, for with
their stronger voting strength, they were now in a position
'substantially to influence the outcome of the elections'
(Ratnam, 1965:201).
As indicated earlier, the change in the MCA leadership
occurred in March, 1958 9 when Tan Cheng-lock, seeking re-
election to a fifth term as the MCA president, was defeated
by Dr. Lim Chong Eu by a vote of 89 to 67. Close supporters
of Tan Cheng-lock were also ousted in the power struggle by
Lim Chong . Eu l s group which was dissatisifed with MCA policies.
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Ong Yoke Lin was replaced by Too Joon Ming as Secretary-
General and Tan Siew Sin (son of Tan Cheng-lock) was
removed as Publicity Chairman in favour of Yong Pung How.
The new MCA leadership came to be known as the 'Young
Blood' or the 'Young Turks'. The 'Young Turks' were
obviously more concerned with the rights and interests of
the Chinese community.
	
Before his election, Lim Chong Eu
had indicated that he would give greater priority to Chinese
interests and Chinese unity, but not at the expense of
abandoning the Alliance (Means, 1970:205)..
The emergence of new MCA leaders undoubtedly posed a
number of problems for the UMNO.
	
"TwINO leaders were not
at all certain if the new leaders would co-operate with
them and make compromises and concessions to the Malays
like the MCA 'old guards' used to do. Tengku Abdul Rahman
was obviously disturbed by the outcome of the MCA election.
He was disappointed that Tan Cheng-lock had been ousted,
but expressed hope that the new MCA would continue to
co-operate with other partners of the Alliance (Straits
Budget, March 26 9 1958).	 Promises to that effect by
Dr. Lim allayed some misgivings, but uncertainty and distrust
among the UMNO leaders remained. Tun Ismail, the then
UMNO Secretary-General, who earlier warned that the unity
of the Alliance depended on the outcome of the MCA election,
described Tan Cheng-lock as 'the true symbol of a Malayan
Chinese', and said that the Malays had confidence in him
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(Haas, 1967:102-4).	 It appears that the UMNO leaders
preferred the MCA 'old guards' such as Tan Cheng-look, and
hoped that the new MCA leaders would conform to their image
of the Malayan Chinese: ever willing to yield to the Malays.
The victory of the new MCA leadership did not eliminate
its internal dissension. 	 Dr. Lim's group could not gain
full control over all MCA branches. 'Old Guard' leaders
like Tan Siew Sin and Ong Yoke Lin still had firm control
over the MCA branches in their respective states.
The newly elected MCA leaders were eager to re-organize
and revitalize their party.
	 Firstly, they hoped that re-
organization would strengthen the Party and make it more
representatIve of the Chinese community by securing a broader
support.	 Pecondly, re-oragnization was also designed to
strengthen the party's Central Working Committee and bring
about unity within the party. Another major motive for
re-organization was that this would give them greater
control of the party and eventually they could prevent Tan
Siew Sin and Ong Yoke Lin and their' associates from staging
a political comeback (Haas, 1967:105; Means, 1970:205).
As a first step to revitalize the MCA and secure a
broader support, the new leaders sought the support of Chinese
guilds and associations. This, they tried to achieve by
dropping all disciplinary action against MCA rebels who had
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earlier followed the delegation of the Chinese guilds and
associations to the London Conference on Malayan Constitution.39
The new leaders in their proposed new MCA constitution
suggested the affiliations of Chinese guilds and associations
whose representatives would have voting power in the Central
Committee. The MCA's aim to affiliate Chinese guilds and
associations was in effect to attempt to win the sapport of
their followers.
	 It must have been felt by the new leaders
that the wealthy businessmen and professional men in the MCA
leadership had little in common with the ordinary labourers
and workers (who formed the bulk of the Chinese population),
and the Chinese school teachers. These people tcnded to
become members and supporters of the Chinese gui l os and
associations. The Chinese school teachers had particularly
objected to the failure of the MCA to press for the Chinese
language as an official language (Haas, 1967:108).
	
This
39. Dissatisfied with the MCA's role in the Alliance as
regards representatives to the Reid Commission on Malayan
Constitution, the various Chinese guilds and associations
resolved to send in May 1957 their own delegation to
London to present to the British government a 'Chinese
point of view' in the final negotiations on the Malayan
Constitution. The delegation was led by Lau Pak Khuan,
president of the Perak Chinese Assembly Hall and a
prominent leader of the MCA. Two other members of the
delegation were Tan Kee Gak, a founder member of the
Malacca MCA and Yap Mau Tatt, who was a former executive
secretary of the MCA. The delegation demanded among
others the principle of jus soli in citizenship and the
Chinese language to be made an official language.
Having closely associated with the delegation, all the
three were suspended from the MCA. Cf. Haas, (1967:107)
and Means (1970:200-1).
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proposal to affiliate guilds and associations, if successful,
would have strengthened substantially the MCA l s position in
the Alliance.
The revised new MCA Constitution contained other important
changes, the most controversial ones being the centralized
control of finance of the branches, the absolute power of
the Central Working Committee to nominate candidates for
federal elections, to discipline, expel or fine members for
breach of party discipline (Means, 1970:205).
The attempt of the new leaders to reorganize the party
and broaden its support was aimed at winning a greater voice
in the Alliance.
	
Sine Independence, the MCA had learnt
that it only occupied	 ,..3condary role in the Alliance,
while the UMNO was a dominant member. By assuming a greater
power in the Alliance, +1-. 4E) new leaders sought to effect a
change in the balance of power between the Chinese and the
Malays (Haas, 1967:106).
The efforts of re-organization by the new leaders
evoked fears among 'old guard' leaders as well as the UMNO
leaders. The s old guard' leaders feared that their power
and influence in the party would be undermined. 40 The
UMNO leaders probably feared that a stronger MCA would assume
40. This was related to the new revised constitution as
regards to centralised financial control. The Selangor
and Malacca branches were the biggest and richest, and
headed by 'old guard' leaders Ong Yoke Lin and Tan Siew
Sin respectively. If the new leaders succeeded in
removing financial control from these branches, they
would have undermined the bases of the t old guard' leaders.
However, this new plan to centralise financial control
was later forced to be dropped by the Association
branches. Cf. Haas, (1967:112).
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a great political power in the Alliance, thus making fewer
concessions to the UMNO.
	 Tun Ismail, UMNO's Secretary, was
quick to react to the proposed new constitution of the MCA.
He referred to the proposal to incorporate Chinese guilds
and associations as 'unrealistic and warned that if imple-
mented it might harm the Alliance (Haas, 1967:117).
	 He was
probably aware of the increased strength of the MCA if the
guilds and associations were to be incorporated."
Tun Ismail also took exception to the new leaders
proposal calling for the union of Singapore with the Federa-
tion. He described the proposal as 'unworkable'. Tangku
Abdul Rahman, head of the UMNO, also came out against any
immediate moves to prepare the way for the merger. Their
reactions were understandable since merger would result in
the increase of the Chinese population and make the Malays
a minority in their own country.
As expected, the revised constitution was opposed bitterly
by the 'old guard' leaders. The proposals were finally
considered by the Central General Committee. After a few
hours heated debate, a vote was taken. A total of 75 votes
were in favour of adopting the proposals, with 50 against and
one abstention.	 Since amendments to the MCA constitution
required a three-fifths majority, a legal dispute ensued
over the result of the vote. The new proposals were only
considered passed by a three-fifth majority if the abstaining
41. The various guilds and associations were said to have
a total membership of over 100,000.
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ballot was not counted in the total. If the abstaining
vote was added to the total, the three-fifth majority fell
short of one vote. However, as presiding officer, Dr. Lim
ruled that the abstention did not count and the amendments
had obtained the required majority. But Tan Siew Sin and
Ong Yoke Lin refused to recognize the legality of the new
constitution.	 And in early 1959, the Regitrar of Societies
announced his rejection of the revised constitution on the
grounds that it failed to secure a necessary three-fifth
majority and that it violated the law by allowing a foreign
political party (the Singapore MCA to affiliate with the
MCA (Haas, 1967:123).
With the new constitution reje '--ad by the Registrar
of Societies, it had to be revised and re-submitted for his
consideration. Many compromises had to be made between the
'Young Turks' and the t old guards'. The redrafted consti-
tution that was finally approved by the Registrar contained
few of the provisions that the t old guards' had earlier
opposed. 42
	This meant a clear victory for the told
guards' leaders. The new leaders' attempt to win wider
support was destroyed since the guilds and associations were
not permitted to be incorporated into the party.
On the face of it, the adoption of the new constitution
by the MCA appeared to give the impression that the party had
42. The Chinese guilds and associations were not allowed
to be affiliated to the MCA under the new constitution.
Only political organizations with the 'same objectives'.
as the MCA could apply for affiliation. The earlier
proposal for transferring the state branch funds to the
headquarters was also dropped. State branches were
also assured the power to nominate candidates for
elections. Cf. Haas (1967:127).
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achieved a new degree of unity which had been lacking since
the new leaders emerged. Whether the dissension between
the 'young Turks' and the 'old guards' had actually been
eliminated was difficult to ascertain. 	 What was evident,
however, was that both factions still retained their separate
supporters and sources of power.
While the dispute over MCA's new constitution was
temporarily settled, two other major issues within the MCA
loomed large and threatened to break up the Alliance party.
The first of these was the position of Chinese education and
language, which hadalwaysbeen the concern of the vast majority
of the Chinese. The Razak Education Report generated bitter-
ness and ornosition among the Chinese who feared that the
government aimed at slowly destroying their education and
language.	 Strong opposition and attack came especially from
two strong organizations closely identified with the operation
of Chinese schools, the United Chinese School Teachers'
Association and the United Chinese School Committees'
Association. The mounting bitterness and discontent of the
Chinese community as a whole resulted in the formation by the
MCA of a Central Education Committee t o look into the
implications of the Razak Report for Chinese education.
The MCA also held discussions with the UMNO so as to reach
some agreement on the possible changes in the government's
education policies."
43. The Razak Report and the language-education issue will
be fully discussed in chapter 5.
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The second issue was related to the MCA's role in the
Alliance.	 In July, 1959, just a few weeks before the
General election, the MCA Central Working Committee resolved
that the MCA should be alloted 40 seats in the Federal election
on the ground that there were 39 constituencies in which the
Chinese voters outnumbered the Malays. 44 The intention of
the MCA was to secure a one-third of the total number of seats.
The MCA leaders feared that if they were not given a minimum
of one-third of the seats, it could result in an amendment
of the Constitution by the Malays without the consent of
the Chinese.	 Amendments to the Constitution required a two-
third majority. The MCA felt that securing a on--third of
the seats was a sure way of safeguarding their jr.-..:.erests.
The demand for more seats for the MCA was obviously an
attempt to strengthen the MCA's position in the Alliance.
It was also an attempt to win more political power for the
Chinese. At least two factors could have influenced the
MCA's demand for more seats.
	
First, as the MCA itself
recognized, there were 39 constituencies where Chinese
voters outnumbered the Malays.
	
Second, the Chinese accounted
for more than 35% of the electorate in 1959 as compared to
only 11.2% in 1955.
44. Another resolution passed by the MCA was that the
Alliance Manifesto should 'clearly express its intention
to review in general the implementation of its educa-
tional policy so that the medium of examinations in
Chinese schools could be the medium of instruction'.
Cf. Vasil (1971:27).
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In connection with the allocation of parliamentary
seats in the Alliance, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, president of the
MCA had earlier written a private letter to Tengku Abdul
Rahman, the UMNO's president. Apart from asking the Alliance
to allocate 40 seats to the MCA, Dr. Lim also made several
other requests: that the Alliance election Manifesto
should promise to review the education policy; that MCA
candidates should be chosen by the MCA itself, not by the
Alliance National Council; and that the Alliance Manifesto
should clearly express the Alliance determination to uphold
the Federal Constitution as it stands.45
There had been no pl.blic mention of Dr. Lim's letter
until it was released wiL.hout Dr. Lim's knowledge. 46 The
letter was accompanied by a press statement issued by the
Chairman of the MCA Publicity Committee, Yong Pung How:
The MCA will stand absolutely firm on
the issue of Chinese education and the
allocation of seats for the MCA
	
If we do not succeed in getting what
we think is fair, the MCA General
Committee will decide on July 12 whether
we fight under the Alliance banner or on
our own.... (Haas, 1967:156)
Yong Pung How also indicated that as a compromise, the
MCA might accept 35 seats. This would still provide the
MCA with one-third of the total 104 seats (provided that all
their candidates were returned).
45. Dr. Lim's private letter to Tengku first appeared in
the China Press of July 8, 1959, and reproduced in the
Straits Times of July 10, 1959. Cf. Means (1970:212,223).
46. Responsibility to release the letter was later acknowledged
by Yong Pung How, MCA's Publicity Chief. See M. Roff
(1965:51).
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The release of the contents of Dr. Lim's letter to the
Tengku and Yong Pung How's press statement evoked a storm of
protest from the UMNO. Tengku Abdul Rahman reacted very
angrily. He referred to the publication of the letter as
an 'ultimatum' and 'a stab in the back'. He also announced
that the UMNO and MIC would contest the election as the
Alliance with those MCA leaders who did not support Dr. Lim's
stand - in other words without Dr. Lim and his supporters
(Means, 1970:213 1 ; Vasil, 1971:30).
	
Later, the Tengku
announced in a press conference that he was taking over the
functions of the Alliance National Council and would personally
:landle the allocation of seats and the selection of candidatc..-
The Tengku's reaction had obviously surprised Dr. Lim.
Jr. Lim was a moderate leader who favoured co-operation
between the MCA and UMNO. The two leaders met on July 12,
1959, and both agreed to settle the crisis on Tengku's terms.
These terms were later announced by Dr Lim in an Emergency
meeting of the MCA's Central General Committee.
With regard to the allocation of seats it is
most likely that we shall be allocated 32
seats... Nomination of candidates will be
made by the Tengku alone, because of the
shortness of time, but before finalizing the
list I would be consulted... (The education)
clause will not be included in the manifesto
but the government will implement it by
administrative directive as soon as possible.
(Vasil, 1971:30-31).
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The MCA Central General Committee voted to reaffirm its
faith in the Tengku and the Alliance, and accepted Tengkuts
terms by 89 votes to 80. This decision means the failure
of the I yonug Turks' to secure a greater power for the MCA.
In the final allocation of seats, the MCA was given 31
seats, the MIC 3 seats and the remaining 70 seats went to
UMNO. It is interesting to note that in accordance with
the agreement, the Tengku undertook the selection of the
MCA candidates. Dr. Lim Chong-Eu was neither consulted
nor even shown the list of candidates.
The final list of the MCA candidates selected by the
Tengku showed that all the 'young Turics i who were responsible
for the MCA-Alliance crisis were ...s.c:-.1ded; only those
candidates who were acceptable to thr UMNO were nominated.
This list included Tan Siew Sin and Cng Yoke Lin, both of
whom did not even enjoy the confidence of the MCA rank and
file, but were given safe Malay majority constituencies.
The action of the Tengku to exclude the MCA new leaders in
the electicns was not without reasons. These new leaders
had advocated equality for all racial groups. The UMNO
feared that if they were al/owed to last through the
election, they might be able to stabilize their position in
the MCA, thus threatening the supremacy of UMNO in the Alliance.
To the UMNO, the sure way of assuming a firm control over the
MCA was to select candidates it felt acceptable (Vasil,
1971:31-32).
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The new leaders who were removed by the Tengku from
the effective participation in the Alliance felt that the
Tengku behaved like a 'dictator'. 	 Completely frustrated,
many of them chose to quit the party. Within a few days it
was reported in the press that over thirty MCA officials
at both the State and Federal level had resigned. 47
The MCA split resulted in a great deal of dissatisfac-
tion among the Chinese, especially those who were Chinese
educated. The split also affected the MCA adversely in
the 1959 Federal election.	 Only 19 of its 31 candidates
were returni-1. 48 Further, the MCA candidates were success-
ful only ip constituencies with a significant Malay vote,
where the votes of the Malays largely compensated for the
defection c the Chinese voters. The MCA candidates fared
badly in predominantly Chinese constituencies (Vasil,
1965:62). Many of the seats lost by the MCA went either
to the Socialist Front, PPP or the Independents. 49
47. Those who resigned included Yong Pung How, Too Joon Hing,
Chin See Yin, Ng Ek Teong, Quek Kai Done and Tan Suan Kok.
Dr. Lim Chong Eu resigned shortly afterwards and went to
Britain for 'medical treatment'. He was replaced by Dr.
Cheah Toon Lok who headed the Kedah MCA and who had taken
an active role in bringing about a reconciliation between
the MCA and the UMNO.
48. The Alliance won 74 of the 104 seats (UMNO won 52, MCA 19,
and MIC 3). It suffered a decline in popular support,
winning only 51.5% of the total votes (as compared to
79.6% in 1955). Cf. T.E. Smith (1960:46).
49. The SF won 8 seats, PPP 4 seats and Independents 3 seats.
Two of the successful Independent candidates were Chin See
Yin and Quek Kai Dong who left the MCA after the crisis.
Too Joon Hing, MCA's former Secretary-General, was elected
to the Parliament in a by-election in May, 1961.
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It is clear from the 1959 election results that many
Chinese were dissatisfied with the MCA and the Alliance.
Tan Siew Sin and his close associates have generally been
more concerned with their business interests. 50 They have
allowed the UMNO to dominate the Alliance. They lack a
popular base among the Chinese and are dependent on the UMNO
for their position in the MCA.	 As a result these leaders
are unable to assert an equal position for their party in
the Alliance. (Vasil, 1971:33).
The 1959 MCA-UMNO crisis clearly indicated the dominant
position of the UMNO in the Alliance and its unwillingness
to make concessions to the Chinese.	 In order to maintain
Sino-Malay co-operation in the form of the Allia--e Party,
the MCA had to make almost all the concessions. The help-
lessness of the MCA in the Alliance is perhaps best summed
up by Yong Pung How:
•.. the MCA has outlived its usefulness and
is no longer able to carry out even the main
objects for which it was formed.... The MCA
is finished.
	
The abject surrender (to the
UMNO) yesterday showed it no longer stands for
anything.	 It crawled back to the Alliance
after being kicked out. The terms (set)
by the Tengku were such that no self-respecting
organization would have accepted them.
(Haas, 1967:169).
50. The 'old guards' (Tan Slew Sin and his associates)
took over the leadership of the MCA in 1961.
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The 1964 General Election
While there was substantial change in the size and
composition of the electorate in the 1959 election, the
change in 1964 had not been very substantial. The propor-
tion of Chinese electorate rose by two percentage points to
38%, as compared to 54% Malays and 810 Indians and others
(Ratnam & Milne i 1967:368).
This was the first election after the formation of
Malaysia in September 1963.
	 There were a total of 279
candidates contesting the 104 parliamentary seats.
	 Of the
candidates 94 were ChiJube, 168 Malays and 17 Indians.
	 The
corresponding figurec fc7 1959 were 79, 157 and 23 respectively.
The increase in the numb c1r of Chinese candidates was largely
the result of the entry of the PAP and UDP which together
fielded 26 Chinese candidates. The Socialist Front also
contributed to the increase by putting up eight more Chinese
than in 1959.	 While the overall figure for Chinese candidates
had increased from 79 in 1959 to 94 in 1964, there was a
substantial decrease in the number of Chinese Independent
candidates, from 17 to 3. This was because in 1959 a
special reason prompted a number of Chinese to stand as
Independents, namely the pre-election Alliance-MCA crisis
which resulted in the resignation of some key MCA figures.
Some of these ex-MCA leaders stood as Independents. By
1964, most of these MCA rebels had either joined the UDP or
had returned to the MCA (Ratnam & Milne, 1967:82-83).
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With regards to the communal breakdown of candidates
within the ruling party, there was no major change of policy
in 1964.	 In 1959, as noted earlier, the dispute over the
allocation of seats almost brought about the dissolution of
the Alliance.
	
This problem did not seem to appear in 1964.
The MCA had a better deal than in 1959, obtaining 33 nomina-
tions, an increase of two. The UMNO and MIC were given 68
and 3 nominations respectively. While clearly reflecting
the inter-communal structure of the party, the Alliance line-
up also showed the relative dominance of the UMNO vis-a-vis
its partners, since the Chinese formed the most numerous
group in 42 constituencies and Malay electors formed the
most numerous group in only 62 constituencies (Ratnam &
Milne, 1967:86, 107).	 The Socialist Front, like the Allianee.
reflected its inter-communal structure by fielding 28
Chinese, 30 Malays and 5 Indians.
The election came at the time when Indonesia launched
its 'confrontation' and 'crush Malaysia' campaign. 	 Indone-
sian 'confrontation' and the threat which it posed to Malaysia's
security therefore became the central issue in the election
campaign. The Alliance capitalized on the issue and put
the opposition on the defensive.	 As a result, contentious
issues like the position of the Chinese language and education,
the special position of the Malays, issues which had played
a decisive role in the 1959 election, were relegated to
secondary importance.
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The language-education issue, though of secondary
importance as compared to the question of national security,
was quite earnestly taken up by the opposition parties, in
particular the UDP and the PPP. Both the UDP and the PPP
accused the Alliance of discriminating against Chinese
education and language, and the MCA of not having done
enough to protect and preserve the position of Chinese
education (Ratnam & Milne, 1967:127-130).
The election results showed that the Alliance was
returned with a very comfortable margin. It captured 89
of the 104 Parliamentary seats.51
	
Copositions parties only
won 15 seats (PMIP - 9, SF - 2, PPP - 2, UDP - 1 and PAP -
Of the 33 MCA candidates 27 were returned. Again, as in
1959, they were successful only in cwistituencies which had
a sizeable Malay vote.
	
In predominantly Chinese constituen-
cies, the MCA candidates had, by and large, been defeated by
non-Malay opposition candidates. This clearly iniicated
that the MCA did not have the solid support among the Chinese.
Its candidates were able to win only in constituencies where
the defection of Chinese voters could be compensated for by
the votes of the Malays (Vasil, 1965:49).
The 1969 General Election
By 1969, before the general election took place, there
was the emergence of two new political parties - the DAP and
51. The Alliance won 58.5% of the total valid votes, as
against 51.8% in 1959.
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Gerakan. Both parties were essentially non-communal, and
both drew their support largely from the non-Malay communities.
Both parties claimed to fight for equality for all citizens.
On the emotive issue of education and language, the Gerakan
pressed for 'the legitimate use of all languages' and examina-
tions to be held in the main medium of instruction. 52 The
DAP went even further.	 It was committed to seek the
'official status for the Chinese, Tamil and English languages'
in addition to Malay.	 As a result, the two parties,
especially the DAP, were able to attract a significant number
of young people from the Chinese and Indian communities and
provided the leadership and rallying point for non-Malay
discontent ,. and disillusionment with the MCA and MIC.
The Alliance suffered serious reverses in the 1969
Parliamentary election, even though it still retained a
comfortable majority to rule.	 It won only 66 out of 104
seats, and secured only 48.4% of the valid votes compared to
51.8% and 58.5% in 1959 and 1964 respectively.	 The MCA,
Alliance's constituent part, suffered a crushing blow more
serious than any other Alliance partners. Of the 33 MCA
candidates, only 13 were returned (as compared to 27 in
1964). Many of the MCA top-ranking leaders were defeated.
These included Dr. Lim Swee Aun, deputy president of the
MCA and Minister of Commerce and Industries, Dr. Ng Kam Poh,
52. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, Election Manifesto: 3rd General
Elections, 1969.
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Minister of Social Welfare, and Mr. Kam Woon Wah, MCAls
Secretary-General. Those MCA candidates who were returned
had their majorities drastically reduced. 	 Once again,
MCA candidates won only in constituencies with a significant
Malay vote, and fared badly in areas with a predominantly
Chinese electorate and a small number of Malay electors
(Vasil, 1972:103-5).
In the State election the Alliance fate was equally
bad.	 It secured only 162 out of a total of 282 seats and
47.95% of the votes.	 In 1959 and 1964 it had won 206
(55.5%) and 241 (57.6%) seats respectively.
	
The most
serious losses of the Alliance were in Penang, P —rak and
Selangor, where non-Malays outnumbered the Malays. In
these states, the MCA was almost completely demolished.	 In
Penang, the Alliance suffered a crushing defeat and captured
only 4 out of 24 seats. The MCA was not able to win a
single seat. In both Perak and Selangor, the Alliance was
deprived of a majority in the State Legislatures, winning
19 (out of 40) and 14 (out of 28) seats respectively.
None of the MCA candidates in Perak was successful and only
one in Selangor secured a seat (Vasil, 1972:36-37).	 The
MCA also suffered reverses in other states like Negri Sembilan
and Malacca, but less severe compared to Penang, Perak and
Selangor.
The election results showed clearly that the Chinese
partner in the Alliance, the MCA, had lost the support of the
majority of the Chinese. The bulk of the Chinese had
turned their support to the two new parties, the DAP and the
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Gerakan, and the PPP. All the three parties were multi-
racial in membership and all had done well in urban constituen-
cies with a large non-Malay electorate. 53 The DAP provided
the major opposition in Perak, Negri Sembilan and Malacca,
the Gerakan in Penang and the PPP in Perak, In Selangor,
both DAP and Gerakan were strong. The success of the DAP
was largely due to its effective use of the 'Malaysian
Malaysia' slogan, while the Gerakan success was mainly the
result of its non-communal posture, its close links with
trade unions and the personal appeals of several of its
leaders (Vasil, 1972:43-44).
The heavy losses suffered by the Alliance were due
partly to the absence of a national issue such as 'confron-
tation' which had helped in 1964. Other factors certainly
made their contributions too. The Chinese and Indians
felt that the Alliance party's policy excessively favoured
the Malays while to the Malays the policy did not seem to
get results fast enough. Consequently, many Malays and
non-Malays alike became disenchanted with the party.
Another factor that worked against the party was the
electoral pact among the opposition parties which had
effectively avoided the dispersion of opposition votes and
forced the Alliance toface straight fights (Vasil, 1972:43).
53. Together these three parties captured 25 seats in the
Parliament: DAP-13, Gerakan-8 and PPP-4.
211
At least three important facts stood out after the
election results were announced - all of which are related
to Chinese politics.	 First there were doubts over the
Alliance claim that it represented the three communities in
the country through its constituent members - the UMNO,
MCA and MIC. The position of the WINO which claimed to
represent the Malays was seriously threatened by the more
extreme PMIP. The latter managed to capture 23.8% of the
total Parliamentary votes. 	 Considering that the Malays
accounted for 56% of the total electorate and the PMIP
drew its support exclusively from the Malays the success
of the PMIP was very significant (Vasil, 1972:46).
The performance of the MCA and MIC was even more
disheartening. The MCA went into the campaign with 27
Parliamentary seats and came out with only 13. More
importantly, in 9 of the 13 constituencies captured by the
MCA the Malay electors accounted for more than 30% of the
total electorate. 	 In the State elections, only 26 of its
80 candidates were successful. Thus there was no longer
any basis for the MCA to claim that it represented the
Chinese. 54
The second important fact was the political defeat for
the Malayan Communist Party and its sympathizers. The MCP
was officially banned in Malaysia, but throughout the election
campaign its supporters (mostly in the Labour Party) urged
54. The MIC also faced the same problem as the MCA. It won
2 Parliamentary and 3 State seats.
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the people to boycott the election. 	 The Labour Party,
which was dominated by extreme left-wingers, had acted as
MCP's spokesman (Vasil, 1972:47).	 It decided in December
1968 not to contest the election and to call for a boycott.
Earlier, in 1967, the party had passed a motion calling on
members to abandon constitutional politics and seek 'a
mass struggle as expounded by Mao Tse-Tung' (Drummond &
Hawkins, 1970:320).	 However, the attempt of the MCP and
its supporters in the Labour Party was unsuccessful. The
majority of the electorate simply ignored the call and the
overall turnout was about 70% (Ratnam & Milne, 1970:210-1).
This was clearly the defeat of the mr? and the Labour Party.
Thirdly, a serious challenge wa- posed to the inter-
communal Alliance monopoly of polit:I Pal power. A detailed
analysis of the election results sh ,-wed clearly vast numbers
of Malaysians had rejected the Alliance inter-communal
structure based on co-operation between a handful of Chinese
businessmen of the MCA on the one hand and the Malay elites
on the other." If the drain of votes from Alliance
continues, the whole raison d'etre of the Alliance could be
undermined.
55, The Alliance suffered from 'an erosion of both the communal
and the anti-communal vote'. For the first time in
Malaysian history, a non-communal party had secured the
control of a state.
	
Its share of the total vote fell from
almost 80% in 1955 to about 52% in 1959 and 48% in 1969.
The 1964 election result was an exception to the generally
declining pattern of Alliance strength. The Alliance
then was able to secure 59% of the vote because important
national issues like 'confrontation' mitigated the effects
of the increasing dissatisfaction of the Chinese and Malays
with the party. Cf. Ratnam & Milne, (1970:224-6), Vasil
(1972:47-48), Gray (1969;15, 18).
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The Impact of May 13 Communal Disturbance 
The outcome of the 1969 election came as a great surprise
to observers who had predicted another Alliance sweep. The
reverses of the Alliance party must have shocked many,
espedially the Alliance leaders themselves.	 In retrospect,
the election results might not have been the cause of the
race riots that broke out on May 13 in Kuala Lumpur but at
least it provided the occasion for the disturbances to take
place. The May 13 communal disturbance has had a great
impact on the political system of Malaysia as well as the
politics of the Malaysian Chinese. Two days after the
disturbam, broke out, a state of national Emergency was
declared, 2.-tlowed by the suspension of the Constitution and
Parliament_ An eight-man National Operations Council (NOC)
headed by rNniRazak, the then Deputy Prime Minister, was
set up to rule by decree.
The Malay-controlled NOC ruled the country until February
1971, when Parliament was finally reinstated. But the
restored Parliament was a much weakened one. Its powers and
privileges were severely restricted. One of the first acts
of the new Parliament was to pass a Constitutional amendment
prohibiting political activity of a communal character.
Under the amendment, it was a seditious offence to discuss
both inside and outside the Parliament constitutional
provisions relating to the special position of the Malays,
the status of the sultans, the National Language and
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citizenship.
	
Thus, with the proscription of these salient
political issues, democracy in Malaysia has been severely
constrained. It can now hardly approximate the Westminster
model of parliamentary democracy which had existed since
Independence until the outbreak of the riots in May, 1969
(Mehmet, 1971:215).
Since the issues removed from public discussion are
issues which centred around the privileges of the Malays,
there seems to be little doubt that the Constitutional
Amendments aimed more at protecting the Malays than the non-
Malays. It is not possible for non-Malay opposition parties
to talk about 'non-communalism' and 'equality fcr all'
without touching the fundamental questions of cit-zenship
and Malay privileges and other related issues. Now that the
discussion of these issues has been prohibited, it has the
net effect of restricting non-Malay political activities
rather than those of the Malays. The non-Malays, especially
the Chinese, are finding it increasingly difficult to
participate effectively in the political process. The May
riots and the subsequent constitutional change have seriously
impaired their faith in the political and legal processes of
the country. Many have come to realize to their despair
that parliamentary democracy is phoney and that what they have
gained through the ballot box in the 1969 election has been
robbed away from them as a result of the riots (Vasil,
1971:313).
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The Chinese Unity Movement 
Apart from resulting in a constitutional amendment
which effectively constrained the hitherto parliamentary
democracy based on the Westminster model, the race riots
also induced a drastic change in government policies. A
new economic programme was drawn up, which in effect favoured
the Malay community more than the non-Malays. Militarily,
the plan to expand the armed forces was also accelerated.
The Royal Malay Regiment (exclusively Malays) has been
expanded from ten to thirteen battalions ostensibly for the
purpose of dealing with -n increased communist threat on
the Malaysia-Thai bordei. A system of work permits was
implemented, which not only barred many permanent residents
from employment but also resulted in the verification of
citizenship under Article 30 of the Constitution. 56 Further,
on the contentious issue of education, Malaylias made by
decree the sole medium of instruction starting with the first
year of all primary schools in 1970.
All these discriminatory measures, taken together, had
the effect of generating fears, anxieties, frustration and
a sense of insecurity among the non-Malay communities. To
add to these, the then Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Ismail made
a statement in January 1971 that 'it would be better for UMNO
to break with the MCA and MIC if the two Alliance partners
continue to be neither dead nor alive'. The MCA leader,
56. Many Chinese had obtained citizenship under Article 30
of the Constitution. They feared that their citizenship
would be revoked after surrendering the citizenship docu-
ments to the government for 'verification'.
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Tan Siew Sin reacted by saying that 'if there was a feeling
in UMNO that it could do without the MCA, it would be far
better for the MCA to be out of the Alliance and operate
under our own banner1.57
It was against this background of fear and insecurity
and the indignation suffered by the MCA that in February,
1971 some Chinese leaders, led by Alex Lee, felt the need to
promote solidarity among the Chinese, and launched the Chinese
unity movement. 58
The Chinese unity movement was first started in Kuala
Lumpur on February 7, 1971. The meeting was a historical
one for the Chinese, for it was on that day that the Chinese
awoke to the need to unite, and it was also on that day that
Tan Siew Sin, president of the MCA offered to step down and
'retire from politics altogether' if he was considered 'a
barrier to Chinese unity'. 59
The meeting resulted in the birth of the Chinese Liaison
Committee for National Unity and a six-point declaration,
which among other things, urged that 'the Malaysian Chinese
must unite in order to make an effective contribution to and
57. Quoted in "A Reflection", a mimeographed copy circulated
by the Perak MCA Reformation Group (n.d.)
58. The unity movement was organized by non-MCA leadership.
The organizer, Alex Lee made it clear in the meeting:
"Though the MCA president Tan Siew Sin has been invited
to attend, I would like to clear any misunderstanding about
the gathering being an MCA meeting. We are not committing
anybody to the MCA".
59. Quoted in The China Press, Feb.8, 1971. Also quoted in
the Guardian (organ of the MCA), May, 1971, p.2. Tan Siew
Sin was invited to address the meeting.
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consolidate national unity'. The delcaration also pledged
the 'undivided loyalty' and the 'absolute allegiance' of the
Chinese to the country, to 'uphold the Constitution' and to
co-operate with other Malaysians 'for the furtherance of
equal opportunities in the economic, social and political
advancement of all Malaysians in a democratic and just society'
(The Guardian, May, 1971:1).
In order to allay Malay fears and distrust in the move-
ment, the organizers were careful to stress that the ultimate
aim of Chinese unity was to co-operate effectively with other
communities, especially the Malays, sr. as to achj.eve national
unity, progress and prosperity. Tan Siew Sin who was invited
to speak made this point very clea.g.-iy:
I want Chinese unity not for the purpose of
promoting Chinese chauvinism, not for the
purpose of confronting the Malays or any other
community, but for co-operating effectively
with them, because a completely disunited
Chinese community is not only of no use to
itself, it is of no use to the other communi-
ties or even to Malaysia.
	 It promotes
political instability and it does not benefit
any one except those who are out to make
mischief.
(The Guardian, May, 1971:2).
The Kuala Lumpur meeting proved a great success and
aroused great enthusiasm among the Chinese throughout the
country. Less than two weeks later, on February 18, a
similar meeting was held in Ipoh. According to press
reports, the good response from the Chinese community was
unprecedented. The audience included Chinese of all walks
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of life, especially shopkeepers, hawkers and workers (Kin
Kuok Daily News, Feb.19, 1971).
	 A similar rally was also
held in Seremban a month later. A fourth and the last rally
was held in Penang. 60
Judging from the enthusiastic response of the Chinese
community and the seriousness of the leaders of the movement,
one would expect that the unity movement would become a
rallying point for the Chinese and eventually unite them as
a strong political force.
	 Some observers even believed
that the unity movement might eventually replace the badly
defeated (ix the 1969 General election) MCA.	 But, to the
disappointmr.nt of many ordinary Chinese who had placed great
hope in the movement as a unifying force, the unity movement
was short-1:Lved.	 It ended in Penang, where it held its
last meeting, after less than three months of its formation.
The death of the unity movement was the result of
interference from the MCA 'old guards' who still control key
positions in the state branches and at headquarters. Tan
Siew Sin, himself an 'old guard', was invited to address the
unity meetings, probably because of his position as the MCA
president and as Finance Minister of the country and also
because of his cordial relationship with the UMNO leaders.
In the course of his speech, Tan Siew Sin admitted MCAls
60. The Penang meeting, in contrast with the first three
meetings, was sponsored by the MCA.
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past mistakes and even offered to step down as MCA president
if the Chinese community so wished. The leaders of the
unity movement appreciated Tan's sincerity in admitting his
past mistakes, and his desire to get to the root of Chinese
problems. A pledge was thus made by the movement to the
effect that the Chinese would follow his leadership, as he
had admitted his past mistakes. The Chinese were obviously
prepared to give him another chance to redeem himself as
the leader of the Chinese community. But the tremendous
response and enthusiasm shown by the Chinese in Kuala Lumpur,
Ipoh and Seremban worried the other MCA t old guar s' such
as Lee San Choon and Kam Woon Wah. These t old gardst
feared that the unity movement might eventually destroy the
MCA (and hence their own positions and vested interests)
since it urged Chinese unity but not under the leadership of
the MCA.	 As a measure of 'self-preservation', the old
guards tried to pack the meeting with MCA youths and hard-
cores. Their intention was presumably to take over the
movement, and unite the Chinese under the banner of the MCA.
In this they failed, as was clear from their effort to
organize the fourth and the last unity meeting in Penang.
In contrast with the first three unity meetings, the MCA-
sponsored Penang rally attracted only a small crowd, and these
being t hardcore MCA types brought to the meeting in 33 buses' 61
Nonetheless, the old guards had at least succeeded in sabota-
ging the unity movement.
61. "A Reflection", a mimeographed copy circulated by the
Perak MCA Reformation Group (n.d.).
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Tan Siew Sin's tactical error also helped in the
intensification of the old guard sabotage. At the time
when the unity movement was being organized throughout the
country, Tan Siew Sin began re-organizing his MCA, in an
attempt to absorb young intellectuals and professional men
into its leadership rank. This move frightened the old guards
in the party. Fearing that their position would be jeopardi-
zed, they quickly closed ranks and proceeded to sabotage
both the unity movement as well as the MCA re-organization
(Pillai, 1971:14).
The strength and influence of the MCA old guards and
their opposition to the unity movement and the MCA reform
programme certainly worried Tan Siew Sin. He might have
sensed that it was safe:- for him to be on he side of the
old guards. This attitude of his and his distrust in the
unity movement began to reveal barely two months after the
inaugural meeting of the unity movement, when Alex Lee, with
the support of Chinese guilds and associations, attempted
to register the Chinese Liaison Committee for National Unity. 62
an Slew Sin warned:
The move to register the Chinese Unity
Movement.., could cause confusion among the
Chinese and led to disunity rather than
unity. Equally important it could create
suspicion in the minds of other communities
particularly the Malays.
(Quoted in "A Reflection").
62. The application for registration of the unity movement
was later rejected by the Registrar of Societies on
7.1.1972. See Kwong Wah Jit Poh, February 12, 1972,
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Later, at the Penang Unity rally, Tan Siew Sin again
voiced his opposition to the registration of the Chinese
unity movement as a political party.
If it is not registered as a political party
under the Societies Act, the Malaysian Chinese
Liaison Committee for National Unity cannot
function as it is doing now - that is promote
Chinese unity which is essentially a political
objective... If the registration created a
new political party, the Chinese would be
represented not by six but seven political
parties.
(Straits Times, April 26, 1971).
There was surpr is ingly a complete change of Tan Siew Sin's
mental attitude within a period of less than three months.
At the first unity rally at Kuala Lumpur, Tan Siew Sin's
attitude was 'Chinese unite and choose your leader'. He said:
If it is the feeling of the Chinese community
that I should withdraw (as MCA President), I am
prepared to throw my support to anyone or any
group which can attract sufficient support to
be able to claim that he or they can genuinely
represent and speak in the name of the Chinese
community. It is for the Chinese community
to decide whom they want and I am prepared to bow
to their wishes.
(The Guardian, May, 1971:2).
Within a short period, his stand seems to be: 'Chinese
unite under the MCA only':
We want this unity in order to get a square
deal. To get a square deal, however, one must
be in the government or be close to the
government... The other point which we must
not forget is that •ee we must be able to
co-operate with the other communities,
especially the Malays.
•	 (Straits Times, April 26, 1971).
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The message was clear. The MCA was a part of the
ruling Alliance party. And it was the MCA which was able
to co-operate with the Malays through the UMNO, the senior
partner in the Alliance. The Chinese should therefore
unite under the MCA banner. This change of attitude on
the part of Tan Siew Sin who was earlier regarded by the
unity movement as the 'supreme leader of the Chinese
community' was disappointing to the Chinese and nipped the
unity movement in the bud.
The Chinese unity movement with its initial success
had raised the hopes of the Chinese at for once solidarity
among the Chinese which had been so l acking was in sight.
But these hopes were short-lived. They were shattered
within a matter of three months, all because of the presence
of a small group of powerful and influential individuals
within tile community who had vested interests in the status
quo. Perhaps the frustration within the community at large
over the failure of the unity movement could best be represen-
ted by the reactions of a respected Chinese school teacher:
There would come a time when our grand-children
and their grand-children after them will spit
at the graves of those so-called leaders who
smashed the Unity Movement. (Pillai, 1971:14)
Contrary to expectations, the UMNO, Alliance dominant
partner, did not seem to put any pressure on the movement,
even though its leader, Tun Razak, was 'totally against' any
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racial unity movement be it Malay or Chinese, because 'it
is negative, as a movement born out of fears is negative'.
However, Tun Razak was in favour of Chinese unity under the 
MCA banner.
The Chinese unity under the MCA banner is
relevant to Malaysia because its achieve-
ment is geared to objectives beneficial to
the community and the country.63
The Political Disunity of the Chinese 
The collapse of the Chinese unity movement is an indica;-
tion that political disunity and diversity remain to be a
feature of tae Chinese community. Even the Chinese them-
selves aP-1-c-, to the description to equate them with 'a pan
of loose sands'.
	
This feature is the result of a combina-
tion of sevc,ral factors.	 Three of these factors - dialect
divisions, different media of education and birth place -
have been mentioned in chapter 1. A fourth factor is
related to the traditional Chinese political philosophy that
government and politics is something out of reach of the
ordinary folk and it is best to have as little to do with
it as possible. This indifferent attitude towards politics
is reinforced by the Chinese philosophy of 'minding one's
on business' - to sweep the snow in front of one's own
doorstep; mind not the snow over other people's roof top,
as the Chinese put it.
63. Quoted in The Guardian, September, 1971, p.9. The
'objectives' he referred to was the successful
implementation of the New Economic Policy under the
Second Malaysia Plan.
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Another factor is the absence of a Chinese national
organization which encompasses Chinese of all walks of life.
This results in the Chinese not voting as a solid bloc.
The Chambers of Commerce and Assembly Halls are influential,
but they can do no more than act as pressure groups and
their influence is usually confined to individual states.
The Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce, though a
national body, is essentially concerned with commercial
interests of the community and its political role is limited.
Finally, as indicated earlier, the role played by the
small vested interests group within the MCA shoula not be
overlooked. This group has been described by s^me as 'the
babas in the Ali-baba (Malay-Chinese) partnership - the
compradores who link up with the administrators to make
money'. This group is not in favour of Chinese unity for
fear of its own position being undermined. It was this
group which sabotaged the Chinese attempt to unite them-
selves. It was this very same group that prevented the
MCA from successfully reforming itself (Pillai, 1971:14).
In a plural society like Malaysia, it is not uncommon
to find political parties having special appeals to certain
communities. There are political parties which especially
attract the Chinese just as there are those which appeal more
to the Malays. If the number of political parties represen-
ting the Chinese is any indication of their political disunity,
then obviously the Chinese are politically disunited. There
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are, at present, five main parties whose supporters are
largely Chinese.
	 The presence of these parties is the
result of Chinese disunity rather than its cause, and it
has the effect of rendering the Chinese ineffective as a
political force.
The political disunity of the Chinese is also evident
from the numerous party in-fightings that have occurred
within the MCA, the DAP and the Gerakan. The first
upheaval of the MCA occurred in 1955, when a 'young blood'
leader, Ong Yoke Lin, defeated H.S. Lee who was described as
t unchallengeable t
 and 'undisputed leader' in Selangor, as
Chairman of Selangor MCA 64.
The second uphes-cml took place in 1958 when Tan Cheng-
lock, Ong Yoke Lin : Tan Siew Sin and T.H. Tan faced the
challenge of Lim Chong Ru and his associates. In the
struggle, the second t unchallengeable t
 man Tan Cheng-lock
was toppled by Lim Chong Eu.
The most recent split within the MCA started in 1971,
when the party attempted a re-organization. The position
of the t old guards' was being challenged by the 'young Turks',
who dominated the reformation movement. In the event, Tan
Siew Sin, a third t unchallengeable t
 man, was being challenged.
Sensing the wind of change just before the party's General
Assembly due to be held in August 1973, Tan Siew Sin and his
close associates were quick to act.
	 The 'young Turk' leaders
64. MCA Reformation News Bulletin, "The MCA Unchallengeable
Men 1949-1973", mimeographed,
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and many of their supporters were expelled from the party. 65
Perak, the state where the MCA Reformation movement began,
and understandably the base of the reformist group, was
most severely hit by Tan Siew Sin's expulsion orders. As
a result of such elimination, the reformists in Perak were
crippled. Many leaders who would have been nominated to
contest the various top party posts in the Central Working
Committee had been sacked and deprived of the opportunity.
Apart from mass expulsion, it was claimed that the
old guard leaders had rigged membership, by back-dating their
supporters while freezing members supporting the reformist
group. Some MCA branches supporting the reformation had
even been dissolved or suspended.66°
The old guard leaders, because of their superior
position in the party, were able to eliminate most of their
opponents in the reformation movement by various means.67
The election results of the 1973 MCA Central Working Committee
showed beyond .doubt that the party was still controlled by
the old guard. Tan Siew Sin and almost all of his close
65. Those prominent leaders expelled from the party included
Lim Keng Yaik (former Minister with Special Functions and
Chairman of the Perak MCA Liaison Committee), Tan Tiong
Hong, Alex Lee, Teh Siew Eng, Yong Su Hian, Paul Leong and
Choon Tien Chuan. Cf. Straits Times, April 27, 1972 and
June 2, 1973, and The Star, April 27, 1972.
66. It is not known how many MCA members had been expelled
throughout the country. In Perak alone, it was claimed by
the reformist group that almost 200had been expelled.
67. The old guard leaders were even able to influence the
government to impose a clamp on the press on June 7,
1973, thus effectively stopped the publication of all news
about the reformation movement.
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Butassociates were returned, many of them unopposed. 68
the crisis of the MCA is by no means over. It is understood
that the reformation group is still active in gathering the
support of the grass-roots, which had been largely alienated
by the MCA old guard leadership.
The split within the DAP - the Chinese-based opposition
party that captured the largest number of parliamentary
seats (a total of 13 in 1969) - came to the surface some time
in June, 1972.
	
It resulted in the resignation of two of the
party's most powerful men." The immediate cause of the
resignation by the two leaders was tbe decision of the party's
Central Executive Committee to suspend them 'for flouting
party policy and for activities detrimental to party discipline
and morale' (Straits Times, June 20- 1972).
But the real reason behind the split, especially that
between the party Secretary-General, Lim Kit Siang and vice-
chairman Goh Hock Guan was believed to be related to the
personality clashes between the two leaders.
	
It might also
partly be the result of the unsuccessful MCA-DAP secret talks
68. Among those returned unopposed were Tan Siew Sin (President)
Lee San Choon (Deputy president), Lee Siok Yew, Kam Woon
Wah, and Wong Seng Chow, the last three as vice-presidents.
It should be noted that those young Turks who intended to
oppose these old guards had all been expelled from the
party. See The Sunday Times, August 12, 1973.
69. They were Goh Hock Guan and A. Soorian, both vice-chairmen
of the party, and M.P's at the time of their resignation.
Goh was earlier the party's Secretary-General but resigned
from the post after the events of May, 1969, when he left
the country. He was made one of the party's vice-chairmen
on his return to Malaysia.
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for an eventual merger of the two parties shortly after the
collapse of the unity movement (The Malayan Thung Pau, July
9, 1972; Straits Times, June 20, June 21, 1972). 	 Whatever
the reasons, the split has greatly weakened the DAP in parti-
cular and the political strength of the Chinese in general.
The Gerakan, the only non-communal party that captured
a State in the 1969 election could not escape from the fate
of party in-fighting either. The result has been the forma-
tion of a new party - Pekemas (Social Justice Party) by a
faction led by Dr. Tan Chee Khoon. Lim Chong Eu remains in
the leaderzhip of the Gerakan which, after the split, had its
strength D-rz.ntly reduced.	 Under the circumstances, the
position of Gerakan in the Penang State Legislature became
precarious nnd it had to co-operate with the Alliance to form
a coalition government in the state.
New Political Leadership
One significant feature of post-war Chinese politics is
the emergence of a new type of political leadership. Before
the Pacific War, the elites of the Chinese community were drawn
largely from the merchant class. These leaders were either
affluent or in command of community organizations, or both.
This situation changed after the war, more conspicuously after
Malaya's Independence. Political leaders are no longer drawn
exclusively from the merchant and business class. This is
particularly true in the case of Chinese opposition parties.
Many of the DAP, Gerakan and Pekemas leaders are young
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intellectuals and professional people such as lawyers,
doctors and lecturers. Even the MCA which used to be
dominated by the conservative Chinese businessmen, has sensed
the wind of change and attempted to recruit into its leader-
ship hierarchy 'new blood' consisting largely of professional
people."
A distinctive feature of these new leaders is their
Malaysian orientation. They are in sharp contrast with
their pre-war counterparts, whose main concern was to establish
links with China. Almost all the newly emerged leaders were
born locally. Their outlook is essentially Mala-isian and
their main concern is to strive for equality for *411 communi-
ties under the Malaysian sun. Very few of them seem to be
attracted by communal politics, although some or ',hese men
are inclined to seek security for their own community.
The emergence of this new type of political leadership
based on education has been largely the result of the
availability of more educational opportunities and better
facilities - in short, the policy of universal education. It
is also due to the country's democratic system which calls on
all its citizens to participate in the choice of the government
as well as the opposition. These two features are still acting
vigorously on the Chinese status hierarchy dominated by the
educated few.
	
It is likely that their long term effect may
be to transform the hierarchy (Wang, 1965:185-6).
70. It should be noted that on the whole the MCA is still
controlled by a small group of rich and influential
businessmen, with vested interests, in the party.
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The Political Strength of the Chinese 
Several main themes have merged from the politics of
the Chinese in Malaysia. Overall, there has been a genuine
effort on the part of the Chinese to achieve inter-communal
co-operation which will be dealt with shortly. The second
main theme is the increased political consciousness of the
Chinese masses.
	
This is clearly indicated by the increase
over the years in the number of Chinese electors, election
candidates, the rise of various Chinese political parties
with their subsequent in-fighting, and the enthusiasm shown
in the unity movement.
The third theme, w" i ch has partly rendered the Chinese
ineffective as a political force, is the ever-present political
diversity and disunity. This feature of disunity has resulted
in the emergence of various political parties shredding the
Chinese support which in turn further divided the community
and weakened its political strength.
However, some powerful external forces have also been at
work to weaken the political strength of the Chinese community.
One of these forces, the race riots, with the resultant cons-
trained democracy and its effect on restricting the Chinese
political activities, had been indicated earlier.	 Another
powerful force has been the electoral manipulations carried
out by the Malay-dominated Alliance Government. This measure
has systematically victimised the Chinese (and Indians) by
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reducing their political power at local, state and national
levels.	 In 1962, the Malay-dominated Parliament passed a
constitutional amendment to cancel the 1960 delimitation of
parliamentary and state constituencies report, and adopted
new procedures for the determination of constituency bounda-
ries. These new procedures favoured the rural areas by
giving them a substantially greater weightage than was pro-
vided in the 1960 delimitation (Ratnam & Milne, 1967:65).
The net result of this has been to reduce the size of rural
constituency to half that of urban constituency.	 Since the
Malays are overwhelmingly rural dwellers and the Chinese
largely urban this means that the voting strength of the
Malays is being doubled while that of the Chinese reduced
by half. 71 This gerrymandering was obviously aimed at
ensuring continued Malay pre-eminence at the national and
state level of electoral politics at the expense of the
Chinese (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1971:473-4).
At the local election 9 the Chinese have also been
victimized. The Chinese have been in control of many of
the town and municipal councils such as those in Ipoh, Penang,
Malacca and Seremban.	 In 1965 these Municipal Councils,
with the exception of Ipoh, were suspended by the government
on alleged charges of malpractice and corruption. This
effectively removed the Chinese from the political control of
municipalities, which they had won in fair elections. The
71. For example, in the 1964 election, the electorate ranged
from 58,000 (Bungsar - urban and predominantly Chinese)
to 17,750 (Ulu Selangor - rural and predominantly Malay)
in Selangor, and in Perak, Menglembu, a predominantly
Chinese constituency, had an electorate of 46,000 while
Hilir Perak, a Malay area, had only 15,800. Cf. Ratnam
& Milne, (1967:66).
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government also set up a Royal Commission Enquiry on local
government resulting in the abolition of local elections in
which non-Malays form the majority of the electors (Rabushka
& Shepsle, 1972:127).
	
In Kuala Lumpur, to prevent the
possibility of the Chinese running the Municipal Council,
Parliament decided in 1961 to replace elective councillors
with an appointed Commissioner and an advisory staff
(Rabushka, 1970:356).
Inter-communal Co-operation
It will be remembered that inter-communal co-operation
in politics dates as far back as the arut Wars in Perak
when Chinese secret societies were rife. Later, it was
attempted in the form of AMCJA-PUTERA coalition in the fight
against the Federation Proposals. When the first local
elections were introduced in 1952, Sino-Malay co-operation
was again attempted in the form of MCA-UMNO electoral alliance
which became the predecessor of the present UMNO-MCA-MIC
Alliance Party. On Malayan Independence day the Socialist
Front - which was a coalition between a Chinese left-wing
party and a Malay left-wing party - was inaugurated.
Whatever the real motives behind these inter-communal
coalitions, the leaders involved must have realized the
importance of co-operation between the various communities,
in particular betweeathe Malays and the Chinese, if they
wished to achieve anything substantial. This realization of
the importance of inter-communal co-operation in politics
is not only evident in the left-wing and right-wing coalitions,
it has also been obvious in many other largely Chinese
233
political organizations.
	
The Gerakan, for example, recognized
the need to place 'special attention and emphasis on the
economically weak Malays 	 and that they should be
'protected from exploitation and assisted to compete with
other communities on a just basis in business, trade and
the professions'. 72 The DAP, commonly regarded by the
Malays as a Chinese communal party, was also keen to attract
the support of the Malays. 73 Even the MCP, which was almost
entirely Chinese, recognized the need to have support from
other communities. In February 1949 merely a few months
after the outbreak of the armed revolt, the insurgent army of
the MCP war rthanged from the Malayan People's Anti-British
Army (MPABA) to the Malayan Races Liberation ArTy (MRLA) in
the hope that some Malays and Indians would be induced to
join the insurgence (O'Ballance, 1966:89).
It is interesting to note a recurrent pattern in inter-
communal co-operation in the form of coalitions: it has
always been threatened by communal issues. When these
communal issues become salient, inter-communal co-operation
becomes unstable. This had been the fate of the AMCJA-
PUTERA coalition and the Socialist Front. Both organizations
collapsed largely because of disagreement over communal issues.
72. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia: Policy Statement, 15 April, 1968.
73. Interview with the DAP Secretary-General, Lim Kit Siang,
November, 1973.
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The Alliance Party, too, is not without its internal problems.
These problems have also been largely related to communal
issues affecting its component parts. 	 The crisis of 1959,
for example, almost threatened to break up the Alliance, had
not the moderates within the MCA reasserted themselves and
forced the more extreme elements to withdraw.
	 Over the
years, the UMNO has assumed a dominant role within the Alliance.
So far the three partners are able to reach compromises over
most issues.	 Apart from the 1959 crisis, there have not been
any insurmountable problems. The political compromise of
the Alliance will presumably go on working in the foreseeable
future as long as the two constituent partners tlaPt represent
the non-Malays are willing to continue accepting their
subservient roles.
Since the 1969 General election and the subsequent communal
disturbance, there has been increasing need for inter-communal
co-operation in Malaysia.
	
Recognizing this, state coalition
governments had been formed in Penang and Perak, the former
between the Gerakan and the Alliance while the latter between
the PPP and the Alliance. But the most recent and spectacular
political development was the formation in January 1973 of the
National Front Government - the Grand Alliance. By far the
broadest coalition in Asian history, the Grand Alliance
includes the Alliance Party, the Party Islam, the Gerakan and
SUPP (Sarawak United People's Part), the last three used to be
opposition parties (Pillai, 1973:18).
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This latest development marked the beginning of a new
political era in the country and left the Opposition with
only 22 parliamentary seats out of 144, representing the DAP,
Pekemas, PPP and SNAP (Sarawak National Party). Tun Razak,
the Prime Minister, speaking in connection with the National
Front Government, felt that active politicking in a multi-
racial society could exacerbate racial tensions unnecessarily,
and the Natlonal Front government would forestall such a
development. The National Front, according to Razak, was
in keeping with the interests and wishes of the majority of
the people and to strengtnen the foundation of national unity
(Sunday Times, August 1P, 1973).
It is hard to predict the impact of this large-scale
coalition on the future political development of the country.
Hopefully, the various parties would cease to have as much
interest as before in winning support through communal or
merely political appeals. And this in turn would give
politics a more developmental focus (Stockwin, 1973:9).
One thing, however, is clear. The MCA is no longer the
only Chinese-based party in the new political structure. The
Alliance' close co-operation with the Gerakan leader, Lim Chong
Eu and the SUPP (whose leader Dato Ong Kee Hui was made a
Cabinet Minister) might to some extent be an indication of
the UMNO's doubt over the MCA's ability to carry the Chinese
community in any crisis of confidence. The formation of
the Grand Alliance also shows that the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance
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is no longer a permanent feature. 	 When need arose, as it
did, new partners would be recruited in an attempt to
strengthen the party.
The Grand Alliance also marks the blurring of divisions
between the major coalition partners, the UMNO and the Party
Islam. This UMNO-Party Islam co-operation has been inter-
preted by the Chinese as an important step toward the politi-
cal unification of the Malays, as indeed it is.	 For with
this latest move, there is no longer any Malay opposition
party being represented in the Parliament.	 Consequently,
there has been on the part of the Chinese community a revival
of the idea of Chinese unity in a new form. This is the
speculation with respect to the possible tripartite MCA-
Gerakan-SUPP co-operation. A fourth party, the PPP has als-%
been implicated in the co-operation. Until now, however,
nothing has yet materialized. 74 If this non-Malay (which
is essentially Chinese) political co-operation eventually
comes into being, it will then add a new dimension to Malay-
sian politics.
Conclusion
The main political problem of the Chinese community seems
to lie in its disunity. This has been manifested in the
74. The talks appear to have reached a stalemate. It is
believed that the MCA does not accept the suggestion
by the Gerakan and SUPP that all the three parties
should dissolve themselves and form a new one.
237
number of Chinese-based political organizations, and the
frequent infightings and internal dissension that confront
them. Over the years, however, there has been a marked
increase in the political awareness of the community.
There has also been a genuine effort on the part of the
community towards Sino-Malay co-operation in politics.
This, together with political awareness, augurs well for
the Chinese community.
However, the Malays have been constantly keeping an
watchful eye on the political activities of the Chinese.
They are determined to maintain their political supremacy
and are prepared to use whatever measure is necessary to curb
Chinese political activities and wer" ren their political
strength. This has been clearly shown by their electoral
manipulations at national, state and local levels in the
1960 1 s. The manner in which the 1959 Alliance crisis was
resolved was another indication that the Malays were not yet
prepared to give any major political concessions to the Chinese
in a way that would threaten their own position. More
recently, the constitutional change as a result of the Kuala
Lumpur race riots directed more at restricting the political
activities of the opposition which is largely Chinese, while
the riot itself is thought to have been an,attempt to stem
a Chinese challenge to Malay political supremacy.
Thus, despite the attempt of the Chinese to secure Sino-
Malay co-operation in politics, Chinese participation in
politics remains a conflict-generating force in Malaysia.
Chinese involvement in the clandestine MCP, their claim for
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increased political power, and their demand for a rightful
place for the Chinese language and education in the national
education system all serve to arouse fear among the Malays
and hence become constant sources of conflict. It is to
this last aspect, namely Chinese education and language, that
we turn in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5 
CHINESE  EDUCATION IN MALAYSIA
Introduction
Overseas Chinese education has generally been regarded
as a vital force in developing and perpetuating 'Chinese
identity' and hence an obstacle to the assimilation of the
Overseas Chinese into the indigenous population. Purcell
(1965:37), for example, has suggested that
the partiality of so many overseas Chi-...se
for education through the medium of the
Chirese language can be said to be the
greatest barrier to the assimilation of
the overseas Chinese into the communities
of the Southeast Asian countries, and has
been the occasion of political action among
the local nationalist parties to check and
off-set it.)
In Thailand, Skinner (1957:381) has also noted the
important role played by Chinese education in preserving
1 Chineseness ,
 among the Chinese immigrants. He suggested
that
without a Chinese education, grandchildren
of Chinese immigrants at the present time
become Thai.
In Malaysia, the role of Chinese education in preserving
and perpetuating 'Chinese identity' is beyond any shadow of
doubt.
	 In fact, the prevalence of Chinese schools, coupled
with the exceptionally strong numerical strength of the Chinese,
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makes 'integration' a problem of the first magnitude. The
term 'assimilation' becomes scarcely a relevant word to use.
In Malaysia, more than elsewhere in Southeast Asia,
Chinese education has sparked off controversies and has become
politically salient for years. Almost invariably the question
of Chinese education and its Siamese twin, language, constitutes
an integral part of the larger education-language issue.
There has not been an education controversy in Malaysia with-
out involving Chinese education and language. Moore (1960:
195-6) even went so far as to say that
The Chinese education issue encompasses almost
the entire range of the political and social
cleavages behind the entire communal struggle
in Malaya, and it is for this reason that what
might in another context be considered a sub-
ject of relatively minor importance, assumed
major significance in post-merdeka Malaya. It
comprehended cleavages within the Chinese com-
munity as well as between the Chinese and Malays.
There is little doubt that in Malaysia, as in other plural
socic —.2s, education has been one of the leading factors in
comml:nalism. There always have been differences of opinion
between the Chinese and the Malays over the education policy.
Before 1971 the controversy was especially centred around
the question of the National Language. The Malays felt
that the Malay language should be made the National and the
sole official language of the country. The Chinese and the
Indians too, while accepting Malay as the National Language,
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advocated multi-lingualism and that the Chinese language
and Tamil should at least be given official status. Now
that Malay has been proclaimed constitutionally as the
National Language, and the official ban on the discussion
of the language issue imposed, the education-language issue
is seldom raised publicly.
	
But the Chinese are far from
satisfied with the position of their language. They feel
that the government's intention is to slowly destroy Chinese
education and language.
A Brief History of Chinese Education
Chinese education	 had a chequered history in Malaysia.
Its phenomenal growth tm-L-an at the turn of the twentieth
century. The growth was accelerated by the Revolution and
the Kuo-Yu movement in allina in 1911 and 1917 respectively.
Both of these events led to an upsurge of enthusiasm for
Chinese education; Chinese schools were rapidly set up
throughout Malaysia. By 1937 there were already about 933
Chinese schools with 79,993 pupils (Mills, 1942;366).	 Since
then, there had been a steady increase of Chinese schools and
their enrolment, reaching its peak, in the case of secondary
schools, in 1961, and in the case of primary schools, in
1959.	 In 1961, there were a total of 132 Chinese secondary
schools and 1,274 Chinese primary schools (1,311 in 1959).
Since 1962, the number of Chinese schools has been declining.
This was particularly true of Chinese secondary schools. By
1971, there were only 40 Chinese secondary schools with a
total enrolment of 17,574 (as compared to 55,741 in 1961).
On the primary level, the number of schools was 1,021 - 291
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less as compared to the 1959 figure. 1	But the Chinese
primary school enrolment has slightly increased over the
years, owing mainly to an increase in Chinese children of
school-going age.
The sharp decrease in the number of Chinese secondary
schools since 1962 was largely due to the fact that many of
them accepted government's terms and became fully-assisted
national-type secondary schools where the medium of instruc-
tion was to become English. 	 Most of these converted schools,
however, still offer Chinese as an academic subject whenever
there is a demand for it.
Another important reason for the decline of Chinese
schools and pupils was purely economic. The diplomas or
certificates issued by the Chinese schools have never been
recognized by any official institution.
	
Chinese school
leavers therefore found it difficult to get employment.
Having realized that English education is the key to more
job opportunities, many parents have no hesitation in sending
their children to English schools. Many of the students
themselves also realise the painful fact that a purely
Chinese education would only lead to unemployment and
frustration.
The 40 Chinese secondary schools that exist today are
generally known as Independent schools. They do not receive
any aid whatsoever from the government. Their main medium
1. Cf. Monthly Statistical Bulletin of Vest Malaysia,
August, 1972, p.219,
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of instruction is Chinese. Most of these schools face the
common problems of finance and shortage of students and
their academic standard is generally poor.
As noted earlier, the phenomenal growth of Chinese
education began at the turn of the century. In the
beginning, it was almcst entirely dependent on private
initiative and community organizations. There were two
main sources of revenue: tuition fees from the pupils and
contributions from guilds and associations and some community-
minded private individuals. No aid was obtained from the
government. At any rate there was II•J reason for the British
colonial government to provide Chin(-1 education for the
Chinese community. The colonialists were only interested in
education in so far as to provide a limited English education
to a small number of people to fill clerical positions in
the British administration and business concerns.
During those early days Chinese education paid little
attention to local conditions. 	 It was completely China-
oriented in its values, style of administration, contents
and methods. Most of the Chinese school teachers were
recruited from China. Text-books were also imported
from China. The whole purpose of education seems to have
been directed at instilling in the pupils a sense of Chinese
nationalism by arousing their awareness of the great Chinese
cultural heritage. This type of China-oriented education
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tended to produce a group of people who regarded themselves
'purely and simply as Chinese' in contrast with the more
'Malayan outlook' of the Chinese who attended English-medium
schools (Purcell, 1967:222).
As the Chinese schools were financed and run by the
Chinese community itself, they were allowed to exist for the
most part outside the jurisdiction of the government. No
official control was exercised and the Chinese were quite
happy running their own schools without any interference.
When in 1935 the government decided to extend grants-in-aid
to Chinese vernacular schools on condition that they conformed
to certain iequirements, the response expected from the
Chinese cok..ranity was not encouraging.	 By this time they
had grown .,.ccustomed to the idea of looking after their own
affairs. They were aware that acceptance of a grant carried
with it a certain measure of control.
	
Most of the schools
rather chose to carry on shouldering their financial respon-
sibilities themselves (Comber, 1961:31-32).	 However, after
the Second World War, many Chinese schools began to show an
interest in obtaining partial aid from the government in
order to improve their facilities. The government on its
part also endeavoured to devise a national education system
and attempt to bring the Chinese schools slowly into the
main stream of the system. The government's efforts in
this direction can be seen through the various education
committee reports and education enactments.
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The Barnes Report 
The first official report that had directly affected
the position of the Chinese education in Malaya was the
Report of the Committee on Malay education, commonly referred
to as the Barnes Report. The Committee was appointed in
1950 by the then High Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Henry
Gurney to look into the various aspects of the education
facilities available for the Malays (Barnes Report, 1951:v).
It was headed by L.J. Barnes, Director of Social Training at
Oxford University and composed exclusively of Europeans and
Malays. No Chinese or Indian was represented.
The Committee recommended, inter alia, the .-,:tting up
of an inter-racial common school system in which Malay and
English were to be the only media of instruction (Barnes
Report, 1951:75).	 Furthermore - and this was very distur-
bing to the non-Malay communities - it went beyond its terms
of reference and recommended 'the end of separate vernacular
schools for the several racial communities' in an attempt to
create a common Malayan citizenship through a unified national
system of education (Barnes Report:75)
Understandably, the Report was generally well received
by the Malays, since the Committee was speically set up to
look into the problems of Malay education. The reactions
of the non-Malay communities were however more complicated.
Various sections of the Chinese community expressed their
disapproval of the Report. For example, a meeting of
representatives from various Chinese guilds and associations
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in the state of Perak was called and a resolution passed
unanimously to oppose the implementation of the Report. 2
Even the Straits Times in its editorial described the Barnes
Report as 'prostitution of education to politics' (Finkelstein,
1952:15).
The Indians too protested against the Report.
	
Under
the auspices of the Malayan Indian Congress, about thirty-
five Indian educators met in Kuala Lumpur to condemn the
Report and request delay in its execution. A group of Indian
school teachers in Negri Sembilan also passed a resolution
protesting against the Rt.:port and asking the government for
the appointment of a sricial committee to look into Indian
education (Finkelstein, 1952:15).
In all fairness, the recommendations of the Committee
for a national system of education to create a common citizen-
ship was perfectly sound in principle. Nevertheless, as an
official body, it was not representative: neither the
Chinese nor the Indians were represented on the Committee. Nor
were they invited to give their views. 	 It was this fact,
together with the recommendation for the termination of
vernacular schools that aroused the suspicions and resentment
of the Chinese and Indians - more so the former whose school
system had been built up almost entirely by private initiative
with very little government aid.
2. The Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce Report (1971:10).
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The Fenn-Wu Report 
The Fenn-Wu Report, unlike the Barnes Report, was more
directly concerned with Chinese education. The Committee
was appointed in early 1951 to look into the various problems
of Chinese education. 	 It consisted of Dr. William Fenn,
Associate Executive Secretary of the Board of Trustees of
a dozen institutions of higher learning in China, and Dr.
Wu Teh-yao, a United Nations official.
Compared to the Barnes Committee, the Fenn-Wu Committee
appeared to be more objective in its views, in that it sought
to gather opinions not only from the Chinese but also from
the representatives of other racial groups. As a result,
the Report which was published in June, 1951 adopted a more
liberal and sympathetic attitude towards Chinese education.
The most significant difference between the Barnes report and
that of the Fenn-Wu was that the former aimed to achieve a
common Malayan nationality through the national school system
using Malay and English only, while the latter felt that a
Malayan nationality could develop through the co-existence of
the various traditions and cultures.
Recognizing as it did the psychological and emotional
attachments of the racial groups towards their cultures and
languages, the Report cautioned that any attempt to impose
one language or two languages upon the peoples of Malaya
would be detrimental to communal understanding and national
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unity, since the unity of a nation 'depends not upon the
singleness of tongue or simplicity of culture', but upon
'the hearts of its citizens' (Fenn-Wu Report, 1951:6).
It further added that 'any attempt at the moment to force
unwilling fusion will almost certainly lead to further
cleavage, which neither Malaya nor the world can affordt
(Fenn-Wu Report, 1951:4).
On the question of the future of Chinese language and
schools, the Report, while recognizing the need to include
Malay and English in the curriculum of all schools, held the
view that the Chinese language was thare to stay. Chinese
schools, the Report suggested, wou1 , 1 ?ersist in Malaya for
a long time to come.
	
'They cannot be eliminated until the
Chinese themselves decide that they are not needed... That
day may never come, for it is quite possible that Chinese
schools should form an integral part of any educational pro-
gramme of the future Malaya' (Fenn-Wu Report, 1951:10).
Becalse of its sympathetic attitude towards Chinese
education, the Fenn-Wu Report was readily accepted by the
Chinese community which had earlier expressed strong fear and
suspicion about the mission as a mere tool designed to
further an established government policy (Fenn-Wu Report,
1951:2).
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Following the publication of the Barnes and the Fenn-Wu
Reports, and the controversies caused by the divergence
between them, a Central Advisory Committee on Education was
established to consider the vital issues involved in Malay
and Chinese education. The Central Advisory Committee,
while supporting the Barnes Proposals, made some concessions
to the non-Malay communities, in recommending that Kuo-Yu
and Tamil could be taught as subjects of studies in schools.3
The 1952 Education Ordinance
In 1952: a Select Committee of the Legislative Council
was appointed to give further consideration to the reports of
the three previous Committees and to make recommendations for
the implementatiun of the Advisory Committee Report. The
resulting Education Ordinance, 1952 accepted the Barnes
concept of a National School System with six years free
primary education, and the Advisory Committee's proposal to
provide facilities for the teaching of Kuo-Yu and Tamil,
in addition to making Malay and English as media of
instruction. The 1952 Education Ordinance was not well
received by the Chinese community. The Chinese feared that
the policy would endanger their language and culture (Straits
Times, Feb. 5, 1954).	 In response, the MCA - the sole
3. Federation of Malaya, Central Advisory Committee on
Education, Report on the Barnes Report on Malay Education
and the Fenn-Wu Report on Chinese Education (1951:3).
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Chinese political party at that time - set up a Chinese
Education Central Committee in 1953 to rally the support of
the Chinese school teachers and those interested in Chinese
education in opposition to the government's education
policy (Haas, 1967:85).
As things turned out, few of the plans contained in the
Ordinance were implemented. The reason was not because of
Chinese opposition, but because of the lack of funds on the
part of the government.	 In 1953, government expenditure on
education jumped to M$95.68 million (as compared to only
M$11.5 million in 1946), and the government defict for the
year was over M$200 million. This unfavourable financial
position prompted the High Commissioner to appoint a special
Commission to look into the feasibility of implementing the
education policy. The Commission concluded that the multi-
racial schools were 'essential' but out of the question due
to a lack of funds (Simandjuntak, 1969:199).
The reactions to both the Barnes Report and the Fenn-Wu
Report were generally divided on communal lines - a feature
characteristic of Malaysia on almost every vital issue.
Throughout the controversy, the Malay- and English-language
press had on the whole favoured the Barnes Report while the
Chinese press had whole-heartedly supported the Fenn-Wu
proposals. There was, however, one exception to the
attitude of the English-language press, the Singapore
Standard, whichfàvoured the Fenn-Wu Report enthusiastically
(Purcell, 1953:74-75). • The Indian press had in the main
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been neutral in the controversy. But this does not mean
thab the Indian community was not interested in the issue.
In fact the reactions of the Indian educators in Kuala Lumpur
and Negri Sembilan mentioned earlier indicated not only that
they too were concerned about their education but also that
the controversy was not solely confined to Chinese and
Malay communities.
The Razak Report 
As mentioned earlier, many of the proposals pertaining
to education were shelved largely as a result of shortage of
funds.	 There was a coo.Ling off period for the Chinese
education controversy.
	
But it was not long before the
controversy came to the fore again. This was the controversy
over the Razak Committee Report, formed at the end of 1955
after the first Alliance government took office.	 It had
as its terms of reference 'to examine the present Education
policy of the Federation of Malaya and to recommend any
alterations or adaptations that are necessary with a view
to establishing a national system of education acceptable
to the people of the Federation as a whole..., having regard
to the intention to make Malay the national language of the
country whilst preserving and sustaining the growth of the
language and culture of other communities living in the
country' (The Razak Report, 1957:1).	 The proposals put
forward by the Razak Committee were largely adopted by the
Federal Legislative Council as the 1957 Education Ordinance.
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The Razak Report contained several important features.
First, Malay was to be made the National language and must
be taught in all schools (Razak Report, 1957:4).	 Secondly,
a common content syllabus was to be introduced in all
schools to achieve a 'Malayan outlook'.
	 The introduction
of a common content syllabus 'is an essential element in
the development of a united Malayan nation' (Razak Report,
1957:18).
The third feature was the administration of common
public examinations to all schools.
	 There should be two
selection examinations, one at the end of primary sdlool
for entry to secondary schools, and the other at the end of
the third year in secondary schools, namely the Lower
certificate of Education.
	
All pupils who complete the
secondary academic course should also sit for the same
examination, that is, the Federalion of Malaya Certificate
of Education (Razak Report, 1957:12-13).
Two other proposals of the Report merit mention here.
The first relates to primary education. The Report abandoned
the idea of the national school system as advocated by the
Barnes Report.
	 It proposed two types of primary schools,
namely, standard primary schools with Malay as the medium of
instruction and standard-type primary schools in which the
main medium of instruction may be Kuo-Yu or Tamil or English.
Malay and English were compulsory subjects in all schools.
Kuo-Yu and Tamil would be taught in all primary schools
whenever the parents of fifteen children or more requested
it (Razak Report, 1957, 9-10).	 Under the system, Malay
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children would be bilingual and Chinese airl Indian children
Moreover, most children would continue their
primary education in separate vernacular schools.
The second proposal concerns secondary education.
There should be only one type of national secondary school
where the pupils worked towards a common final examination.
While Malay and English should be made compulsory subjects,
The Report did not seek to change the practice in Chinese
seocndary schools of using Kuo-Yu as a general medium of
instruction.	 It saw 'no educational objection to the
learning of three languages in secz--7...lary schools or to the
use of more than one language in th; same school as the
medium of instruction' (Razak Report. 1957:12).
The Razak Report, by giving sohie minor concessions to
the position of Chinese education, did not please the Chinese
community. The Chinese on the whole wanted their language
to be given official recognition and felt that Malayan
nationality could be developed on the basis of multi-
lingualism. Many probably regarded the adoption of Malay
as the natoinal language as part of an effort to create a
Malay rather than a Malayan nation (Haas, 1967:89).
Some Chinese, however, did not seem to object ID the
principle of Malay being the national language. But, as
the second largest community in the country, many wanted
254
the Chinese language to be given also an official status
and that examinations should be given in the medium of instruc-
tion. The Chinese point of view was most clearly expressed
by Lim Lian Geok, president of the powerful United Chinese
School Teachers Association:
The Chinese schools and most of the Chinese
community ... (accepted) the principle of
Malay being the national language of indepen-
dent Malaya ... To foster unity among the
various races, a common language was
necessary ...	 This could only be Malay
(since) Malay was the language of the
majority of the population and was spoken by
a good proportion of the non-Malays also ...
To develop this common language and to make
im...ze people learn it, Malay should be taught
-..,.apulsorily in all types of schools, and
tLe Chinese would be the first to give their
2,,U support for this policy.	 However, the
claim by Chinese schools (and students) for
aOucation in their mother tongue and (for)
allowiug them to take examinations in the
P-me language medium as in the schools was
most reasonable ...
(The Malay Mail, Jan.7 1 1959).
In the previous chapter, reference has already been
made to the Alliance crisis of 1959 in which one of the
two major issues involved was the education-language
controversy. The education-language controversy centred
around the official status of the Chinese language and the
medium of instruction and of examinations in Chinese schools.
In September, 1958, a meeting of 500 Chinese educationists
was held and a resolution passed to cal upon the Alliance to
include in its election manifesto a pledge that Chinese should
be made an official language (Haas, 1967:134; Moore, 1960:203).
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In April the following year, a meeting of representa-
tives of Chinese guilds and associations was held. The
meeting, sponsored by the country's three most important
and influential Chinese educational groups - The United
Chinese School Teachers Association (UCSTA), The United
Chinese School Committees Association (UCSCA) and the MCA
Central Education Committee - made several demands. These
included, among others, the call to guarantee that 'the
mother tongue of the pupil should be used as the medium
of instruction and the medium of examination in all schools',
and that 'equitable and fair treatment' in educavlon should
be given to all Malayan students irrespective of *-ace (Haas,
1967:139-140).	 In the meeting, Lim Lian Geok repeatedly
criticized the government for harming Chinese schools and
education by introducing what he called 'unreasonable
measures'.
The crux of the whole problem is that the
government is using the official language issue
as a weapon to force Chinese students to sit
for their examinations in English. If we
accept this ..., thousands of Chinese students
will be forced into the streets.
(Haas, 1967:140).
Lim Chong Eu, the MCA president, in a secret letter to
The Prime Minister, also urged that until the Malay language
was sufficiently developed, Kuo-Yu should continue to function
as a medium of instruction and examination in Chinese schools,
and that the results of such examinations should be recognized
as equivalent to those Of the national secondary school exami-
nations (Straits Times, July 10, 1959).
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The call for Chinese as an official language sparked
some negative reactions from the Malay community. Tengku
Abdul Rahman responded by saying that no other language
(apart from the Malay language) would be made an official
language since this would only delay Malaya's social unifi-
cation.	 He warned that:
The sooner everybody appreciates that we
must have one language for the country,
the better.	 They should also realize
that the Malay rulers have a big say in the
matter	 I want to make it clear that while
we can give, we can also come to a point at
which we can st-p giving. This is the point
at which I can t, top giving, that is, on the
language issue,
(Haas, 1967:136).
The PMIP also came out to object to the suggestion that
Chinese be made an official language. The party clearly
intended to rally Malay support against such a move (Straits
Budget, Nov.12, 1958).
The stand taken by the Chinese educational organizations
clearly iniicated the absence of any permanent agreement
between Malays and non-Malays on educational policy, while
the reactions from the Tengku and PMIP was an indication of
the intransigence of the Malays on the edlcation-language
controversy.
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The Talib Education Review Committee 
The Talib Committee, headed by Abdul Rahman bin Talib,
was appointed in 1960 to review the Razak Plan and its
implementation, and to make further recommendations.	 On the
Razak policy, the Committee's finding was that it 'has been
faithfully and successfully carried out within the limits
imposed by financial stringency in 1958 and 1959 and by the
sheer magnitude of the many-sided task'.
	
However, the
Committee felt that 'there is still more that needs to be
done in the fields of technical, commercial and secondary
education ... 1 and more importantly, that 'there is a long
road to travel before the ultimate objective of making the
National Language the main medium of instruction in all
schools can be fully realized' (Talib Report, 1960:14).
Several proposals of the Talib Report affected Chinese
education.	 First of all, all Chinese secondary schools
which were partially assisted should either apply for full
assistance (in which case they became national-type schools
and had to conform to the Ministry of Education's requirements
and subject to more control) or become Independent schools
without any government aid. All partial assistance to non-
conforming schools would be discontinued as from January
1962 (Talib Report, 1960:29).	 Secondly, the 3-3 system,
that is, three years of Junior-Middle followed by three years
of Senior Middle in the assisted Chinese secondary schools
should be converted to the 4-2 system, that is, four years
of lower secondary and two years of upper secondary, the
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first year being called the Remove class, a special language
class for pupils who have had education in a language medium
other than that of the secondary school.
Another important change was that all Chinese school
examinations - the Junior Middle Three examination, the
Chinese Secondary Schools Promotion examination, and the
Chinese Secondary Schools Leaving Certificate examination -
should be discontinued from 1961. They would be replaced
by the LCE and FMCE examinations, conducted only in Malay and
English. There would be no special examinations for Indepen-
dent schools, although entries from Independent schools would
be accepted for the LCE and FMCE exr na tnations (Talib Report,
1960:33)•
Many Chinese who saw the propsoals as a calculated
onslaught against Chinese education and language came out to
oppose the scheme. Too Joon Hing, the MCA Secretary-General
who resigned as a result of the 1959 crisis, unsuccessfully
called for the withdrawal of the new Education Bill embodying
the Talib proposals and the appointment of an all-party
committee to undertake a fresh review of the Razak Report
(Simandjuntak, 1969:204).
Lim Lian Geok, a strong advocate of Chinese education,
objected to the idea of the conversion of Chinese secondary
schools to national-type schools which meant greater control
of these schools by the government. He also attacked the
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government's plan to discontinue financial assistance to
private Chinese secondary schools. Urging the government
to 'go slow' in implementing the Talib Report, Lim said
that he would not 'shirk in his responsibility in fighting
for a square deal on behalf of Chinese schools' (Haas, 1967:
186).
As a result of his views on educational policies, the
once 'Most powerful man in Malaya' (King, 1957:40) had his
permit to teach in government schools cancelled in 1961.
More importantly, the government asked him to show cause
why his citfzenship.should not be_revoked l (Straits Budget,
August 30, 1 961).	 He was charged by the Registrar-General
of citizenship with
deliberate misinterpretation and inversions
_f government policy in a manner calculated
to excite disaffection... Emotional appeals
of an extreme commuanl nature calculated to
promote	 and hostility between different
races in the Federation and likely to cause
violence.
(Haas, 1967:186-7).
The chief justice of Malaya ruled that Lim's citizenship
could not be revoked merely because he had criticized the
government on its education policies. 	 Such an action
could be taken only if his activities were considered to
endanger domestic peace or showed disloyalty to the country.
However, as a result of appeals by the Registrar-General of
citizenship through the Malayan Supreme Court and British
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Privy Council, Lim's citizenship was finally revoked in
1964.	 It is difficult to assess whether the revocation of
Lim's citizenship was due to an honest belief that he had
abused his rights as a Malayan citizen or merely because
of his anti-government views on educational policies,
although the latter appeared to be an important factor.
What is clear, however, is that Lim's case gave further
evidence that the Malays were determined to preserve the
'Malay' nature of the country and were not prepared to
give much concessions to the Chinese in matters relating
to education (Haas, 2967:187).
The 1967 Language Bill 
The 1957 Constitution of the Federation of Malaya
(Article 152, Clauses 1 and 2) provided that 'the national
language shall be the Malay language,' though English still
retained its official status 'for a period of ten years
after merdeka day, and thereafter until Parliament other-
wise provides•. 1 	 The ten years period ended on August 31,
1967 and Malay was made the country's national and sole
official language with effect from September 1, 1967.
Before the Bill was passed, concern was shown by the
Chinese community as regards the status of the Chinese
language. The Chinese feared that the propagation of
Malay as the sole official language would inevitably
jeopardize their language. Their fear was aggravated by
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the formation of the National Language Action Front (NLAF)
in early 1965 by what the Chinese regarded as a Malay communa-
list, Syed Nasir bin Ismail. The aim of the NLAF was to
'assist the government in the implementation of Malay as
the official language by 1967 1 (Straits Times, April 6,
1965).	 In February, 1966, the National Language Month
Conference headed by Syed Nasir called upon the Alliance
government to implement Article 152 of the Constitution and
make Malay the sole official language of the country on
September 1, 1967 (Straits Times, Feb. 26,1966).	 Syed
Nasir had always been feared by the Chinese as an extremist,
and it was understood	 his aim in forming the NLAF was to
rally Malay support e 7.1.4_ =lit pressure on the government to
ensure that no concessiop s were made to the non-Malays
(Vasil, 1972:14).
In response to this, certain groups both within the
Chinese community as a who and within the MCA began to
defend the position of their language. The Selangor branch
of the MCA passed a resolution to call upon the national
body to secure a 'more liberal use' of the Chinese language
for official purposes (The Malay Mail, Oct. 4, 1966).
Almost immediately, the Perak branch came out in support of
the resolution. Then came the Penang branch which passed
a resolution that 'Chinese should be respected and accepted
as a language for official and extensive use throughout
the country' (Straits Tumes, Oct.10, 1966).
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Realizing the disquiet of some of its branches and the
intensity of the feelings among certain sections of the
Chinese community, the MCA Central Working Committee held
an -Omergency meeting at which it was decided that while the
party could not support any move to have Chinese made an
official language, it 'pledged its support for the more
liberal use of Chinese language in selected fields and in
government notices, forms and so on' (M.Roff, 1967:323).
This attitude of the MCA showed clearly that there were
conservative but influential elements within the party who
were concerned above all else with remaining safely within
the Alliance and were willing to make whatever compromise
and accommodation was necessary to this end. 	 These peoplc.
were prepared to pay lip services to the Chinese community
to achieve their aim but they would never dare to press too
hard on any communal issue for fear of jeopardising their
own position within the Alliance.
It is interesting to note that in the same meeting of
the MCA Central Working Committee that pledged 'for more
liberal use of Chinese language', one of its three vice-
presidents of the party's youth section, Sim Now Yu, was
expelled for 'defying party leadership'. Significantly
enough, Sim was the president of the UCSTA and like his
predecessor Lim Lian Geok, a strong advocate of Chinese
education and culture. If Lim Lian Geolc's case was an
indication of the Malays' wariness towards demands for
change in respect to education-language policies, then the
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expulsion of Sim Mow Yu was evidence of MCA's reluctance to
change.	 Both incidents, however, further indicated that
demanding the Chinese language to be accorded official status
was not to be tolerated - not even by the MCA that purports
to safeguard the interests of the Chinese.
On the eve of the passage of the Bill, discussion and
dissension continued. The various Chinese guilds and
associations were warned by the Registrar of Societies that
it was improper for them to meddle in the language contro-
versy sindb it was a political matter, and since their
membership was open to non-citizens a-3 well (M.Roff, 1967:324).
When the Bill was finally pass?g, the Chinese community
as a whole was unhappy that Chinese language was not accorded
official status.	 However, there were some consolations.
Fairly liberal provisions were made in the Bill for the use
of other languages. 	 Clause 3 of the Bill which had been
seen as a concession to the non-Malay communities, affirmed
that 'Nothing in this Act shall affect the right of the
Federal Government or any State Government to use any
translation of official documents or communications in the
language of any other community in the Federation for such
purposes as may be deemed necessary in the public interest'.
Clause L. states that 'the Yang Di Pertuan Agong may permit
the continued use of the English language for such official
purposes as may be deemed fit'.	 Clauses 5-8 provided for
the continued use of English in the Courts, Federal Parliament
and State Assenblies, and in the texts of laws.
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While the non-Malays, in particular the Chinese, were
relieved at the 'liberality' of the provisions of the Bill,
many groups within the Malay community were dissatisfied
with it. These groups included some UMNO branches, various
Malay Teachers' Associations, the Malay Language Society of
the University of Malaya and PENA, the national writers'
association.	 These groups united under the leadership of
the NLAF in an attempt to persuade the government to change
the Bill (M.Roff, 1967:327). Their opposition was two-fold.
First they opposed the provision for the continued widespread
use of Engli .ih, and that no time limit was stipulated as
to the use ui English for official purposes.
	
Second, they
felt that the Bill had indirectly introduced multi-lingualism
by giving Chinese and Tamil a kind of 'semi-official'
status (Vasil, 1972:15).
The Language Bill controversy had raised once again
the emotive language-education issue.
	
The opposition
parties took the occasion to secure support for their
respective parties. Within the UMNO and the Malay community
there were also signs of dissension and divisions, and
widespread feeling of having been let down by the Alliance
and the Tengku.	 In the MCA too the issue created some
divisions between the branches on the one hand and the
national organization on the ohter.
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Measures Detrimental to Chinese Education
With the exception of the Barnes Report which proposed
to abolish all vernacular schools, no other government-
appointed education reports directly attempted to abolish
Chinese schools. The government must have realized that
with the Chinese constituting more than one-third of the
total population, it would be dynamite for it to attempt to
close any Chinese schools, the majority of which had been
set up by the Chinese themselves through their own initia-
tive.
	
The policy not to abolish Chinese and other vernacular
schools is in sharp contrast with that of many of Ler South-
east Asian nations where the Chinese are in a mi,writy.
	
In
Thailand, Chinese schools have been most severely restricted
and many have been closed down for having failed to comply
with governemnt's regulations (Murray, 1964:71, 74-75).
In Indonesia, beginning 1957, most of the Chinese schools
have been nationalized and converted to Indonesian-medium
institutions following the government curriculum.	 Only in
some of these converted schools, was Chinese offered as a
language subject for a few hours weekly. Chinese who were
Indonesian citizens were barred from attending Chinese schools
(Murray, 1964:77-78).
	
In South Vietnam, severe restrictions
had been placed on the curriculum and administration of
Chinese schools (Murray, 1964:84).	 But in Malaya, since
Independence, not one Chinese school has been forcibly closed
by the government and no Chinese child has ever been barred
from receiving education in his mother tongue.
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Nevertheless, the various measures taken by the govern-
ment were by no means conducive to the development of Chinese
schools and education. 	 One important measure taken by the
government was the ruling requiring all Chinese secondary
schools to decide by the end of 1961 whether they wished to
become national-type schools or remain Independent. In the
case of the former, the schools would receive full financial
assistance and the main medium of instructions would be
either English or Malay.
	
In the latter case, Chinese could
be used as the main medium of instruction but financial aid
from the government woul . be discontinued (Talib Report,
1960:29).	 This policy, many Chinese educationalists rightly
believed, had sounded the death-knell of Chinese language
and education, and had resulted in Chinese language being
relegated to a position of secondary importance in comparison
with either English or Malay (Comber, 1961:30).
Another important measure was the abolition of examina-
tions in the medium of Chinese with effect from 1961.
	
These
included the Junior Middle Three examination, Chinese Secondary
Schools Promotion examination, and the Chinese Secondary
Schools Leaving Certificate examination (Talib Report, 1960:33).
All Chinese school students who wish to enter assisted schools
or go for further studies in the University of Malaya have
to sit for public examinations such as the LCE, the MCE and
finally the HSC, all in Malay or English only. This means
that the medium of instruction in Chinese schools (i.e.
Chinese) cannot be accepted as the medium of examinations.
With their relatively lower standard of English, their chances
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of success in the public examinations are not as good as
students from English-medium schools. 	 Furthermore, Chinese
is no longer an important examination subject, in that
passing or failing the language does not affect the overall
performance of a student's examination.	 In the examinations
held in Chinese on the other hand, Chinese language was
crucial in the examination results. 	 A student who failed
his Chinese language would not be awarded a certificate,
which meant in effect he failed the whole examination.
A further blow to Chinese school and education was the
government's refusal to recognize the value of Chinese school
diplomas or certificates.
	
A graduate who completed Chinese
Senior Middle Three with six years of secondary education is
in a much inferior position to a student possessing only the
LCE, who has only completed three years of secondary education
in an English or a Malay school. The same problem is faced
by Chinese graduates who obtain degrees from the Nanyang
University in Singapore or universities in Taiwan. Their
degrees are likewise not recognized by the government. Due
to lack of knowledge in Malay, these graduates find it
difficult to obtain jobs; and if they are lucky enough to
find one, it is often much below that for which they are
qualified.	 As a result, there is a widespread feeling
among these Chinese-educated that they have been unfairly
treated. Resentment and frustration resulting from being
discriminated thus lead many of these Chinese graduates to
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incline to radical political doctrines. 	 In this connection,
it is therefore incorrect, as Wolfgang Franke (1965:185-6)
has suggested, to identify political extremism with Chinese
education as such.	 Political radicalization among the
Chinese school students is largely the result of frustration
and resentment.
All these measures - discontinuation of government aid
to Chinese secondary schools, abolition of examinations
conducted in Chinese and non-recognition of Chinese diplomas
and certificates - have the net effect of discouraging the
growth of Chinese schools and education.
	
Consequently,
Chinese schools are losing grounds. The Chinese as a
whole love their language and culture, even though many of
them can neither read nor write Chinese themselves. They
support Chinese schools because they rightly recognize that
these schools are the most effective formal institutions
for imparting their cultural values and patterns to the
younger generation. The maintenance of these values and
patterns is crucial for their communal cohesiveness.
	
But
the Chinese are practical people too. They realize that
giving their children a pure Chinese education would only do
the latter a gross disservice, and handicap them in making
a good living. They are thus faced with a difficult choice
between maintenance of Chinese culture in the form of Chinese
schools and a good living (guaranteed by an English educatio:34.
Many have chosen the latter. 	 Interestingly, many heads of
Chinese schools, while making great efforts to persuade
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parents to have their children educated in Chinese schools,
send their own children to English schools. 	 These heads
certainly realize the economic value of an English education.
Education and Politics 
Due to the plural nature of the Malaysian society,
education-language issue has always been able to arouse
intense feeling among the various communities.	 This issue
has been particularly significant in politics. Ratnam
(1965:200), for instance, equated the language issue and
educational policies in general with 'the salt and the
pepper' an 3aid that 'they had to be in everything'.
Reference has already been made to the Barnes Report
and Chines e. reactions.	 In the 1955 election, the Alliance
manifesto was careful not to alienate Chinese electorate.
On education, it promised that it would t allow vernacular
schools their normal expaislion t .	 At any rate at this time
the overriding question was Independence, and potentially
explosive issues such as education were relatively little
discussed.
But with the publication of the Razak Report in 1956,
the education-language issue came to a head and dominated
the political scene for some time. 	 Chinese antagonism was
particularly aroused by the proposals to make Malay and
English compulsory subjects in all schools, and media of
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public examinations. Despite the effort of some of the
MCA old guard leaders to convince the Chinese community
that the promotion of a national system of education was
not incompatible with the preservation of Chinese culture and
language, many of the Chinese were unmoved and unconvinced.
Their discontent and dissatisfaction was demonstrated
politically a year later (1957) when in a by-election at
Ipoh, the MCA candidate was defeated by a PPP candidate who
capitalized on the Chinese education issue (M.Roff, 1965:50).
Again, in 1959,. 	 it was disagreement over thr . Chinese
education issue that nearly broke up the Alliance as well as
the MCA.	 In this case it was the moderate elements within
the MCA which reasserted themselves and forced t:t_ more
extreme members to withdraw.
In the 1964 election the education-language question
was not of critical political significance as in 1959.
At that time Indonesian 'confrontation' was the major national
issue and unifying slogan for the Alliance. The language
issue which would have loomed large was relegated to secondary
importance.	 Nevertheless it was still the most important
communal issue at the time. 	 Chinese opposition parties
such as the UDP PPP and DAP included in their manifesto
as an important item that Chinese should be made an official
language in addition to Malay. All of them attacked the
government on its policy on Chinese eduaction.
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Throughout the election campaign, the UDP was the
strongest critic of the government's Chinese education
policy.
	
The party accused the Alliance of 'deceit and
insincerity' for trying to give the impression that it was
promoting Chinese education merely by distributing money to
Chinese schools, 4 when it was clear that Okainese schools
and education had been discriminated under the existing
policies.	 The UDP argued that 'the basic problem was that
of protecting and preserving a truly good Chinese education,
and it has in the medium of teaching and examination'
(Sin Chew Jit Poh, Feb. f t 1964).
In the 1969 electi—, the education-language issue
once again assumed its political significance. This was
partly dueio the 1967 National Language Bill which made Malay
the sole official language of the country. Moreover, the
non-Malay communitues, the Chinese in particular, were more
and more dissatisfied with the position of their language
and education. This discontent and dissatisfaction provided
the non-Malay opposition parties such as the PPP and the DAP
a handy issue to project themselves as the champions of the
cause of the non-Malay communities. 	 On the question of
Chinese language, the DAP's position was clear.	 While
4. Shortly before the election campaign began, the MCA
president, who was also the Finance Minister, toured
the country distributing money to Chinese schools -
obviously in an attempt to win electoral support.
The total sum distributed was MØ5 million. Cf. Sin
Chew Jit Poh, Feb. 29, 1964.
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accepting Malay as the national language, it sought to
obtain official status for the Chinese, Tamil and English
languages.	 It also advocated the 'free use of Chinese,
Tamil and English in Parliament, State Assemblies, and in
public notices and government correspondence' .5
	
The PPP
stuck to its education and language policy. The party
demanded that 'the medium of instruction and examination
should be in accordance with the wishes of the parents' and
that it would 'continue its struggle for the recognition of
Chinese and Tamil as official languages in addition to Malay1.6
Some time before the 1969 general election, one of the
communal issues that dominated the political scene for a
while was the proposed establishment of the Merdeka
University where the medium ofinstruction would be Chinese.
The Merdeka University was proposed by certain sections of
the Chinese community to provide facilities for higher
studies to Chinese-medium students.
	
These students,
because of their generally poor standard of English, could
not enter the University of Malaylwhere the medium was
English.	 Within the country, there were no other facilities
for higher studies available to them. Traditionally,
therefore, they had to go to Singapore or Taiwan for their
higher studies in Chinese. But those who went abroad had
5. DAP Genera_ Elections Manifesto, 1969.
6. People's Progressive Party of Ma.laya Mainfesto, 1969.
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always been restricted to a small number who could afford
it. The majority of the Chinese secondary school leavers
could not afford to go abroad and had to look for a job in
the country. This, they found very difficult because their
diplomas had not been recognized by the government. These
students thus faced a dilemma: they could neither go for
further studies nor obtain jobs. 	 Parents began to realize
that sending their children to Chinese secondary schools was
to handicap them in the struggle for jobs. This attitude
partly contributed to the decline of Chinese-medium schools.
The Merdeka University would prtvide these students an
outlet.	 So when the scheme was pr.:Tosed, it was favourably
received by a large section of the Chinese community who had
probably come to believe that one w.11e way to ensure the
existence of Chinese secondary schools was to provide higher
studies facilities within the country. 	 But the scheme did
not 'find favour with the government which feared that it
would only promote more Chinese chauvinism and perpetuate the
gulf between the various communities.
As the champion of the cause of the non-Malay communities,
it was to be expected that the DAP came out in full support
of the Merdeka University project. The Gerakan considered
to be a moderate party, was also in favour of, and supported
the establishment of the Merdeka University in its election
manifesto. The PPP did not mention the Merdeka University
scheme in its manifesto, but from the party's stand on mutli-
lingualism, it could not have objected it.
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The proposal, however, put the MCA in a dilemma. On
the one hand the party could not support the proposal openly
for fear of hurting its senior partner in the Alliance, the
UMNO.	 On the other hand it could not afford to reject it
outright because that would result in too much loss in Chinese
votes in the election.	 As a middle-course, the MCA initiated
the idea of a Tengku Abdul Rahman College (a feeder college
to prepare Chinese-medium students for admission to universi-
ties) to replace the Merdeka University scheme.
In rejecting the Merdeka University scheme, a top MCA
official rsoned:
A rrivate racial univeristy, no matter in
what language medium it may be, would not
conducive to promoting harmony and
understanding in a multi-racial society.
In the present circumstances, it can
only bring confusion and misunderstanding.
(The Guardian, March, 1968:1).
The then MCA president, Tan Siew Sin, in rejecting the
Merdeka University scheme in favour of the feeder co]lege,
commented:
It is true that we /squire more universities
and more institutions of higher learning...
but it should also be acknowledged that it
is better to take a little more time and
eventually establish first-class institutions
rather than for a few individuals to make haste
on their own and set up a university which would
not be worthy of the name and which would do
far more harm than good to those whom it is
designed to benefit...
(The Guardian, April, 1968:3).
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The idea of the Merdeka University was eventually
dropped.
	
In its place the MCA, with the support of the
Alliance government, set up the Tengku Abdul Rahman College
in early 1969, shortly before the general election. 	 The
Tengku Abdul Rahman College was regarded by some Chinese
as 'something better than nothing at all'. But in the
eyes of the sponsors of the Merdeka University, the college
was nothing more than an attempt to sabotage their project.
The proposal to establish a Chinese university at
least partly stimulated the Malay desire to set up a Malay
University.	 In 1970, two years after the Chinesc university
was proposed, the National University (whose main medium is
Malay) was established.	 It is difficult to so.y what would
have been the Malay reaction had the Merdeka Univ-rsity come
into being.	 Perhaps the hostile attitudes of M-lay students
at the University of Malaya towards the Tengku Abdul Rahman
College offer some guide in this respect.
	 In August, 1972,
Malay students at the University of Malaydemonstrated
against the Alliance government for supporting the college.
They were hostile towards the college basically for its
failure to use Malay as the medium of instruction. This
practice, according to them, was against the principle of
the natioanl education system.7
7. The Alliance Government has committed itself to giving
financial support to the college since 1969 in the hope
of strengthening the electoral appeal of the MCA, since
the college was an adjunct to the MCA. Cf. The Guardian
(London), August, 25, 1972,
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Political and Social Consequences of the Continued
Existence of Chinese Schools.
The Malays always see themselves as the bumiputra (sons
of the soil) and as such it is natural for them to see that
their language becomes the national and sole official
language both in words and in reality. The Chinese, too
have always been proud of their own language and schools
which are part of what they regard as their great cultural
heritage.	 If possible, the Chinese, like the Malays, would
like to see that their language be recognized at least for
official purposes.
As long as the Mal; and Chinese positions remain
mutually exclusive, the continued existence of Chinese schools
would remain a source of irritation between the two communi-
ties.	 As has often been the case before, the issue would
assume political significance and find political expressions
in the near future.
	
It is not likely that the issue would
be easily resolved to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.
So far as cultural assimilation is concerned, the
continued existence of Chinese education presents a great
obstacle.
	 A proportion of the Chinese would insist that
their children be educated in the Chinese language. This
group of Chinese school product would have a different
orientation from that of students under the national education
system. There would be little interaction and understanding
between the Chinese-educated .group on the one hand, and the
rest of the student community on the other. This quite
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effectively prevents the process of social integration from
taking place among the students.	 Interaction and integration
are two inter-related processes.
	
In a study of ethnic
attitudes among Chinese and Malay students, a scholar has
concluded that tie higher the rate of interaction among
students, the higher the sense of integration (Rabushka,
1969:53-63).
	
It should, of course, be borne in mind that
interaction may lead to conflict and friction rather than
integration or assimilation. But a certain amount of
racial friction may be inevitable and may well be a worth-
while price for progress towards an integrated society.
The continued existence of Chinese education also means
the continued inflow of Chinese school leavers and Chinese
university graduates into the labour market. But the
government's non-recognition of their academic qualifications
not only prevents them from obtaining jobs in government
and quasi-government establishment, but it also deprives
the nation of trained human resources which are so badly
needed for the development of the nation.
More importantly, government's discrimination against
Chinese-educated graduates would antagonize as well as
frustrate them, setting in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy:
subscription to, or more seriously, indulgence in political
extremism and communist ideology which the government itself
can neither tolerate nor afford.
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Recent Developments 
Since 1969, especially after the May 13 communal dis-
turbance in Kuala Lumpur, there has been a drastic change
in the economic policy of the government.
	
In the field of
education, the government has also been very determined to
implement Malay as the national and sole official language
of the country.	 Increasingly, emphasis has been placed on
the use of the Malay language.
	
Slowly, but steadily,
English, which had been an important tool of communication
both officially and unofficially is now being relegated to
a secondary position. English as a 4ledium of instruction
at the University of Malayahas been 1owly replaced by Malay.
At the National University which was set up in 1970, the
medium of instruction is wholly Malay.
	
So is the medium
of instruction at the Serdang Agricultural University set
up in 1973.
At the primary school level, Malay was made the sole
medium of instruction in the first year of English-medium
primary schools in 1970.
	
By 1982, all government-assisted
secondary schools will use Malay as the sole medium of
instruction. English and Chinese will only be taught as
language subjects.
	
Consequently, by 1983, all except
language courses for new admission to universities will be
conducted in the Malay language (Second Malaysia Plan, p.236).
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The forty Independent Chinese secondary schools in Malaya
are subject to less control by the government since they
receive no aid from it. These schools are allowed to use
Chinese as the main medium of instruction. There are no
special examinations for these Independent schools. 	 The
students are, however, allowed to sit for the LCE and MCE,
both of which are conducted in the medium of English or
Malay only.	 Some of the students who complete their
Senior Middle Three can further their studies at the Nanyang
University or universities in Taiwan.
As i1.1,11,ated earlier, these Independent Chinese schools
are face" -f-th the problems of finance, shortage of students
and poor academic standard.	 In view of this, a meeting of
representaf 4 ves of Independent schools was held in July,
1972. The meeting resulted in the formation of an Independent
School Sub-Commitee to look into the various problems of
Independent schools. This Sub-Committee was to function
under the three highest organizations which identify themselves
with Chinese education - the UCSTA, UCSCA and the MCA Central
Education Committee. The meeting also urged the public, in
particular the Chinese, to support Independent Chinese
schools so as to preserve Chinese education. 	 It also called
on the government to resume Chinese Senior Middle Three
examination and to recognize degrees from the Nanyang
University and universities in Taiwan (Nanyang Siang Pao,
July 3, 1972).
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The enthusiasm for Chinese education in the form of
Independent schools was clearly shown by the Chinese all
over the country in 1973, when a campaign was launched to
set up an Independent School Development Fund to 'preserve
Chinese schools and education'.
	
The response to the
campaign to preserve Chinese Independent schools was very
encouraging. The UCSCA in its annual meeting in September
resolved unanimously to support the campaign whole-heartedly
(Sin Chew Jit Poh, Sept, 10, 1973). A meeting of represen-
tatives of all Chinese guilds and associations in Perak also
decided to 'support all efforts to raise funds fe-' Indepen-
dent Schools'.
	
In the same meetings the presidclt of the
UCSTA, Sim Mow Yu, stated that 'Independent schools are the
forts for Chinese cultures; they should be streligthered to
provide Chinese education for Chinese children' (The China
Press, Sept. 14, 1973).	 He then urged the tin miners to
contribute generously to the Independent Schools Development
Fund.
Faced with various problems, Chinese education is, as
one Chinese daily puts it, at a cross road (Editorial, Nanyang
Siang Pao, July 5, 1972).	 Some Chinese are even more
pessimistic. They regard the present campaign to preserve
Chinese Independent schools as a desperate and futile attempt
to save something that is 'gradually dying a natural death'..
There is certainly some truth in the statement.
	 Since 1962,
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Chinese schools and their enrolment have been declining.
With the present government's emphasis on the importance
of Malay, many Chinese children are shifting their attention
to learning Malay. As long as this policy continues, there
is no reason to believe that the declining trend of Chinese
schools will not continue.
We have indicated in the beginning of this chapter that
education has been an important factor in cQmmunalism. As
a matter of fact, communalism is one of the most intricate
problems in Malaysia today affecting almost all aspects of
Malaysian life. Becausa of this, we suggest to look into
this problem in greater r etail in our next chapter.
CHAPTER 6 
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINESE AND MALAYS
Introduction: The Pre-war Period
Prior to the Second World War, Sino-Malay relations had
been reasonably satisfactory. There was occasional friction
and conflict, but the keynote was communal harmony or the
absence of solmosity.
	
The absence of animosity was the
result of :5-7eral factors. 	 Mutual submission to Pax
Britannica was one (Ratnam, 1965:42).	 As Silcock (1965:181)
has put it, l in many spheres of activity the different races
were more concerned with their relations to the British, who
co-ordinated the whole system, than with relations to one
another'.
Secondly, there had been relatively little conflict of
interests among the two communities. This was particularly
true in the economic sphere where there was specialization
of functions, with the Chinese largely engaging in commercial
activities, and the Malays in agricultural pursuits. The
two communities 'stood in complementary and not conflicting
relations to one another', and neither 'had had any reason
to step on the other's toes' (Ratnam, 1965:42).
The third factor that accounted for the relatively low
intensity of communal conflict in the pre-war era was the
different political orientations of the two communities.
283
Not only were the Chinese at that time an unorganized
political force (Burridge, 1957:165), but they were also
largely indifferent to local politics.
	
Those who were
interested in politics were mainly concerned with the
political development in their homeland. The Malays, on
the other hand, were more concerned with local politics,
even though some were attracted to, and ploitically
motivated by, the developments in Egypt, Turkey or Indonesia.
As a result, the two communities were less inclined to regard
each other as political protagonists (Means, 1970:44).
The relatively harmonious relations between the
Chinese and the Malays before the war does not neuessarily
mean that racial tension did not exist.	 It onl: means that
Sino-Malay tension and antagonism had not develoed to such
an extent as to produce an open conflict. 	 Racial tension
resulting from differences in language, religion, custom and
economic imbalances has always existed.
	
The point is that
the tension between the communities was latent at the outbreak
of the Second World War.
The Japanese Occupation of Malaya, as mentioned earlier
in chapter 3, changed the pre-war race relations situation
and brought racial antagonism to the surface. Because of
its divide-and-rule policy, the Japanese made use of the
Malay police force to fight the almost exclusively Chinese
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resistance movement, leading to strong resentment on the part
of the Chinese towards the Malays. Apart from the Japanese
exploitation of racial differences, another factor which led
to a deterioration in Sino-Malay relations was 'the prevailing
sense of insecurity' which made people believe that they
were safest among members of the same ethnic origin (Morrison,
19)l9:241).
The steady deterioration in Sino-Malay relations during
the war years reached a climax immediately after the surrender
of the Japanese, in the outburst of bitter communal clashes.
During the interregnum butween the surrender of the Japanese
and the re-establishmen i- of British authority, armed Chinese
guerillas emerged from the jungle and started to pay off old
scores against the Malays whc collaborated with the
Japanese.	 Serious but isolated racial outbreaks erupted in
Johore, 1 Negri Sembilan and Perak (Gullick, 1969:100).
Racial feelings were running high but in all these incidents
responsible moderate leaders from both communities were able
to exert their influence and mobilize opinion against
violence.
Post-War Race Relations 
While the racial feelings were prevented from running
so wild as to be uncontrollable, it should be noted that no
successful and effective steps have been taken towards
removing the sources of conflict between the two communities.
1. For a fairly detailed account of racial outbreaks in
Johore, see Burridge (1957:151-168). The author
attributed the communal clashes to the Chinese attack
on Malay axioms.
285
Consequently, in the post-war and post-independence period,
communal antagonism has, if anything, become more evident.
This has been evidenced by communal outbreaks in 1957 (Penang),
1959 (Pangkor Island), 1964 (Singapore and Bukit Mertajam),
1967 (Penang), reaching a climax in the Kuala Lumpur
riots of 1969. 2 The last-mentioned, because of its.
scale and impact, warrants some further elaboration.
	
But
before proceeding to that an attempt is made in what follows
to examine the sources of Sino-Malay conflict. 	 This is
discussed under the following headings: political relation-
'hips, economic relationships and general social relationships-
uolitical Relationships
Politics in post-war Malaya has been a constant source
of communal tension. 	 The tension centres around the
Malays' insistence on their predominant position in the govern-
ment and administration of the country and the Chinese claims
for increased political authority. The Malays firmly believe
that as bumiputra, they have special rights to control the
country's political life.	 Some Malays even went so far as
to say that 'Malaya is for the Malays 1 . 3 Moreover, with
the control of economic and commercial life by the non-Malays,
2. For an account of the Singapore and Penang riots, see
Leifer, (1964:1115-1121) and Snider (1968:960-975)
respectively. The National Operations Council (1969:
15-20) provides a brief government version of the dis-
turbances in Penang, Bukit Mertajam and Pangkor.
3. It is interesting to note that among the Malays who made
this statement is one none other than the former Prime
Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman. He once declared: "Malaya
is for the Malays and it should not be governed by a mixture
of races". On another occasion, the Tengku said: "It is
understood by all that this country by its very name, its
traditions and character is Malay". (Cf. Vasil, 1971:6).
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the Malays feel imperative that they should have a pre-
eminent position in the political power so as to offset the
non-Malay economic power.
The Chinese, on the other hand, strongly feel that as
citizens, they should have equal access to the government and
administration of the country as the Malays. Their present
position, as many rightly claim, is only that of the 'second-
class citizens', since in civil administration, as well as
in some other fields, they are discriminated against on the
sheer ground of ethnicity.
It is these conflicting claims oetween the two
communities that often produce co 	 (11.-al antagonisms.	 As
has been indicated earlier in chaptc-r- 4, the Alliance Party -
a symbol of communal co-operation - .as almost broken up in
1959 as a result of controversies over the allocation of
seats among its components.
	
In this instance, Chinese
demand for one-third of the total seats in the Alliance was
to ensure that their interests in the government could be
proportionately and properly represented. But their
demand met with strong opposition from the Malays represented
by the UMN° who insisted that the MCA should not be given more
seats than what they thought was necessary. Communal tension
was generated by the MCA-UMNO crisis, but a showdown was
avoided and a compromise reached largely as a result of the
MCA making substantial concessions to the UMNO.
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The
This brings us to the wider question of power
relationship of the Chinese vis-a-vis the Malays.
1959 Alliance crisis was but one example of the dependent
power position of the Chinese in Malaysia and the reluctance
of the Malays to extend further political power to the
Chinese.	 Since the formation of the Alliance, the UMNO
has maintained its pre-eminent position in the partnership,
keeping the MCA and the MIC in a subordinate position. On
this, a writer has commented that
It now became an important feature of
UMNO strategy to keep the MCA weak
eno : Igh (in terms aC popular Chinese
votes) so as to make it dependent on
UMNO and not enable it to make
exuessive demands on behalf of the
Chinese community and at the same
tir-? popular enough among the Chinese
to deliver the necessary votes, in add-
i-Lion to the larger UMNO vote, to
retain the Alliance in power.
(Vasil, 1971:15).
Another writer, interestingly Tengku Abdul Rahmants
biographer, has also commented on the dominant position of
the UMNO in the Alliance Party:
... the Alliance is really made up of one
principal party, the UMNO, with the MCA
and the MIC as branches clothed with the
intelligentsia and capitalist classes of
each community. The MCA is not represen-
tative of the	 Chinese in the Federation,
neither is the MIC of ... Indians.
	
Neither
of them has roots in the villages and small
towns.
(Miller, 1959:216)
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The dependent power position of the Chinese, however,
is not confined to the Alliance Party set-up or the present
National Front government.
	 In other spheres, notably the
civil service, the Armed Forces and the Police, Chinese
dependence is also evident. Statistics on these are diffi-
cult to come by, hut any observer (including the Malays) can
easily be convinced that the Chinese role in these areas is
insignificant.	 In the civil service, for example, the
four to one quota in favour of the Malays bars many qualified
Chinese.
	 In the Armed Forces, the specially designed Malay
Regiments close their doors to the Chinese and othcr non-
Malays.
The most glaring fact about the Chinese dependent
power relationship in the Malaysian society can h ., seen from
their representation in the Cabinet. Of a total of thirty-
four Ministers, their deputies and Parliamentary Secretaries
in 1972, only five were Chinese (Straits Times, Dec. 29, 1972).
In 1974, only eight (or less than 22%) of a total of thirty-
seven Cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers were Chinese
(Malaysian Digest, Sept. 6, 1974).	 More importantly, the
ministerial posts held by the Chinese are relatively less
important ones. Apart from this, both the Dewan Rakyat 
(House of Representatives) and Dewan Negara (Senate) have
been dominated by Malays. All this means that any major or
minor political decisions will have to be approved by the
Malays.
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This Malay dominance of political authority cannot but
evoke fear, mistrust, and insecurity among the Chinese,
many of whom see the strong political position of the
Malays as a threat to their hard-won economic position. 4
This sense of insecurity has been particularly strong since
the Kuala Lumpur riots which prompted the government to
implement a number of pro-Malay policies avowedly to correct
the Sino-Malay economic imbalance. The feeling of insecurity
not only tends to draw the Chinese closer together but it
also produces ethnic prejudice against the Malays.
Chinese resentmeni, is further heightened by the con-
stitutional guarantee :,J7 the special position of the Malays.
To many, if not most Chi n ese, the seemingly permanent Malay
Special Privileges are - gross injustice to say the least.
In the public services, because of the discriminatory quotas,
the top policy-making positions are dominated by the Malays.
Many well-qualified Chinese find it difficult to enter the
service while less-qualified Malay candidates are recruited.
Those Chinese already in the service find it extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to obtain promotion, which is often
4. Tan Siew Sin, MCA l s president, was one of the many who
brought out the question of insecurity among the Chinese.
In his address to the MCA Annual Assembly, Tan Siew Sin
said: "As president of the MCA, I receive a constant
stream of grievances. Underlying all these grouses is
that feeling of insecurity in regard to the future.
Until 13th May, 1969, the Chinese felt that their pre-
ponderence in the economic field could make up for their
weakness in the political field. Now they feel that
they are not only politically handicapped, even their
economic position is being steadily eroded". Cf. Straits
Times, Sept. 3, 1972.
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based more on ethnic consideration than objective
performance standards, resulting in less qualified Malays to
be placed in high administrative and policy-making positions.
The outcome is a general low morale and frustration prevailing
among the Chinese and Indian public servants. 	 To some
extent, therefore, as Means (1972:46-48) has rightly put it,
the discriminatory quotas have contributed to a 'weakening
of the legitimacy of the government' in the eyes of the
Chinese as well as other non-Malays.
Not least significant in inciting communal feelings
the role played by the various political parties,
r-irticularly communal parties.
	
Almost all the political
parties in Malaysia have at one time or another seized
ome communal issues and exploited them to their own
advantage.	 During the past election campaigns, exploitation
of communal issues was a common feature. 	 Such overtly Malay
right-wing communal parties like the PMIP made no pretence
at being communal and anti-Chinese.	 On the one hand it
openly advocated the establishment of an Islamic state in
Malaysia, which caused serious concern among the Chinese.
On the other hand, the party exploited fears among the
Malays that they would be overwhelmed by the non-Malays.
29 1
Other parties like the DAP and PPP were more subtle in
their approaches. Both advocated equality for all irrespec-
tive of race. Having the bulk of their support from the
Chinese community, however, these parties could not but
capitalize on some communal issues in order to project them-
selves as the champions of the cause of the Chinese and other
non-Malays. They raised the issues of multi-lingualism and
the Malay Special Privileges, which inevitably antagonized
the Malays.	 It is therefore hardly surprising that the
Malays viewed the DAP and PPP with suspicion and feared them
just as the Chinese feared (and they .till do) the PMIP.
The Alliance Party, which clair...1 itself to be non-
communal, 5 could not avoid playing on communal issues to
secure support.	 In the 1969 election campaign, for example,
in an attempt to discredit the DAP, it accused the party of
being anti-Malay working to deprive the Malays of their
rights.	 It also accused the DAP as an offshoot of Lee
Kuan Yew's PAP in Singapore and described DAP's 'Malaysian
Malaysia' concept as aiming at creating antagonism between
the Malays and the non-Malays (Vasil, 1972:29).
In short, exploitation of communal issues - especially
those pertaining to language and the Malay Special Privileges -
and mutual allegations of communalism have been a common
feature in Malaysian politics. This tends to incite fear
5. The Alliance is basically a communal party or at best an
inter-communal party, being made up of three communal
components.	 Each of the component parties must appeal
to its own supporters.
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and communal hostility and serve as a constant source of
irritation among the Chinese and the Malays.
A further source of conflict is the Chinese dissatis-
faction and resentment over the Malays effort at electoral
manipulation. This manipulation to ensure continued Malay
pre-eminence in the country's politics have been touched on
earlier in chapter 4.	 Constituency delimitation in favour
of the Malay electors, the suspension of local-level elec-
toral politics and the constitutional ban on certain funda-
mental issues affecting Chinese community all serve to
remind thR rainese that there is no free and open electoral
competitio:. In a plural society like Malaysia. 6 They further
reflect the intransigent attitude of the Malays in matters
concerning their political power.
Economic Relationships 
Two related aspects of the Malaysian economic structure
are pertinent: one concerns the economic roles of the Chinese
and the Malays, the other the economic imbalances between
the two communities.
To a large extent, it is still true that economic roles
in Malaysia are differentiated along communal lines. Broadly
speaking, the Chinese are more urban-centred and vis-a-vis
the Malays they dominate commerce, manufacturing, mining,
6. In a study of politics in plural societies, Rabuskha and
Shepsle (1971, 1972) report that 'free and open electoral
competition may not • be appropriate in the plural society'
and 'democracy may be more than their (plural societies)
citizens dare afford'.
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construction, finance and the liberal professions. 7
 The
Malays, on the other hand, are overwhelmingly rural dwellers
engaging in rice growing, fishing and small-holder rubber
industry. They contorl the military service and the police
force and are prominent in the government and administration
especially in the civil service.
	 In commerce and industries,
the Malays are under-represented in comparison to their
numbers.
	 All in all, the general picture is one of occupa-
tional specialization along communal lines, which has contri-
buted partly to the present racial economic imbalances.
There are four aspects of the Sino-Malay ecolomic
imbalances, namely income disparity, disparities 1,-..tween
sectors of the economy, in economic status and in ownership.
There is little doubt that the Sino-Malay income uispa.rity
remains wide. As has been indicated in chapter 2, both in
terms of median and mean household incomes, the Chinese more
than doubled the Malays in 1970, with the Malays predominating
in the lowest income groups.
Between various sectors of the economy, the imbalances
are more evident, even though the overall employment reflects
the nation's racial composition. Unlike the Chinese, the
Malays predominate in the poorer sectors of the economy.
The Chinese account for about 65-66% (of the total employment)
7. It should be remembered that the comparison is between
the Chinese and the Malays only. In terms of ownership
and control of the Malaysian economy as a whole, as has
been indicated in chapter 2, the foreigners still have a
significant influence.
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in mining, commerce and manufactuidLng while the Malays
constitute 67% of those employed in agriculture. More
significantly, a great number of Malays engaged in agricul-
ture are to be found in traditional activities with low
productivity. In manufacturing a significant but
unspecified proportion of the Malays are concentrated in wood
products, cottage industries, .agricultural processing and
other low-wage activities, while a considerable proportion
classified as engaged in commerce are petty retailers or
itinerant traders in rural areas.
To exacerbate the tuation a big proportion of the
Malays are concentrated ..J1 the poorer occupations within
each sector of the economy, being found mainly in the
unskilled and semi-skilled categories and under-represented
in professional, managerial and technical categories. To
cite but one example, in 1970, as many as 46% of Malay
employment in manufacturing was unskilled, compared with
26% for the Chinese.	 In the same sector, the Malays
accounted for only 7% of the total employed in the managerial
and professional section, as against 68% Chinese.
Another aspect of the economic imbalances lies in
ownership. In the ownership of corporate agriculture and
corporate industry (including manufacturing, mining and
construction), the foreigners have a substantial share. They
own 70.8% of corporate agriculture and 57.2% of corporate
industry, compared with 29.2% and 42.8% respectively for all
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Malaysians.	 Of this the Chinese hold 25.9% and 26.2%
respectively while the share of the Malays is less than
1% in each.
In the ownership of share capital of limited companies,
the situation is similar to the above. The foreigners
have a dominant position, controlling slightly less than
two-thirds.	 Among the local communities, the Chinese are
the most prominent group, owning about 23% of the total as
compared to a miserable 2% for the Malays.
This situation of economic imbalances between the
Chinese and the Malays has always been a potential source
of conflict between the two communities. 	 It has become
one of the most, if not the most important political issue
of Malaysia today.
	
More often than not, political discussions
are centred around these imbalances and the ways in which
these could be rectified in order to achieve racial harmony
and national unity.
On the other hand, it is not uncommon to see the
'imbalance' issue being exploited by some communalist poli-
ticians.	 In such instances, the Sino-Malay economic
imbalances are deliberately exaggerated while no reference
is made as to the dominant position of the foreigners,
especially the Europeans. 8 One possible consequence of
8. One such politician is Matiathir bin Mohamad (1970),
especially chapter 4, pp.32-61.
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such deliberate instigations is a growing awareness of
backwardness on the part of the Malays which in turn
contributes to greater frustrtaion and resentment, and even
economic insecurity.9
General Social Relationships
Several studies have revealed that there is little
social interaction between Chinese and Malays, and that
social separation between the two communities is rather
pronounced.	 One reason for this probably lies in the fact
that the two communities are physically segregated.	 Broadly
speaking, the Chinese are concentr i -d on the west coast of
the Peninsula and in urban centres	 the Malays are
found largely on the east coast and in the north. Chinese
'new villages' created in the first few years of the Emergency
also served to divide the two communities into separate
residential compartments.
The lack of social contact, however, is not due entirely
to residential segregation.	 In a study of Chinese rural
community, Newell (1962:39) finds that there is very little
contact between the Chinese and the Malays even though both
communities live in the same village of Treacherous River.
9. In his investigation in Liverpool Richmond (1950:147-170)
finds that ethnic prejudice is a function of three
factors acting in conjunction,ramely, the existence of
two or more groups easily distinguishable from each other,
the creation of false-stereotyped ideas and feelings of
economic insecurity, the last-mentioned being the most
important factor.
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Nyce (1973:157) also notes that
Fellowship between the Chinese and people of
other ethnic groups living nearby is...
occasional and casual.
	
Close cross-cultural
friendships are rare, though contacts between
individuals of different groups are super-
ficially pleasant and little open antagonism
has been witnessed.
Wilson (1967:24 & 29) in his study of a Malay village
also observes that relations between urban Chinese and
village Malays are highly selective and confined to economic
relations only, and that there is little or no contact of
any personal nature, and a lack of opportunity to develop
such personai relationships.
While physical segregation to a certain extent tends
to restrict sociel contact between the two communities,
there are other important factors. One such factor is
tha distinct cultural differences between the Chinese and
the Malays. Each community has its own culture and language,
religion, and its own values and ways of life.
	
Each is
ethnocentric, thinking that its own culture is superior to
the others.
In religion, the Malays are Muslims while the Chinese
are not. 10 This makes intermarriage very difficult since
Islam forbids the marriage of Muslims to non-Muslims.
However, Islam does not prevent a person from becoming Muslim.
10. The Chinese in Malaysia are noted for their eclecticism
and tolerance in religious practice. They practice a
variety of faiths, including Christianity and the Chinese
system of supernatural belief, which is a combination of
Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism and ancestor worship. An
insignificant number of Chinese are Muslims.
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A Chinese is allowed to marry a Malay provided that he becomes
a Muslim. But the conversion to Islam entails physical
sacrifices from the converts, namely circumcision and
prohibition of eating pork which is a favourite Chinese dish.
Moreover, the convert has to adopt a Muslim name. This
virtually means an acceptance of Malay customs over those
of the Chinese in the eyes of other Chinese. The Chinese
who marries a Malay thus faces the threat of ostracism from
his own community.
	
Islam therefore acts as a major barrier
to inter-ethnic marriage as well as cultural and social
integration among the two ethnic groups.
On the question of inter-marriage between 1 4,,ays and
Chinese, most scholars have concluded that the phenomenon
is relatively rare.
One scholar, for example, states that:
As far as is known from the evidence available,
intermarriage between Chinese and Malays in
Malaya has not been frequent 	 The Chinese in
Malaya have at no time been forbidden to convert
to Islam or to marry Malays. Under British
colonial rule no system of residential quarters
for ethnic groups was set up, nor were there
rigid official categories of 'European',
'foreign oriental' and 'Inlander' such as
existed in Indonesia. Theoretically this means
that the situation was more open in Malaya;
despite this intermarriage and assimilation
have not flourished.
(Edmonds, 1968:59)
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Another scholar observes:
There is little intermarriage, because of
the strong barrier of the Muslim religion.
But where this barrier does not exist,
Muslims who wish to conform to Malay custom
and speak the Malay language are usually
accepted as Malays, and intermarry with
them freely.
(Silcock, 1965:180)
Islam, however, is not the only barrier to intermarriage.
Reluctance to intermarry may be .associated with the question
of ethnic group identity.	 One who intermarries fears that
he may lose his ethnic identity or will only gain marginal
status in his group as well as in the spouse f s group.	 This
may in turn lead to f-,i_Lngs of insecurity.
Language differenc7-, acts as a furthor barrier between
the two peoples.
	
It creates communication problems and
hinders the development of personal relationships. More
importantly, however, language differences gives rise to
the problem of language usage and its derivative problem
of medium of instruction in schools. The question of language
use and language instruction thus involves government poli-
cies and assumes its political importance. The debate over
a policy of multi-lingualism versus Malay as the sole official
language has been the main bone of contention between the
two communities and has aroused intense communal feeling
until very recently. 11
11. For a discussion of the language and education issue,
see M. Roff (1967:316-328), Enloe (1968:372-385),
Snider (1970:1070-1080).
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Then there is the difference in values held by the two
peoples. The values emphasized by both communities are in
many instances opposite or incompatible. The typical
Chinese is down-to-earth, materialistic, and places a premium
on the acquisition of wealth either as an end in itself or
as a means to social position. The typical Malay, on the
other hand, places more emphasis on religious values and
spiritual development of the individual. 	 He does not 'chase
money for the sake of the money' (Burridge, 1957:163).
To the Chinese, industriousness is a virtue worth
striving for; the Malay, however, prefers to be 'easy-going'
The Chinese likes pork while to the Malay eating of pork is
regarded as unclean and prohibited by his religion.
To these value differences must be added some racial
stereotypes which are not uncommon inaplural society like
Malaysia.	 Systematic information on racial stereotypes in
Malaysia is lacking, 12 but an analysis of various economic,
political, historical, anthropological and sociological
studies reveals that racial stereotypes are abundant. 13
The Chinese generally believe that the Malays are lazy, stupid,
lack achievement orientation and show a distaste for hard
12. Recently, however, an attempt has been made to document
group stereotypes by means of systematic survey materials.
Cf. Rabushka (1971:709-716).
13. See, for example, the following works: Burridge (1957:
157, 163-4); Silcock (1965:183); Ness (1967:46);
Tjoa (1963:3-15); Wilson (1967:25).
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labour. The Malays, on the other hand, consider the Chinese
to be industrious, intelligent, ambitious but dirty
(ritually) and money-grabbing.
Differences in values and the presence of stereotyped
ideas are likely to lead to ethnic prejudice and cause
friction and delay the process of integration. 14
It is clear from the foregoing that there are constant
sources of conflict that are to be found in the political,
economic and social structures of the plural society.
Differences and contradictions are also present in the cultures
and traditions of the various ethnic groups.
Since Independence Malaya has witnessed a radical change
in the aspirations of both the Chinese and Malay communities,
especially among the younger groups. Modern education has
been an important factor in this development. It is gradually
breaking down the traditional occupational dividing lines
between the two communities.
	
As Kennedy (1945:311) has
rightly suggested, 'eduaction would be dynamite for the rigid
caste systems of colonies'. Young Malays influenced by
education and information media, desire economic power and
aspire to occupations which were previously out of their
bounds, and largely the preserve of the Chinese. One
14. Rabushka, however, suggests that 'stereotypes do not
significantly influence social or political behaviour'.
Cf. Rabushka (1971:716).
30 2
consequence of this is the development of direct conflict and
sometimes fierce competition.
The young Chinese, unlike their fathers, are no longer
interested exclusively in making material advancement.
Increasingly, they demand greater participation in the
government and administration of the country. They want
a 'Malaysian Malaysia' (in contrast to a 'Malay Malaysia')
in which all races enjoy equal treatment and equal rights.
In short, the aspirations of members of both communities
have changed in such a way that they now, as Esman (1972:39)
has aptly si-sgested,
1AL.2easingly aspire to similar goals and make
competing demands on the political system.
ThP original Alliance agreement that provided
for a lough differentiation of roles is
irzreasingly unacceptable to the younger
generation of both races, yet the outlines of
a revised distribution of roles which could
be mutually acceptable has not emerged.
To compound the difficulty, neither community seems
willing to give concessions to the other in matters concerning
its vital interests. The young Chinese, while demanding
greater political power, are reluctant to yield their
economic position which they feel they and their fathers
have achieved through great labour and industriousness; the
young Malays-who demand greater economic power are not
willing to sacrifice Malay special privileges and political
hegemony.	 As a consequence, the potential for conflict
increases (Esman, 1972:39).
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With all this said, it is reasonably safe to conclude
that in Malaysia, due to its plurality, the potential for
conflict has been very great. This is particularly so
after Malaysia achieved its Independence, when with the
departure of the colonial power, which previously acted
as a balancing power, the two communities have to come
face to face.	 In such a conflict-prone society, it takes
only some minor incidents to trigger off communal riots.
This has been proven in Malaysian history. The incidents
in Pangkor and Bukit Mertajam, for example, all b .gan with
a fight between a Chinese and a Malay. A relie—us
celebration provided the occasion for the Singapore riots
in 1964.	 In the Penang riots of 1967, it was the currency
devaluation that sparked off the disturbance. More
recently, the Kuala Lumpur riot was triggered off by the
1969 general election results.	 To this latest event
we will now turn.
3o4
The Kuala Lumpur Riots of 1969 
May 13, 1969 was a tragic day for Malaysia.
	
On that
day communal violence broke out in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia's
capital.	 Initially, the riots were confined to the capital
city and its vicinity.
	
Subsequently, however, they spread
to other states, notably the west coast states of Penang,
Perak, Malacca and Negri Sembilan. 	 Serious rioting, arson
and murder continued for several days before they were
finally brought under control. Two days after the out-
breaks, the government, realizing the gravity of the
situation, declared a Qi-te of Emergency throughout the
nation.	 Parliament wo, suspended and with it the
Constitution. 15 An eight-man National Operations Council
was set up to rule by decree. Malaysia was virtually under
martial law.
Damage to property as a result of the riots was simply
impossible to assess. 	 As for the loss of life, official
sources put the casualty figures at 196 dead, 439 injured,
1,019 reported missing and 9,143 arrested (National Operations
Council, 1969:88-96).	 Of the 196 listed dead, 143 were
Chinese.	 Unofficial estimates, however, put the death
toll much higher. 16
15. Parliament was reinstated in February, 1971.
16. Slimming (1969:47-48) suggests that even a conservative
estimate puts the death figure at over 800.
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Almost everyone was shaken by the unprecedented scale
of the riots.	 Tun Ismail, Minister for Home Affairs, sadly
declared:
Democracy is dead in this country. It
died at the hands of the opposition parties
who triggered off the events leading to
this violence.
(FEER, May 22, 1969:437)
The Prime Minster Tengku Abdul Rahman (1969:7) stated:
The whole nation suffered a profound shock,
shaken to its very core.... May 13th, 1969
was a social and political eruption of the
first magnitude 	
Tun Razak, Director of the National Operations Council
wrote:
May 13; 1969 will go down in our history
as a day of national tragedy. On that
day the very foundation of this Nation
was shaken by racial disturbances whose
violence far surpassed any we had known.
(National Operations Council, 1969:iii).
There are controversial accounts as to why, how, and
by whom the notorious riots were started. 17 What is clear
is that the outbreak originated directly from the post-
election 'victory parades' by opposition parties, pre-
dominantly Chinese, and a scheduled counter-demonstration
by the more extreme elements of the UMNO, the Malay wing of
the Alliance Party.
17. For details see Slimming (1969), National Operations
Council (1969) and Tengku Abdul Rahman (1969).
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The government's initial reaction to the riots was
characteristic: to put the blame on the communists. Later,
however, some government spokesmen shifted away from this
initial position and accused the opposition parties. Still
later, the blame was put on the Chinese secret societies
and communal extremists. 18 In Malaysia, all these terms -
communist, opposition party, secret society and communal
extremist - did not have much difference in meanings.
They all meant Chinese. To point the finger of blame at
these categories of people was as good as blaming the
Chinese and could only evoke resentmPat on the latter.
The root causes of the distures, however, should
not be overlooked. These are to bP found in several
decades of communal suspicion, mistr .:Ist, and discontent; in
economic disparity and jealousy, in conflicting political
claims and in social and cultural diversities - all of which
we have indicated earlier. The tension between the two
peoples, so to speak, had already been there.
	
All it
needed was a spark. The General election and events
immediately preceding and following it provided the spark for
the tragic violence.
18. Tun Ismail accused the opposition parties 'who triggered
off the events leading to this violence'. He later
explained: "Everybody thought that the communists were
responsible for the disturbances. Later we found that
they were as much surprised as we were". See Straits
Times, June 21, 1969. Tengku Abdul Rahman, however, did
not change his initial position, and maintained that the
communists were behind the riots. CF. Tengku Abdul Rahman
(1969:181), NOC (1969:25-27, 77-78) and Straits Times,
May 19 and June 14, 1969.
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The 1969 general election campaign was conducted in a
highly charged atmosphere in which communal issues were
predominant. Almost without exception, every party made
racial appeals in order to gain electoral support. The
Alliance, which had ruled the country since 1955, was espec-
ially under strong attack.	 Its senior partner, the UMNO,
was accused by the PMIP for selling out Malay interests to
the Chinese; the MCA was attacked (by the DAP in particular)
for being unable to fight for Chinese interests such as
multi-lingualism; the MIC came under attack for its
subservient and ineffective role in the Alliance (Snider,
1970:71).
The Alliance, in its counter-attack, branded the pre-
dominantly Chinece DAP as 'anti-Malay' and PMIP as 'anti-
Chinese' and accused the latter of having connections with
the communists near the Thai border (Straits Times, April 15,
1969). The PPP, a Perak based predominantly non-Malay party,
was also branded by the Alliance as a Chinese communal party
attempting to destroy Malay rights.
	
It is significant to
note that the Alliance, while accusing the opposition of
using communal appeal, had done very much the same thing.
A substantial part of the attacks, counter-attacks,
allegations and counter-allegations was essentially centred
around three communally sensitive issues: the education-
language issue, the citizenship issue and the Malay Special
Rights, all of which tended to arouse strong communal feelings
and lead to intense polarization.
308
In the tension-filled atmosphere of heated political
campaigning, an incident of some siginficance occurred.
In Kepong, near Kuala Lumpur, a Chinese Labour Party youth
was killed by the police on May 4, 1969 while painting anti-
election slogans.
	
This incident of unnecessary police
brutality was resented by many Chinese. 19
The funeral took place on May 9, the eve of the polling
day.	 Permission for the funeral procession to be held in
Kuala Lumpur was given by the police who specified that the
procession should follow certain routes.	 However, as things
turned out, an estimated 3,00020 strong processios (mostly
Chinese) filed through the heart of Kuala Lumpur, ignoring
police instruction, chanting communist slogans and waving
communist banners and flags.
The police exercised 'highest restraint' and no attempt
was made to disrupt the procession despite its defiance of
police instruction. What could have turned into an ugly
situation was carefully handled.	 Nevertheless, the incident
may have contributed in generating fears in the Malays and
led to their later over-reaction. The Malays felt that
'if the Chinese can so flaunt their Chineseness in the
nation's capital now, what will happen to us if they do
ever take over the State Government as they threaten' (Reid:
1969:266-7).
19. The police asserted that they shot the youth, Lim Sun Seng
in self-defence. This assertion was derided since the
youth was shot through the head from behind. Cf.
Slimming (1969:16).
20. The NOC estimated that 10,000 people took part in the
procession. The police estimate, according to Slimming
(1969:16-17), was 'never more than 3,000 people'. Also
see NOC (1969:27-28).
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The general election was held on May 10. The results,
as indicated earlier, came as a great surprise, and
'shocked' many Alliance leaders.
	
The Alliance was returned
to power, but with a reduced majority.
	
It only captured
48.4% of the total votes compared to 58% in 1964.	 Three
of the party's ministers were defeated.	 In the State
elections, the party lost Penang (to Gerakan) and Kelantan
(retained by PMIP).
	
In Perak, the Alliance also lost its
overall control.
	
The result in Selangor was a deadlock,
the Alliance and the opposition each securing 14 seats.
The opposition parties, especially the DAP, Gerakan and
PPP, all predominantly 7-inese, had substantial gains.
The DAP won 13 seats, the Gerakan 8 and the PPP 4. What
was more significant about the result, however, was the
increased tendency for the newly-elected members in some
state Assemblies to divide into opposing groups along
communal lines, namely Malay government and non-Malay
opposition. This feature was undoubtedly potentially
dangerous (Reid, 1969:264).
Of the Alliance partners, the MCA suffered the most
severe setback.	 Only 13 out of its 33 candidates were
returned. The shocking defeat prompted its leaders to
decide on May 13 to withdraw from the governemnt. A MCA
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statement read:
The Chinese community have rejected the
Malaysian Chinese Association as their
representatives in the government...
As politicians practising parliamentary
democracy, the MCA must accept this to
be the case.
	
Thus there is no other
course for the MCA than to withdraw
from participation in the government.
(Straits Times, May 14, 1969).
The MCA would 7 the statement added 'remain in the Alliance'
but would not accept any appointment in the Federal Cabinet
or State Executive Councils. This was stunning news to
many.	 For the first time since Malaysia's Independence,
the Chinese community would not be represented in the
government. 21
The MCA's decision, although not directly connected
with the outbreak of the riots, had the effect of increasing
subsequent tension.	 This was particularly true among some
Malay leaders who believed that the MCA had betrayed the
Alliance and was joining the opposition for Chinese power
(Reid, 1969:264).
	
To the Chinese, the MCA decision served
to contribute to the atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty.
Opposition parties were jubilant over their electoral
success and the fact that the Alliance was reduced to a
simple majority in Parliament.
	
Filled with excitement and
21. Later, however, the MCA compromised its original position
to take part in the Emergency Cabinet. Three of its
leaders were appointed Ministers with special functions.
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exuberance, both Gerakan and DAP supporters (mostly non-
Malays) held 'victory parades t on May 11 and 12.	 In the
course of the marches, it was reported that some insults
and obscenities were hurled at the Malay community as a
whole. 22
Meanwhile the UMNO was planning its own massive demon-
stration 'to teach the Chinese a lesson',
	
The demonstra-
tion was to begin from the residence of the Selangor Menteri
Besar, Dato Harun bin Idris (who was also the UMNO state
Chairman) on the evening of May 13.
	
In connection with this,
it was reported that groups of Malay ff were already gathering
in Kampong Bahru on May 11 and 12 ir% order to take part in
the May 13 demonstration.	 Many of these people who arrived
from outlying areas were armed with knives, parang and
spears (Slimming, 1969:26).	 Violence was clearly thought
to be a possibility by these would-be participants.
According to Reid (1969:268), "many of those who marched to
join the rally from outlying areas wore the white headband
of mourning around their songkoks, a symbol which was also
used in 1946 when the Malays were mobilized to fight British
plans to remove the sovereignty of the Malay Sultans".
The UMNO demonstration never took place. The tension
was so high that before the demonstration, a group of
emotional would-be participants from Gombak, on their way
22. According to police and other eye-witnesses, the
demonstration shouted such anti-Malay abusive remarks
(in Malay) as: "Malays go back to their kampong",
"Malays go and die", "This is not a Malay country",
"End of the Malays" and "Sack all Malay policemen".
Cf. NOC (1969:29-35).
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to the Menteri Besar's residence had a clash with the
Chinese and Indians at Setapak (NOC, 1969:44; Tengku A.
Rahman, 1969:94).
	
News of the clash reached the Menteri
Besar's residence where thousands of Malays had already
gathered.	 The crowd soon disintegrated into a rioting
mob killing passing Chinese and burning cars and shop-
houses.	 Within a short while violence broke out in
various parts of the capital. 	 Kuala Lumpur, as the Prime
Minister put it, 'was a city on fire'. 	 (Tengku A. Rahman,
1969:91).
The Aftermatr,
We ha-- earlier noted in chapter 4 that the riots have
politically resulted in the emergence of a 'constrained
democracy' where discussion on certain communally sensitive
issues is constitutionally proscribed. 	 In terms of race
relations, the effect of the riots has been equally far
reaching.	 The riots, to be sure, have tended to polarize
the population on ethnic lines.
	
Each group tends to
retreat to the confines of its communal boundary where fears
and anxieties are shared.	 Inter..-group trust has been
eroded almost to the vanishing point.
Moreover, the alleged partiality shown by the army
which had been called in to maintain law and order was bitterly
resented by the Chinese. 23 The army's action has undermined
23. This was particularly true of the Royal Malay Regiments,
which consisted exclusively of Malays. It was reported
that 'the curfew was rigorously enforced against the
Chinese, while the Malays were allowed to roam the streets
at will'• A number of foreign correspondents saw soldiers
from the Royal Malay Regiment firing into Chinese shop-
houses without any apparent reasons. Malay soldiers were
also biased in favour of the Malays in the distribution
of food and relief supplies. Cf. Slimming (1969:36-37;
49-51); PEER, May 22, 1969, p.438.
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the Chinese faith and confidence in the government's
impartiality and willingness to protect their lives and
properties. Many Chinese realize after the riots that in
times of communal clash, the presence of the military is
not always a guarantee that they would be safe.
The increasingly pro-Malay policies adopted by the
government after the racial riots tend to disillusion and
alienate the Chinese further. 	 Widespread unemployment
and a feeling of being unjustly treated are driving an
increasing number of young Chinese into the arms of secret
societies and the communists.
	
The present gover-iment's
imaginary threat of a communist insurgency may bef:ome real
one day.
As long as MalTsia remains a plural society, and as
long as one community is more equal than the others, communal
tension will remain a feature of the society for a long time.
However, a riot as serious as the 1969 riots is thought to
be unlikely. The reason is not because communal tensions
have abated, but because very few would find a vested interst
in a violent showdown. Moreover, the government is more
vigilant than ever and is aware of the possible international
repercussions in the event of fresh riots.
CHAPTER 7 
THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL UNITY
We have thus far analysed the colonial social structure
in Malaysia, various important aspects of the Chinese
community as well as the relations between Chinese and Malays.
In so doing we have drawn attention to the fact that there
are constant sources of conflict among the two major ethnic
groups in Malaysia - ecu . omically,politically, educationally
and socially.
Given the tremendous amount of diversities and conflict
in the plural society of Malaysia, the question which we
should address ourselves is: what actually binds the
society together?	 Before we attempt to answer this question,
we should first consider briefly whether or not the various
institutions of the Chinese community we have discussed
resist integration or assimilation.
Chinese Community and Integration
At a glance, it would appear that Chinese institutions
and their related values give the community a separatist
character leading to not the elimination, but the perpetua-
tion of race relations problems.	 Indeed, this is the view
of those who expect complete assimilation of the Chinese, in
the sense of losing their Chinese identity. However, if one
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is to look at the Chinese 'problem' 1 more closely and objec-
tively, one would find that the presence of Chinese institu-
tions per se does not necessarily generate conflict or
problems.	 The problems arise largely because there is a
lack of understanding and tolerance between different ethnic
groups and because different ethnic groups have different
aspirations as well as conflicting views of what assimilation
or integration means.
The Malays expect of the Chinese a fundamental change
in the Chinese way of life and true identification with the
political, economic and social interests of the nation.
To the Chinese, true identification with the Malaysian
nation may be possible - as many have already done so.
But to change the Chinese way of life fundamentally to the
extent of losing their Chinese identity is certainly further
than many wish to go or think it necessary to go. After
all, to the Chinese, they can co-exist with any racial group
and the Chinese way of life does not in any way interfere
with this co-existence.
It is in this light that we look at some of the Chinese
institutions. Let us begin with the various Chinese guilds
and associations which are prevalent in all overseas Chinese
communities.	 As we save seen in chapter 1, these guilds
and associations serve various purposes both within the
1. The characterization of the Chinese as a 'problem' is
for convenience only. No derogatory value judgement
is intended.
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Chinese community itself as well as the nation at large.
Within the community itself, the complex of guilds and
associations has enabled the Chinese to live a self-
contained and self-satisfying community life within a
traditional framework (Wan, 1967:87).
	
Outside the community
these associations sometimes serve as the spokesman or
'go-between' between the Chinese on the one hand and the
other ethnic groups on the other.
	
The presence of these
ethnic organizations in a plural society obviously tends
to draw one ethnic group away from another preventing inter-
ethnic interactions.	 Furthermore, laing exclusively Chinese,
very little about these organization- is known to other
ethnic groups. The impression that other ethnic groups
get is that Chinese 'stick together'.
	
Their 'sticking'
together is based not on special interests but on the mere
fact that they are Chinese. This has been a major source
of irritation between the Chinese and other ethnic groups.
It has also led to some amount of racial prejudice and
stereotype.
In the case of Chinese participation or 'domination' in
the economy, many controversies have been raised, one of
which being the question of whether or not the Chinese really
control the economy of Malaysia. This question has been
discussed in chapter 2 in which it was shown that the
Chinese are far from dominating or controlling the Malaysian
ecnnomy. Malaysian economy, contrary to the belief of
many laymen, is still largely in the hands of foreign
capitalists.
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However, what is really important is not whether the
Chinese control the economy.	 The important point is that
most of the Malays - those who occupy the lower socio-
economic stratum in particular - believe this to be true.
And this is all that matters beacuse it is this belief that
often determines their negative attitude towards the Chinese.
Chinese business enterprise, with its informal
organization and familism, often works to exclude Malay
participation.	 In addition, there is a well-founded belief
among the Mc_lays that Chinese traders tend to form a tight
ring, with :ts private channels of communication and intelli-
gence, into which the non-Chinese can hardly break (Hunter,
1966:43-44).	 This belief tends to reinforce their prejudice
and may even fan the economic jealousy already existing
among certain groups.
Politics is another breeding ground for conflict in a
plural society.	 There are several facets of politics which
generate communal tensions between the Chinese and the Malays.
One is the conflicting claims between the two communities
with regards to political power: the Malays insistence to
have a pre-eminent position in the country's government and
administration on the one hand and the Chinese attempt to
secure a bigger share in political authority on the other.
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A second facet is the role played by the Chinese
political parties.
	
Their focus on certain racial issues
arouses communal feelings not only among the Chinese but
also among the Malays.
	
Two racial issues commonly raised
by Chinese political parties are multi-lingualism and the
Malay Special Rights. 	 Both issues arouse emotions and
communal hostility.
	
The Chinese feel that the government
is doing too much for the Malays. They advocate equality
for all citizens irrespective of racial origins.
	
The
Malays, on the other hand, fear that they would be over-
whelmed by the non-Malays if equality is given to them.
Fears are generated in both communities and each -%riews the
other's political parties with suspicion.
Chinese involvement with the clandestine Malaysian
Communist Party is another facet of the communal problems.
Here again, the fact that only a handful of Chinese are
involved in communist activities is not so important.	 The
important point is that the Malays believe that most of the
Chinese are or can be communists or their sympathizers.
This belief, though illogical and unfounded, has nonetheless
played a part in determining the Malay attitude towards the
Chinese.
	
Chinese are believed to be untrustworthy and not
infrequently they are regarded as having some form of connec-
tion with communism or still looking towards mainland China.
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In the political arena, therefore, there are constant
sources of friction.	 As long as the present political
system persists, and as long as communal parties still
appeal to the respective communities, there is no reason to
believe that the sources of friction will diminish, let alone
disappear.	 For this reason, the process of integration will
also be delayed - not by the presence of Chinese political
organizations alone, but equally responsible are the politi-
cal institutions and activities of the Malays.
The one single issue which generates most debates and
controversies, and arcii--s most intense communal feelings
is education which has 	 discussed in detail in chapter 5.
We wish only to emphasi7e here that opinions of the Chinese
and Malays differ in matters regarding education policy and
language. To the Malays, communal harmony and national
unity can better be achieved through a national education
policy with Bahasa Malaysia as the sole medium of instruction.
Thus, the insistence on the part of the Chinese to perpetuate
Chinese schools and language is seen by the Malays as
chauvinistic and contravenes the national education policy.
To the Chinese, the education policy of the Malay-dominated
government which gives top priority to Bahasa Malaysia is
an all-out effort to eliminate Chinese education and language
in Malaysia. Both communities regard each other as chauvin-
istic and interestingly both are determined to defend their
mutually exclusive communal interests. Under such circum-
stances of communal riveary, there is little hope that inte-
gration will occur.
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The various aspects of Chinese institutions and organi-
zations, their political and economic activities, as we have
seen so far, do seem to make the Chinese a self-reliant and
self-contained community. The perpetuation of such a
Chinese identity in the Malaysian plural society has created
many problems.	 In the eyes of the Malays, for instance,
the Chinese are an unassimilable lump because they care too
much about their on culture and institutions. One way to
assimilate them is, according to some racial bigots, to make
them forget the Chinese language and dialects and speak only
Malay.
The Chinese, like any other racial group, love their
culture, institutions and organizations, which they have
buil.; up through years of hardship with little support from
the government. To many of them, their institutions have
all the rights to co-exist with those of the indigenous
people.	 They certainly do not see that their institutions
will in one way or another hinder integration among the
various communities.	 To the accusation that Chinese ethnic
organizations tend to perpetuate Chinese identity and resist
integration, the Chinese would reply by saying that Malay
institutions and organizations could create similar problems.
Here again, each community feels that the other's institutions
are undesirable. There seems to be no end to such conflicting
view points.
	
Little do the two communities realize that
communal institutions and organizations are natural phenomena
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or even permanent features in a plural society which can
be lived with. What is really important and which can
render the conflict less painful is the attitude of give-
and-take and a thorough understanding of each other's
cultures and institutions. 	 In a plural society with
diverse cultures, only accommodation and compromise between
the various groups can make the system viable.
Unifying Factors 
Given the numerous divisive forcc, s in plural societies,
we now return to the very fundamenriAl. question posed earlier,
namely, what actually bind togethcr L:Ite various segments
in the society?	 It is most appropri9.te here to explore
the thesis advanced by M.G. Smith Ic'th regards to the
dynamics of colonial social systems.
	
According to Smith,
plural colonial societies are held together by the political
domination of one cultural segment, usually the metropolitan
power. The withdrawal of colonial power together with its
political institutions which held the society together gives
rise to several possibilities.
In the first place, following the attainment of
political independence, one dominant segment in the society
may succeed the colonial power in wielding political power.
In the second place, there is a danger that the society may
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eventually break up.	 Thirdly, there is the possibility of
the emergence of a neo-colonial situation in which the
continuance of metropolitan economic domination keeps the
various ethnic groups working together in the same
industries. 2
As Rex (1974b:20-21) has rightly indicated, it is almost
impossible only three decades after the beginning of the post-
colonial era to validate or invalidate Smith's thesis that
the withdrawal of the colonial power from colonial societies
would threaten their continued existence.	 Sufficient
historical v.-Lses could be produced both to show that post-
colonial soc±eties are fraught with racial conflict which
appears to be increasing, and that some post-colonial
societies are em-irging as multi-racial nations.
The case of Malaysia is interesting.
	
In the first
place, the Malays who constitute slightly over half of the
total population have taken over political power from the
colonial regime since Independence in 1957. That the
Malays became the successor of political power of the
colonizer was no accident at all. 	 It had been planned by
the British colonial regime.	 Secondly, what we see in
Malaysia today is essentially a social system of capitalist
neo-colonialism in which, as we saw earlier, the bulk of
2. Cf. M.G. Smith (1965), Smith & Kuper, (1969), Rex
(1974a and b).
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the national wealth continues to be controlled by foreign
capitalists.	 Neo-colonialism despite its many undesirable
qualities, serves the latent function of involving workers
of various racial origin in the same industries, binding
them together to some extent.
Thus, in so far as Malaysia is concerned, the
succession of political power by one cultural segment and
the emergence of neo-colonialism seem to be in line with
Smith's thesis.
	
However, Smith's prediction of the eventual
breakup of colonial societies still need time to be validated.
Many colonial plural societies are riven with racial conflict.
Yet none had completely broken up. Malaysia di't plunge
into a national chaos at the time of the comminii:± riots in
1969. A nation-wide state of Emergency was declared and
Parliament was suspended following the riots.
	
With the
suspension of Parliament and certain civil liberties, the
whole nation was virtually placed under martial law.
However, the chaotic conditions of riots and arsons
did not last very long. Within a couple of weeks order
was restored and the security situation was under control
although rumours and tensions still abounded. Within
less than a year, Parliament was reinstated.
The communal riots of 1969 in Malaysia serve to
illustrate two important points. 	 First, democratic poli-
tics is inherently unstable in plural societies given the
salience of communal issues. 3 The second point which is
3. For a systematic account of the patterns of democratic
instability in plural societies, see Rabushka & Shepsle(1971 and 1972).
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related to the first, is that independence in most cases
does not automatically resolve the conflict between the
indigenous people and the immigrant population in plural
societies, and that any bid to capture political power by
the latter may well lead to serious riots or even to their
violent extermination (Rex, 1970a:75).
	
To say this
however is not to show complete agreement with Smith as
regards his thesis of the eventual breakup of plural
societies; it is merely to note the instability of the
plural social systems.
It should be noted, nonetheless, that despite the
tremendous amount of coll:lict in post-colonial plural
societies, there also exist some amount of national unity
and integration.	 Smitn has suggested political institutions
to be the sole binding factor. That the political
institutions play an important role in binding together
the various ethnic segments in Malaysia is a fact few can
dispute. The political institutions that have developed
in Malaysia are in some sense unique.
	 In the first place,
the whole political system is a blending of traditional
Malay political institutions with western democracy.4
As a result of this, many of the elements in the traditional
Malay political system still remain today. These include,
among others, the institutiaaof the Sultanate with its role
4. For a detailed analysis of the indigencts. Malay political
institutions see Gullick (1958).
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in systems of symbolism and status. Under the parliamentary
system, the sultans exercise little real power.	 However,
as in the case of the traditional Malay society, the sultan
still enjoys a position of great dignity and is still
regarded as the symbol of unity in each state.	 The sultan's
role in the system of status looks more like increasing than
decreasing.	 He is still the titular source of rank for
members of the royal family as well as the rakyat ,
 (commoners).
This can be illustrated by the large numbers of people who
are conferred titles every year on the occasion ad' the
sultans' birthdays.
The Malaysian political system is unique in another
sense.	 This refers to the formation of the National Front
government in 1971 which brought together the major parties
in Malaysia at both Federal and State levels. This
coalition has not only facilitated inter-party co-operation
but also reduced the strength of the opposition.	 Opinions
vary as to the reasons behind the coalition.	 Some political
leaders have attributed the formation of the National Front
government to a genuine desire of the parties concerned to
consolidate political stability and national unity. Others
have doubted that coalition politics would ever promote
national unity. They accused the UMNO of the desire towards
the establishment of a one-party state through the elimina-
tion of all opposition parties, either by absorption or
suppression.5
5. This view was expressed by Lim Kit Siang, Secretary-
General of the DAP. Cf. The Democratic Action Party of
Malaysia, "Coalition Politics in Malaysia: The DAP View",
Kuala Lumpur (n.d.)..
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There seem to be some elements of truth in both the
opinions.	 But both are equally difficult to prove or
disprove.	 What does seem to be clear, however, is the
apparent decrease in the amount of politicking after the
coalition.
These two unique features of the Malaysian political
system somehow serve to bind the various segments together.
Earlier, we have in fact drawn attention to the fact that
politics as a process can be very divisive.	 Both of these
observations are true in Malaysia. They are in no way
contradictory.	 Polities has the potential of both dividing
or unifying people, depending on th c. circumstances. It is
for this reason that Smith's thesis f the political
institutions as the sole binding force in plural societies
is untenable.	 Rex, too, takes exception to Smith's view
but for different reasons.
	
According to Rex, in so far
as political domination is the binding factor, it is
very weak. The reason is simply that power begets its
own opposition, and that if that opposition is externally
supported, it cannot be suppressed forever (Rex, 1974a:173).
Apart from political institutions, one very important
factor that serves to maintain unity in plural societies is
the institutions of the economy or the social relations of
production. 6 The Malaysian case is again very unique. To
begin with, various ethnic groups participate in the laissez
6. This point has been repeatedly stressed by Rex (1970a:
58;	 1974a:173).	 •
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faire capitalist economy, even though there is imbalance in
the involvement of ethnic groups in certain sectors of the
economy, such as there are more Chinese than Malays in the
retail trade.	 But the general picture is one of involvemArit
of all ethnic groups in the same type of industries - as
fishermen, rubber tappers, factory workers and many others.
To a large extent, involvement of the ethnic groups in the
economic institutions tend to bind them together. 	 Inte-
gration, for instance, can and does occur in the factories,
on the rubber estates or in the fishing villages.
	
Moreover,
there is increasing co-operation and collaboration at
different l p-rels of economic activities, and this tends to
strengthen .-Ater-ethnic ties.
More jr7)ortantly, the dysjunction between the economic
power of t1-_. Chinese on the one hand, and the political
power of the Malays on the other, functions to maintain
some form of unity. The dysjunction strikes a balance bet-
ween the two communities, so that both have some bargaining
power and none risks to go beyond what it thinks to be the
limit.
We do not, however, claim that the political and
economic institutions are the only unifying forces in
Malaysia.	 In point of fact, both political and economic
institutions have their dysfunctional aspects.
	
The history
of Malaysia has So far shown that the various communities
have often quarrelled over the distribution of political and
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economic power.	 On some occasions conflict was so intense
that it threatened to break up the whole social system.
On others, conflict was avoided as a result of compromises
between the conflicting parties.
There are, to be sure, other forces that contribute to
the maintenance of unity in Malaysia.
	
One such force is
the common experiences and characteristics derived from
membership in the same trade unions, youth clubs and certain
cultural organizations.
	 The struggle for independence,
the creation of Malaysia and the defence against Indonesian
confrontation were also integrative forces which 1-rought
the people together.
	 With this said, it is imp rvrtant to
note some of the deliberate attempts by the government to
foster unity and integration among the people.
	 '_hese
attempts include the establishment of the nationou education
policy, the New Economic Policy, the Rukunegara, the
National Unity Board and the Rukun Tetanpiga.
We have earlier touched on the New Economic Policy with
its possible effects, and the education policy of making
Bahasa Malaysia the sole medium of instruction.
	 We wish
to add that, in the case of the New Economic Policy, which
was incorporated in the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-75, its
long-term effects could be very rewarding and that an
integrated and just society could well be achieved i f the
plans for development are properly implemented. The New
Economic Policy has set itself two main tasks, namely, to
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eradicate poverty irrespective of race and restructure
society.
	 But at the moment it appears that the plan
period now ending has seen the second objective better
fulfilled than the first. There are indications that
massive efforts to assist the Malays have not been matched
by plans to help the non-Malays. This has caused a lot
of resentment among the latter.
Education remains a tricky and sensitive subject in
Malaysia. However, there are signs of non-Malays
accepting - albeit unwillingly among certain sections -
Bahasa Malaysia as the National Language and the sole
medium of instructions .1-1 schools and institutions of higher
learning,	 Increasing numbers of candidates are sitting
for the Bahasa Malaysia exaimnations every year. Even
commercial and business establishments are beginning to
pay more attention to the use of Bahasa Malaysia as a means
of communication. All this certainly means that, in the
near future, Bahasa Malaysia may serve as a common factor
binding the people together.
One aspect of the government's education policy has
been to correct the imbalance in educational advancement
between the Malays and non-Malays, by offering more
opportunities for advancement to the former. One way to
do this, as the government has been doing, is to impose
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quotas for local university entrance in favour of the Malays.
The non-Malays have generally accepted this policy in some-
thing like good faith. The imbalance, they feel, needs to
be rectified if there is to be peace and harmony.	 Chinese
high regard for learning was little deterred by the imposi-
tion of quotas in local universities in favour of the Malays.
As an alternative, many sent their children abroad for
education.
Two recent developments, however, have upset the
Chinese and other non-Malays. One is that private students
who wish to go abroad for further education have to obtain
prior approval and 'sponsorship' from the Malaysian Ministry
of Education.
	
The grant of sponsorship involves some red-
tape and its introduction has been interpreted by the non-
Malays as an attempt to discourage them from going abroad
for further studies.
The second development is the announcement made by the
Minister of Education Dr. Mahathir Mohamad that future
students going abroad might have to be registered. This
announcement was made soon after demonstrations by some
Malaysian students in Australia and New Zealand against the
Prime Minister during his official visits there some time in
1975. 7 Registration is believed to aim at weeding out
what the government regards as 'undesirable' students
especially those who are anti-government.
the reasons behind the
that it was very much
But a leaflet distributed
demanded, among other
political prisoners and
Eastern Economic Review
7. No one is absolutely clear about
demonstrations. One report says
undergraduate love for causes'.
during one of the demonstrations
things, the release of Malaysian
an end to surveillance. Cf. Far
(November 14, 1975:13-14).
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So far the registration proposals have not been implemented.
But the announcement has upset many non-Malays who have looked
abroad as a fair alternative to educate their children. The
worry now is that they may even be deprived of this alternative
which they feel they have worked for (FEER, No. 14, 1975:14).
In an attempt to bring the people closer together after
the shock of the May 13 tragedy, the government issued in 1970
a statement of fundamental national principles, called the
Rukunegara. 8 Since its enunciation, the Rukunegara has been
given something like the status of a national ideology. The
rukunegara Declaration reads as follows:
Our nation, Malaysia, being dedicated to
achieving a greater unity of all her peoples;
to maintaining a democratic way of life; to
creating a just society in which the wealth of
the nation shall be equitably shared; to
ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and
diverse cultural traditions; to building a
progressive society which shall be oriented to
modern science and technology; WE, the peoples,
pledge our united efforts to attain these ends
guided by these principles;
Belief in God
Loyalty to King and Country
Upholding the Constitution
Rule of Law
Good Behaviour and Morality.
The 'ends' as spelt out in the Declaration cannot be disputed
by anyone who is in favour of national harmony and unity. As
can be seen clearly, these ends include almost all that is required
for a modern, progressive society - unity, democracy, justice,
equality, liberality and an emphasis on science and technology.
8. Rukunegara is formed-from two Malay words: Rukun which means
'basic principles' or the five pillars of Islam and negara
which means 'state' or 'nation'. 	 The term is now translated
into English as the National Ideology or the Pillars of the
Nation.
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What can be disputed, however, are the five 'guiding
principles' for attaining these ends.
	
These principles
seem to be nothing more than the obligations of a citizen.
If strictly adhered to, they might produce large numbers of
'good' citizens.	 But to strive for equality and national
unity requires more than merely the five principles. As
we shall see later, what is urgently needed is the removal
of the sources of conflict and a rapidly expanding economy
in which there are ample economic opportunities for all
citizens, irrespective of their racial origin.
Another deliberate attempt to foster unity	 the
setting up of the Ministry of National Unity, now .‘ aown as
the National Unity Board.	 Since its formation in 1969
little has been known about its functions and activities.
No serious research, for example, has so far been carried out
by the Board to look into the problem of national unity. 9
The dialogue sessions organized by the Board from time to
time are highly selective and restricted to a small group
of people only. 10 There is therefore an urgent need for the
9. The Board publishes a half-yearly journal called Negara
whose circulation is very limited.
10. The writer and a few colleagues from the Department of
Anthropology and Sociology, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
once corresponded with the Chairman of the Unity Board
expressing their interest in attending some of the dialogue
sessions.	 There was no positive response from the Board.
The incident gives the writer the impression that the
dialogue sessions are confined to some groups of selected
people only.
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Board to change its present state of affairs, and look more
seriously and systematically into the problems facing the
nation, especially those aspects that affect inter-ethnic
relations.	 For a start, the Board could work closely with
the ins Litutions of higher learning to carry out some
specific research projects.
The latest move by the government to foster community
togetherness is the formation of the Rukun Tetangga
scheme. 11 Under the scheme, multi-racial vigilante corps
have been formed in many big towns to look after the secu-
rity of their local comm-inities. The government has announced
its intention to introud^e the scheme throughout the nation.
Participation in the scheme is compulsory for males aged
between eighteen and f3f.y-fjve.
It is still early to assess how effective this 'compulsory
togetherness' can be in fostering solidarity among the people.
According to press reports, the majority of the vigilantes
take the exercise seriously.
	 Only a small minority is
shirking its duties.12
This is obviously a good sign and a good beginning.
But to ensure the success of the scheme, both in terms of
helping the police in maintaining law and order in the
community and in terms of fostering togetherness among people
11. Rukun Tetangga has been translated into English as
'pillars of the community'. It is sometimes referred
to as 'community self-reliance'.
12. This minority can be divided into three categories:
those who completely ignore the patrol or guard duties;
those who treat it as a game and those who answer the
call of duty very reluctantly. See New Sunday Times,
Feb. 29, 1976.
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of various ethnic origins, more has to be done to improve
the organization of the scheme on a nation-wide scale.
Already there have been complaints that there is a lack of
supervision by the Rukun Tetangga Secretariat of the functions
of the appointed sector committees. 	 This has resulted in
an unequal distribution of duties: some residents heing
given more duties while others have not been called for
duty at all. This shortcoming should be remedied to enable
the residents carry out their duties effectively.
The present skeleton staff in the Rukun Tetangga
Secretariat is insufficient to cope with the vast amount of
organizational and supervisory work involved. The govern-
ment should set up a special department, adequately staffed
with experienced personnel, to look after the scheme.
It is interesting to note a feature common to many of
these deliberate attempts to promote unity. 	 This is that
the Rukunegara, the Rukun Tetangga, the New Economic Policy
and the National Unity Board were all set up after 1969 -
the year of the racial riots.
	 This is an indication of the
government's grave concern over the problem of national
unity. To a certain degree these attempts also reflect
the government's determination to build a truly united
nation.	 There is little doubt about that. The government,
however, has obviously overlooked two important things. One
is that some of these measures, forinstance, policies with
regards to economic and educational opportunities, are
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blatantly in favour of one particular community, namely, the
Malays.
	
This can only evoke resentment from other groups.
Indeed, there are indications that many young Chinese and
Indians have already been alienated by such discriminatory
policies.
The second point is that many remedial measures fail
to take into account the real sources of conflict between
the Malays and the non-Malays - sources that we have discus-
sed in the preceding chapter.
	
A case in point is the
Rukunegara. It is difficult to see how the 'guiding
principles' as stipulated can contrilute to a solution of
the nation's political and economic rsroblems, let alone the
problem of unity.
As there are many sources of conflict in Malaysia, so
there are many facets of the problems of unity. What lies
at the root of the tensions seems to be economic competition
and jealousies between groups. We have already noted the
unequal position between the Malays and Chinese in terms of
economic and political power. From our analysis it can
also be safely said that neither community is contented with
its own position as a result of rising expectations. Yet
there is a balance of power between the two groups, in the
sense that one has a measure of economic power and another
political power.
	
Some amount of co-operation and
compromises does exist between the two communities in order
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to prevent the whole social system from disintegrating.
This situation very much resembles what Rex (1961:127-9)
has called a 'truce situation'. 	 Rex (1961:129) has drawn
attention to the precarious nature of the truce situation:
Thus for any individual the truce situation
continually poses value-conflicts. He must
on the one hand co-operate with the other
side and on the other he must be prepared
to participate in activities which are
directed against them.	 On a psychological
level he finds that his attitudes towards them
are ambivalent.
Thus, according to Rex, the truce situation could only
become the basis of a new social order in 'exceptionally
favourable -onditions l .	 Rex does not however specify what
these 'exceptionally favourable conditions' are. 	 In so
far as Malaysia is concerned, where conlfict is more obvious
than consensus, it is almost impossible to find such
favourable circumstances for the development of a new unitary
social order.	 Social and cultural pluralism is likely to
persist for a considerable period of time.
Since economic competition and jealousies are central
to the problems in Malaysia, part of the solution must also
lie in economic development. What is required, therefore,
is an economy that is rapidly expanding, in which there are
sufficient opportunities for all members of society. 	 In
other words, efforts should be concentrated on enlarging the
economic cake (to use a local cliche), so that everyone has
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a fair share in it.	 As Raymond Smith (1962:143) has
rightly put it:
It would be ideal if the rapidity of economic
development opened up so many opportunities
that the jealousies and fears based on race
assumed an insignificant role.	 If this
pace of economic development is not initiated
and maintained, then the danger of racial
conflict is increased.
Apart from rapid economic development, there is also an
urgent need for the conflicting groups, the Malays and
Chinese, to change their attitudes towards each other and
seek compromises.	 Otherwise the future for Mala;sia may
not be too encouraging. To quote Rupert Emerson;
The Malays must modify their sense that
they are the sole rightful inhabitants c' the
country as the Chinese must be prepared to
share their economic predominance. 	 If
the Malays resort to political power to
wrest economic control from the Chinese,
and the Chinese wield their economic power
to extort political concessions from the
Malays, then there is good reason to
think that disaster lies ahead.
(King, 1957:ix)
In an attempt to solve the racial problems in Malaysia,
it may be worthwhile for us to look for solutions in other
plural societies. In this connecton, the Dutch example
is illuminating and may well be pondered in Malaysia
(Bagley, 1973 and Rex, 1973b:313-4).
Dutch society is unique because of its deliberate
plural organizations. The whole society is divided into
four blocs, or verzuilin (pillars) as the Dutch call them.
These four blocs or pillars are Catholic, Protestant (which
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is divided into two, namely Dutch Reformed and Re-Reformed,
both having Calvinist origins) and secular (or Humanist).
Each of these blocs has set up its own institutions and
organizations encompassing almost every sphere of life.
Schools and universities, mass media, trade unions, health
and welfare agencies, and even sports associations are
organized on a bloc or religious basis. The whole nation,
in short, is deeply divided by religious differences
(Bagley, 1973:2-4).
Given this extreme segmentation of almost every aspect
of Dutch life, one would expect the society to be riven with
conflict.	 But this hcn. not occurred.	 In fact the opposite
is the case.	 Some die of consensus exists in the society
as a whole and relatior between the various blocs have so
far been harmonious. This is possible, according to Bagley,
because Dutch people adhere to a number of 'deeply
institutionalized beliefs and modes of behaviour'. There
are, first of all, the maintenance of the existing system
with no major attempt at proselytisation between the blocs;
secondly, the cultivation of a sense of nationalism, with
the monarch, as the symbol of unity; thirdly, elite
negotiations on a secret diplomatic basis on matters concer-
ning inter-bloc relations; fourthly, proportional electoral
representation; and finally, relative equality of access
to wealth, means of production, education, housing, and other
social services.	 These are the main conditions, says Bagley,
that tend to minimize conflict between members of different
blocs (Bagley, 1973:1619; Rex, 1973b:313).
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In essence, what the Dutch are doing is mutual accommodation
among the various blocs. 	 It is this mutual accommodation
that resulted in the institutionalisation of separatism
between blocs with different interests. 	 Accommodation
also serves to maintain a satisfactory equilibrium between
the various blocs in the society, by emphasizing the right
to a separate cultural existence of different blocs and
encouraging elite and diplomatic negotiations on the basis
of equality.
What lessons, then, can Malaysia learn from the Dutch
example? To begin with, Malaysia may do well in underlying
accommodation as the key process in tackling its racial
problems. This is by no means to say that accommodation
does not exist between the various groups in Malaysia.
Rather, given Malaysia's high degree of plurality, the
amount of accommodation should be increased so as to cover
all spheres of life - political, economic, social, cultural
and educational.	 Furthermore, equality, not inequality,
should form the basis of accommodation and relations between
groups. This would imply an amendment in the Malaysian
Constitution, especially with regards to Article 153
which grants special privileges to the Malays. This is not
likely to happen in the near future. For one thing, the
Malays could always argue that parity has not been achieved
(the purpose of according the Malays special privileges is
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to enable them to compete with the more progressive races).
For another, a system of preferential treatment has created
strong vested interests and it would not be easy to discard
it even when the reason for its existence ceases.	 More
importantly, the Conference of Rulers has the power to
veto any attempt to abolish the special privileges (Hoang-
Thio, 1964:12).
To the extent that Malay special privileges are not
abolished, they would remain a major source of irritation
between Malays and Chinese. What the policy-makers could
do is to accord preferential treatmert to all persons in
the lower socio-economic strata, irrespective of racial
origins. This would not only benefit the bulk of the
Malays (since they are in the main i q Jrer), thus achieving
the avowed purpose of discriminating in their favour, but
also avoid offending the sensitivities of other races.
Preferential treatment based on economic rather than racial
criteria would also be more equitable since it would benefit
those non-Malays who occupy similar socio-economic strata
(Hoang-Thio, 1964:12).
The unequal power relationships among the three major
ethnic groups w.ould have to be rectified in order to build
a stable and just society. This would mean a radical
change in the power structure of the country involving,
among other things, the reshuffling of the Cabinet to include
more non-Malays as Ministers and deputy Ministers, the re-
organization of the Malay dominated armed forces, and a new
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constituency delimination to avoid gerrymandering in favour
of one particular ethnic group. 	 All these are by no means
easy to come by.	 A change in the power structure based
on equality among races would inevitably involve an increase
on the part of non-Malays and a decrease on the part of the
Malays in terms of power. 13 This may never be acceptable
to the Malays.	 The majority of them still regard themselves
as the sole rightful inhabitants of the country and hence
they should occupy a predominant position in the administra-
tion and government of the country. There are also other
Malays who strongly feel that they should retain their
political p.i.dominance to avoid being 'swamped' by the over-
whelming Ch :se economic power.
Whatevem the attitudes and conceptions of each ethnic
group may be towards each other, it is important to realize
that the Chinese and Indians are here in Malaysia to stay.
They have formed a permanent and important component in the
Malaysian plural society.
	
Even with local nationality, these
non-Malays may from time to time exhibit their strong
sentimental ties to their motherland. But it is a permanent
feature that can be lived with. Any forms of oppression or
discrimination based on racial criteria are not likely to
bring any good to the nation in the long run. 	 Social harmony
and integration which are so necessary for a united nation is
wanting in Malaysia, as in many other plural societies. This
can only be achieved through accommodation between the various
groups.
	
Forced assimilation could only lead to chaos.
13. Power is here regarded as a zero-sum concept: the more
one group has, the less is available to the other.
CHAPTER 8 
TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF MALAYSIA: 
Some Theoretical Considerations 
By using the phrase 'Sociology of Malaysia' it is by
no means to imply that Malaysia needs a special brand of
sociology.	 Rather, it is suggested here that Malaysia,
because of its plurality and rapid rate of change,
challenges much of the a)nventional theoretical models and
calls for a more adequate approach.
Two sets of problems will be dealt with in turn:
first, the inadequacy of some Western conventional theoretical
models, and second, the plural society theory and its
relevance in Malaysia.
Inadequacy of Conventional Theoretical Models.
From the outset, it should be noted that most attempts
of theoretical constructons in race relations have been
based upon black-white relationships in the United States
or Britain.	 These theoretical constructions might be
useful in Western societies. However, when applied
uncritically to Malaysia or other Southeast Asian nations,
they are either unilluminating or completely invalid.
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Let us begin with one of the earliest attempts at formu-
lating a race relations theory, namely Robert Park's race
relations cycle.	 According to Park (1950:150), contact
between groups is followed by competition, then by accommoda-
tion, and eventually by assimilation and amalgamation.
One virtue of Park's scheme is that it was based on the
study of interaction and it related its principal categories to
features of collective life - an attempt which was particularly
notable in his time (Banton, 1967:305). 	 There might be some
cases in the history of human societies that approximated
Park's scheme.	 But the scheme has it limited utility when
applied to such plural societies as Nalaysia.	 First, like
many such cyclical theories, it is simplistic and concerns
itself only with the racial situation in a country of immigra-
tion and takes little account of the wider institutional and
political context within which race relations occur or of the
characteristics of the interacting groups (Banton, 1967:76).
Secondly, the theory is weak in so far as it points assimi-
lation as an inevitable outcome.
	
After almost two decades of
independence, there is still little sign of assimilation in
Malaysia. Judging from the reality that Chinese still remain
Chinese to all intents and purposes, it is doubtful whether
assimilation or amalgamation would ever occur. What is more
likely is that cultural and social pluralism may remain
Malaysia's destiny for a long time to come.
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Another American attempt at a theory of race relations
was Warner's theory of colour-caste (Warner, 1936:234-7)
which has been mentioned in an earlier chapter. This
theory still remains prominent to the present day even though
it has been strongly criticised by some sociologists like
Oliver Cox. 1 According to Warner, American society is
divided into two castes, namely the whites and the Negroes,
by a caste barrier. 	 Within each of these colour-castes
there are permeable classes.
	
In other words, American
society includes both caste and class divisions.
Warner's contention that whites and negroes in the
United Stat-3 are separated by an impermeable 'caste-line',
and that this line only tilts but never disappears remains
largely trLe in the United States. His theory has also
the virtue of drawing one's attention to the fact that race
relations in the United States cannot be fully explained in
terms of normal stratification models (Rex, 1970a:15).
Despite its usefulness in America, the model loses its
explanatory power when imported to the plural society in
Malaysia. In the first place, race relations in Malaysia
are essentially yellow-brown relations, in contrast with
those between blacks and whites in America. The main
difference between yellow-brown relations and black-white
1. Cox (1959) argues that the Hindu caste system is a
unique historical phenomenon and that the term 'caste'
should not be used loosely in situations other than India.
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relations is that the former is based more on cultural
distinctions while the latter on physical differences.
In the second place, there has never been any so-cal]ed
'caste-line' that separates the Malays and Chinese in Malaysia. 2
A third difference is that whereas the negroes in America
are a numerical minority accounting for only ten per cent of
the total population, in Malaysia the Chinese are a signifi-
cant minority, accounting for more than one-third of the
total population.	 This numerical strength, together with
their relatively powerful economic position, makes the
position of the Chinese unique and completely different
from that of the American negroes.
Another approach which is popular among studPnts or
scholars of race relations derives from the Marx 4 -t or class
perspective.
	
The Negro sociologist, Oliver Cox (1959), for
instance, looks at the American race relations in terms of
this perspective.	 In objecting Warner's theory of colour-
caste, Cox argued that race relations in America were essentially
those of political class relations, where Negroes as an under-
class were to a degree especially exploited within a capita-
list system of social relations of production.
2. It could however be argued that some form of 'caste-
like' divisions existed between the white rulers and
the colonized people during the colonial period.
346
This type of Marxist approach has also been applied to
analyse the problem of communalism in Malaysia. Rahman
Embong, a young Marxist sociologist, has remarked that 'class
relations are the basic relations, and communal relations,
essentially, are subordinated to class relations', and that
1 (communalism) is being used as an ideology as well as a
strategy of action by the ruling classes to keep the
masses divided and to maintain the present neo-colonial
system intact' (Rahman Embong, 1974:66 & 68).	 This position
is essentially similar to that of the vulgar Marxists, who,
in the modern Western context, would look upon racism as a
device by the capitalist class to divide the working class
into antagonistic segmeni-s for better control.
There is certainly some truth in the Marxist assertion,
especially its emphasis on the importance of the economic
variable.	 However, just as the theory cannot convincingly
account for the divisions between white and negro workers in
the United States, Britain and.South Africa, so it also fails
to explain the antagonism between Chinese and Malay workers
satisfactorily. Nor can the theory account for the identifi-
cation of race with economic functions in Malaysia.
It is also questionnable that class conflict has always
been the determining factor in race relations, as some
Marxists have asserted. 	 Class conflict may feature more
prominently than racial differences in certain race relations
situations.
	
Yet this is certainly not true in the case of
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Malaysia.
	 Malaysia is not a class society in the true
Marxist sense.
	 It is still at an early stage of industrial
development and class consciousness and class antagonisms
are conspicuously lacking.
	 Everywhere, racial bonds seem
to be stronger than class affiliations.
Like most other plural societies, racial conflict in
Malaysia is more akin to rebellion than revolution.
	
This
means that the object of the conflict is not so much to
change the system of domination in the Marxist sense of
revolution but to reverse the relationship of domination
between the conflicting groups.
	 As Lockwood (1970:64)
has put it:
By contrast with class revolution conflict
in plural society, however violent, is not
first and foremost directed at an alteration
in the structure of power and deference but
rather at the usurpation of power and defer-
ence by one section of the community to the
disadvantage of the other.
It is for this reason, added Lockwood (1970:64-65)
that
revolutionary goals are unlikely to emerge from
the antagonisms of groups in plural societies
unless ethnic and racial divisions happen to
coincide with lines of economic and other
power relationships. Yet when this coincidence
obtains, it by no means always follows that
the equation of race or ethnicity with class
position leads to forms of conflict in which
the latter element predominates over the
former. And where this coincidence is lacking,
the racial or ethnic identification usually
overrides the consciousness of a class
position.
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This situation is largely true in Malaysia.	 The
consciousness of the conflict between groups is in terms of
ethnicity rather than class, and the object of the struggle
and communal bargaining is not so much to change the system
of domination as such, but rather to alter the relationship
of domination, namely which group should get what, and how
much.
	
In the National Front Government for example, the
central question is 'which component party should get how
many seats'. In economy, the emphasis is to redistribute
the national wealth more equitably between the groups. In
educational opportunities, there is the imposition of quotas
based on ethnicity.
	
Clearly ethnicity plays a far more
important role than other critericL.
Under such circumstances, the i.ure intense the conflict
between the Malays and Chinese becomes, the more likely that
solidarity of each ethnic group will become focused on the
symbol and consciousness of ethnicity. 	 To the extent that
this is so, the weaker will be class consciousness between
ethnic groups, and class distinctions within each group.
Furthermore, events of recent years have shown that
non-economic factors such as the educational policy
(particularly with regards to the language issue) can cause
as much cleavages between Malays and Chinese as the differen-
tial relationships to the means of production in Western
societies, and which cannot be fully dealt with in Marxist
terms.3
3. See, for example M. Roff (1967:316-328) and Haas (1967).
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It remains now for us to consider the usefulness of
normal stratification models, more specifically functionalism.
The functionalist approach has been much debated in sociology
and it is not our intention here to enter these debates.
What we are concerned here is to examine its relevance in
plural societies particularly in Malaysia.
In its more recent and sophisticated form, functinalism
has postulated among other things that societies consist of
inter-related parts and that causation is multiple and
reciprocal; hence societies must be looked at holistically
(van den Ber-i-he, 1967b:295).
	
These postulates seem to be
reasonably v-eful in drawing our attention to the inter-
relations and inter-dependence of the various parts that
make up a f-pciety.	 Nevertheless, most functionalists have
tended to overstress inter-relationships between parts, and
conversely, to underrate the degree of 'compartmentalization'
that is possible in a society (van den Berghe, 1967b:302).
One needs only to look closely at some plural societies
to realize that different elements or parts of a society
can co-exist without being significantly complementary and
interdependent.	 In Indonesia, for instance, Boeke (1953)
has observed the existence of a dual economy, namely, the co-
existence of a capitalist and a pre-capitalist economy, side
by side, and yet separately.
	
In Malaysia, we have earlier
observed the functioning of different types of schools -
Malay, Chinese, English and Tamil - side by side and yet
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independently of each other.	 These examples show that
social systems do not necessarily consist of complementary
and functinnally related parts as the functionalists have
claimed.	 On the contrary, social systems can,and do, as
in the case of many plural societies, consist of non-
complementary, functionally unrelated and structurally
discrete segments.
A very important assumption of the functionalist approach
is value consensus as a pre-requisite to the existence of a
social system (as Parsons (1967:5, 471-5) asserts).	 This
position has been criticised to be untenable (van den Berghe,
1967b:296).	 Malaysia, like many other plural societies, is
characterized by heterogeneity, dissensus and
Each ethnic group has its own language, religion, and its
own customs and ways of life. There is a lack -f what
Furnivall (1948:306) called 'social 	 Furthermore,
members of the various ethnic groups share no common system
of values.	 Yet, despite the conspicuous lack of value
consensus, the society has so far managed to hang together.
This raises the fundamental question of the relationShip
between consensus and integration.	 Consensus may be an
important and sufficient basis of social integration.	 But
it is by no means a necessary condition. 	 In the absense of
a value consensus, as in Malaysia, there are other alternative
bases of social integration. As we have seen in the previous
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chapter, one such basis is political coercion or domination
by a cultural segment. But we have also indicated the
instability of political domination as a basis of inte-
gration.	 Hence we suggested also the institutions of the
economy or the social relations of productinn as another
basis.
	
We wish to add that when these two bases are
combined, they are likely to be quite effective as alterna-
tives to consensus.
The case of South Africa offers a good illustration.
The dominant white minority not only monopolizes the political
apparatus, but also controls key economic resources. The
net effect is that the non-whites are rendered politically
impotent and economicali, dependent on the whites, so that,
in the words of van der Ilerghe (1967a:139), 'tyranny is
difficult to overthrows_
The relative lack of a common value system in plural
societies clearly indicates the inadequacy of the functionalist
approach or stratification theory. 	 But this is not to say
that it has no validity in other situations. 	 At least in
the case of Malaysia, the notion of a stratifiction system
is useful in analysing each constituent segment of the society,
such as we have done for the Chinese community.
The above remarks suffice to indicate the failure of
the various attempts to reduce race relations theory to the
position of being a particular case of stratification theory.
Race is not simply a special case of stratification as
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claimed by sociologists like van den Berghe (1967a:21-25)
or Runciman (1972:497-509).	 This view is taken by British
sociologists such as Rex (1970a and 1970b:35-55) and Lockwood
(1970:57-72) who have argued that race relations present a
distinctive type of sociological problem which cannot be
wholly dealt with in class and stratification terms. 	 As
Rex (1970b:37) has correctly put it, there are aspects of
race relations situations such as ascriptive role allocations
and stereotyping according to observable characteristics
which are not satisfactorily explained even by a flexible use
of stratification theory.	 And in Malaysia, the salience of
ethnicity and the strong ethnocentrism that exists within
Pach ethnic group do seem to add some new dimensions to race
relations situations.
The Plural Society Theory
Let us now turn to the second major problem of this
chapter, namely, the theory of the plural society. 	 The
plural society concept was first formulated by J.S. Furnivall
(1939 & 1948) on the basis of his research in Burma and
Indonesia. The concept referred to societies (particularly
those in the tropical region under colonial domination) with
sharp cleavages between different population groups brought
together within the same political unit. 	 In the passage
quoted earlier (see above, p.30), the plural society according
to Furnivall consists of a medley of peoples with diverse
cultures and that there is little contact between the various
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groups except in buying and selling. Furnivall further
notes that in all societies conflict occurs along economic
boundaries but in a plural society racial and ethnic differ-
ences coincide with these divisions, so that tension and
instability are morelikely to take place.
	
As Furnivall
(1948:311) himself put it:
Everywhere, in all forms of society, the
working of economic forces makes for
tension between groups with competing or
conflicting interests; between town and
country, industry and agriculture, capital
and labour. In a homogeneous society the
tension is alleviated by their common
citizenship, but in a plural society there
is a corresponding cleavage along racial
lines. The foreign elements live in the
towns, the native in rurai areas; commerce
and industry are in foreigp nands and the
natives are mainly occupi.:a in agriculture;
foreign capital employs native labour or
imported coolies.
Before we go on to examine the relevance of Furnivall's
theory, it should be noted that however disjunctive between
the various groups may be in the plural society, there are
nevertheless three types of relationships that bind the
society together.
	
Furnivall speaks of 'religion, culture
and language, ideas and ways' of the various groups, and
this apparently refers to normative ties. 	 He also refers
to the 'same political unit' thus recognizing coercive ties.
Finally he speaks of individuals meeting 'in the market place,
in buying and selling' and 'a division of labour along racial
lines'.	 This is an apparent recognition of utilitarian and
economic bonds (Rex, 1970a:20).
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As a model deriving from research on two major southeast
Asian societies, it would seem that Furnivall's theory is
more appropriate than some of the models we have examined
earlier for the analysis of race relations in Malaysia.
Since Furnivall wrote, the concept of the plural society has
been widely used to refer to the Malaysian society. 4
 More
importantly, the dominant features of Furnivall's plural
society which include cultural heterogeneity, residential
separation, occupational specialization by race, lack of
social contact and one politically dominant group are all
exhibited by Malaysia (Rabushka, 1973:14-15, 19-27).
That Malays i -t consists of various ethnic groups with diverse
cultures ur the same political unit fits particularly well
Furnivall's description.
Furni, -,al l s theory, however, is by no means without
flaws.	 In the first place, the notion of the plural society,
as pointed out by Morris (1957:125), tempts us to focus our
attention on cultural and racial appearances and in so doing
overlook the underlying structural uniformities. Malaysia
has exhibited important cultural and racial divisions through
most of its modern history, but these divisions had not
created cleavages running the length and breadth of the
country. The different ideals and aspirations of the various
ethnic groups may be more disintegrative than integrative;
4. See, for example, Freedman (1960:158-168), Tregonning
(1962:420-428), Rabushka (1973), Ratnam (1961:1-10).
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but there has not been a framework for a complete alignment
of ethnic forces. There are other non-ethnic cleavages in
the society (Freedman, 1960:168).
Related to the above is the fact that the use of the
term 'plural' focuses attention on the diversities apparent
in racially or ethnically mixed societies thus ignoring the
varied and numerous bonds which link members of different
sections either individually or as groups. 	 At the same time
the theory seems to exaggerate the unity of these sections
and fails to take into account their internal divisions
(Morris, 1957:125; Smith, 1969b:421).
The plural society theory has been widely ai-cussed and
analysed since Furnivall's work was published.	 he most
extensive analysis, however, is that of M.G. Smi'h. 5	In
the tradition of Furnivall, Smith too sees plural societies
as characterized by cultural diversity, social cleavage and
political domination by a cultural segment.
For Smith, institutions play a very significant role
in a social structure.	 It is the isntitutiom which deter-
mine what category a society belongs. Thus a society whose
members all share a single set of institutions is culturally
and socially homogeneous. A society having one basic
5. Cf. Smith (1965). Other scholars who have analysed the
concept include: Rex (1959:114-124), Lockwood (1970),
van den Berghe (1967a). See also Race, vol.12, no.49
1971 and Kuper and Smith, (eds.) (1969).
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institutional system and a number of institutional alterna-
tives and specialities is culturally and socially hetero-
geneous. A plural society is one in which there is a
formal diversity in the basic system of compulsory institu-
tions (such as kinship, education, religion, property and
economy) (Smith, 1965:8,2 & 88).	 A further defining chara-
cteristic which Smith insists is that in a plural society
the political domination is exercised by a culturally distinct
numerical minority.
	
Obviously this definition would
include nearly all colonial societies but, interestingly/
it would exclude 'some newly-independent post-colonial
societies.
Comparing the apnr-c-ches of Furnivall and Smith, there
seems to be a basic agreement on the political form of the
plural society, namely, domination by a cultural minority.
Furthernore, both Furnivall and Smith emphasize cultural
diversity and social cleavage as characteristics of the plural
society. For Furnivall, both political domination by a
cultural minority and cultural diversity are matters of
historical fact resulting from Western colonialism. 	 Smith,
however, organizes these characteristics within a different
theoretical framework. He regards them as the necessary and
sufficient conditions of pluralism (Kuper, 1969:13).
Main differences between the two models are: first,
in the type of societies conceived as plural.	 Furnivall is
mainly concerned with colonial societies in the tropics under
the impact of western capitalism.
	
Smith includes societies
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other than plural ones, such as those originating from
• conquest, migration and other forces.	 Second there is
also a difference in their approach to causal factors.
Furnivall emphasizes the role of colonialism and capitalism
in the formation of the plural society and cultural diver-
sity is the context within which the primacy of economic
forces leads to the disintegration of the common will and
the transformation of groups into mass aggregates.
	
Smith,
however, attributes causal signTicance to cutlural incompa-
tibility or wide cultural differences (Kuper, 1969:14).
A major difficulty in Smith's formulations, as we have
seen in the preceding chapter, is the problem of why colonial
societies do not break up after independence.
	
Smith has
insisted on the importance of political domination as the
binding factor and argued that the withdrawal of the colonial
power from colonial territories would eventually threaten
the latter l s existence.	 This may be what happens in some
cases, but what Smith overlooks is the fact that there are
also other non-political institutions that contribute to
the maintenance of the society.
Smith has been accused of leaning too heavily on simple
cultural anthropology and of not making 'any careful study of
the relations of the market place which occupied a central
place in Furnivall's work. Neither does he consider what
Malinowski (1945) refers to as the 'third column' institutions
which arise within the process of culture contact.
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Smith's formulations, like many other plural society
theories, also suffer the danger of being oversimple. 	 As
Malcolm Cross has pointed out, the plural society theory
describes a society 'in terms of essentially one category or
sets of categories', namely, those related to 'cultural
variation expressed in terms of institutional difference and
ethnic difference'.	 There is no doubt that ethnic or
racial divisions are of great importance in plural societies,
but they are not the only divisions in the formation of
groups.	 There are, for instance, class distinctions, divisions
between those who wield political pow-1r and those who do not,
and between those who occupy prestigc-)us positions and those
who do not. All of these non-ethnic divisions are seldom
taken into consideration by the pluiai society theorists
(Cross, 1971:484).
Another scholar whose idea on the plural society deserves
a brief discussion here is van den Berghe. For van den
Berghe (1967a:34) societies are plural insofar as 'they are
segmented into corporate groups that frequently, although not
necessarily, have different cultures or subcultures and inso-
far as their social structure is compartmentalized into
analogous, parallel, non-complementary, but distinguishable
sets of institutions.
	 The two defining characteristics of
pluralism are therefore cleavage between corporate groups
and institutional duplication.	 It is these two criteria,
according to van den Berghe, that distinguish plural soceities
from other types of societies, including those characterized
by Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity.
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van den Berghe (1967a:35) outlines some additional
characteristics of pluralism such as a lack of value consensus,
cultural heterogeneity, presence of conflict, relative
autonomy between the different segments of the society,
importance of political coercion and economic interdependence
as alternative bases of social integration and political
domination by one corporate group.
For van den Berghe (1969:68) pluralism should be
regarded as a variable. 	 As he explains:
I prefer to regard pluralism as a variable,
ard to include cases of stratification
bed on I race l caste estate or class
instances of pluralism, even though
constituent groups share the same
general culture.
Clearly, van den Berghe l s usage of the concept of
pluralism is more general and inclusive than, but broadly
congruent with, that of Smith.
Pluralism, says van den Berghe, should also be regarded
as a question of degree.	 Thus, some societies, like South
Africa, which consists of four major racial castes with
diverse cultural traditions are more pluralistic than such
societies as the United States which comprise only two major
races sharing more or less the same European culture.
van den Berghe (1967a:136-144) also suggests that the
analysis of plural societies should be tackled at four main
levels - groups, institutions, values and individuals.
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These four levels of analysis would bring out the main
dimensions of pluralism in a society.
	
But this approach
has its virtue beyond the confines of plural societies.
It can also be applied fruitfully to other non-plural socie-
ties, since all societies consist of groups, institutions,
values and individuals.
van den Berghe has performed a good service in attemp-
ting to draw up a scheme in regards to the major dimensions
of pluralism at the four levels of analysis (van den Berghe,
1967a:142-3).	 But he is quick to point out that the attempt
to determine how pluralistic a society is is not an end in
itself. He himself recognizes the implicit suggestion in
the scheme that pluralism should always be re.cd-d as a set
of independent variables that help us to underst-3-d the
various fundamental sociological questions such 	 the origin
of group conflict, bases of social integration, the distri-
bution and exercise of political power, and the dynamics of
culture change and assimilation. He is confident that
the analysis of pluralism is a somewhat new
vantage point from which to approach the
comparative study of whole societies and
more specifically a conceptual framework for
the understanding of complex, heterogeneous
societies.
(van den Berghe, 1967a:141)
Despite the various criticisms and objections, the
plural society theory has its inestimable merit. 	 This is
that it is one of the few attempts to explicitly imorporate
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racial and ethnic divisions within an overall conceptual
framework.	 It is a conflict theory in that it attempts to
account for dissensus and divisions between ethnic groups in
plural colonial societies which cannot be fully accounted
for in terms of the conventional sociological concepts and
categories.
The importance of the theory of the plural society has
been aptly summed up by Rex (1959:124):
The study of plural societies is important
for sociology generally because the explicit
recognition that they are plural draws
attention to till fact that social systems do
exist in whirb -onflict is more obvious than
consensus.	 T1,- model of the plural society,
-when its work..,,s are more fully understood,
is one which is just as essential to the
sociologist as is, say, Parsons' model of an
integrated social system.
Clearly, as a conceptual framework, the plural society
theory has its usefulness in the race relations situation in
Malaysia - a situation no longer explicable in terms of the
functionalist approach which has stressed so much on consen-
sus, harmony, stability and integration.	 Malaysian society
is characterized by conflict, coercion, change and instability.
Hence, only a conflict model or society can best explain the
society in general and race relations in particular.
This brings us to the problem of a suitable analytical
framework in terms of which the Malaysian plural society can
be fruitfully analysed. Once again, van den Berghe's
framework is highly relevant. Race relations, van den Berghe
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(1967a:148-9) maintains, must be studied historically,
holistically and cross-culturally.	 Lack of a historical
perspective is a major problem in the study of race rela-
tions in Malaysia. This is by no means to imply that race
relations scholars are unaware of basic historical facts -
far from it.	 Morrison, Carnell, Burridge, Silcock, Ratnam
and Rabushka l 6 to mention just a few, were all aware of
Malaysian history in their writings.	 Rather, they have
failed to discuss the 'evolutionary dynamics' of Malaysian
race relations through reasons known only to themselves.
None of them, for example, had analysed British colonial
domination and its implications for race relations. 	 Every
racial situation has a history.	 Thus, to emphasize the
historical dimension of race relations would enable us to
understand the present situation better. 	 Furthermore, sime
racial conflict is closely related to colonialism, there is
also an urgent need to examine colonialism in great detail,
along lines suggested by Rex (1970a), for instance, before
we try to understand race relations problems in Malaysia.
To study race relations holistically is to study it
macro-sociologically, that is, in the context of the total
society in which race relations take place. To put it
another way, race relations should be related to the wider
6. Cf. Morrison (1949:239-253), Carnell (1953:99-117),
Burridge (1957:151-168), Silcock (1965:177-199),
Ratnam (1965) and Rabushka (1973).
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social structure. 	 As van den Berghe (1970:16) explains:
To understand the structure of a plural
society, the first steps in the analysis
are to map out the lines of cleavage
between the groups, to specify the insti-
tutional areas that are shared between
these groups and those that are not, to
establish the form and content of relation-
ships between members of these groups, and
to define in which ways these intergroup
relations differ from relations within the
groups.	 This procedure is equivalent to
study the entire society.
This plea for a holistic approach in no way implies the
worthlessness of narrow specific studies. 	 Narrowly focused
specific studies are perfectly legitimate.
	
What it does
mean, however, is that in order to gatn a correct interpreta-
tion of a situation, one should relri-e it to the wider social
context. To understand the Chinese community in Malaysia,
for instance, one should know the structure of the Malaysian
plural society, including of course the social relations of
production and power relations.
It is also important that we must approach race relations
from a comparative, cross-cultural perspective. 	 At present,
there is a general dearth of sociological studies of race
relations in Malaysia, more particularly cross-cultural
studies. 7	There is, for instance, almost a complete absence
7. However, some sociological studies of race relations
that are worth mentioning include: Charles Hirschman
(1972), Raymond Lee (1975), Sanusi Osman (1972) and
Rabushka (1973).
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of comparative, cross-cultural sociological studies of Over-
seas Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia.	 Much of the
literature on race relations today seems to have concentrated
on Western industrial societies and has been written by
scholars who lack comparative experience (van den Berghe,
1967a:4-5).
	
A comparative, cross-cultural approach is
essential in that it enables us to make broad generalizations
which is a necessary step towards the attempt to construct a
general theory of race relations.
From the theoretical contributions to the study of the
plural societ .:7 we have discussed above and bearing in mind
the importar- of a historico-comparative-macrosociological
approach, it is possible for us to outline some broad genera-
lizations to serve as the basis for our analytical framework.
First, plural societies emerge largely as a result of
colonialism.	 Among the main features of such societies are
political and economic coercion.	 It is political coercion as
well as economic interdependence that hold the plural society
together. Our first task in the study of any plural society
is therefore to examine the various aspects of colonialism,
including its basic political and economic institutions. 	 This
involves not only a historical but also a macro-sociological
perspective.
Second, all plural societies involve some form of
stratification, using the term as Rex suggests in a wider
sense to include all kinds of differentiation and conflict.
Our next task is to look at the stratification and structure
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of plural societies - not merely at the point of production,
but also in the society as a whole.
Third, at least five major groups can be found in plural
societies.	 These are classes, political groups, deference
groups, racial groups and ethnic groups (Cross, 1971:487).
An adequate analysis of race relations should include a
detailed examination of these group divisions, such as the
degree of superimposition that any group may possess, and the
degree of disjunction between groups.
This leads us to the fourth point which has been made by
van den Berghe, namely, in addition to corporate groups, there
are three other levels of pluralism: institution . , values and
individuals.
	 These four levels are interrelated; but to
separate them analytically would enable us to see the dimensions
of pluralism more clearly and systematically.
Fifth and finally, plural situations are characterized by
a relative prominence of conflict and a conspicuous absence of
consensus.
	 This point has been stressed by almost all the
scholars of race relations and plural societies.
	 In view of this,
a conflict model is more likely to bring about a fruitful analysis
than a consensus model.
We are not suggesting, of course, that this framework is
the only one available in terms of which plural societies might
be analysed.
	 Nevertheless, it represents an attempt to
combine some of the useful insights of scholars who have
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had direct experience with plural societies.
	
The framework,
if strictly adhered to, would enable us to acquire a fuller
picture of the complexities of plural societies.
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